GHSA-HWRP-QJ75-RGXM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-01 15:30 – Updated: 2026-10-15 03:35In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: ccp: Don't attempt to copy CSR to userspace if PSP command failed
When retrieving the PEK CSR, don't attempt to copy the blob to userspace if the firmware command failed. If the failure was due to an invalid length, i.e. the userspace buffer+length was too small, copying the number of bytes firmware requires will overflow the kernel-allocated buffer and leak data to userspace.
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in instrument_copy_to_user ../include/linux/instrumented.h:129 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _inline_copy_to_user ../include/linux/uaccess.h:205 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _copy_to_user+0x66/0xa0 ../lib/usercopy.c:26 Read of size 2084 at addr ffff898144612e20 by task syz.9.219/21405
CPU: 14 UID: 0 PID: 21405 Comm: syz.9.219 Tainted: G U O 7.0.0-smp-DEV #28 PREEMPTLAZY Tainted: [U]=USER, [O]=OOT_MODULE Hardware name: Google, Inc. Arcadia_IT_80/Arcadia_IT_80, BIOS 12.62.0-0 11/19/2025 Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl+0xc5/0x110 ../lib/dump_stack.c:120 print_address_description ../mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline] print_report+0xbc/0x260 ../mm/kasan/report.c:482 kasan_report+0xa2/0xe0 ../mm/kasan/report.c:595 check_region_inline ../mm/kasan/generic.c:-1 [inline] kasan_check_range+0x264/0x2c0 ../mm/kasan/generic.c:200 instrument_copy_to_user ../include/linux/instrumented.h:129 [inline] _inline_copy_to_user ../include/linux/uaccess.h:205 [inline] _copy_to_user+0x66/0xa0 ../lib/usercopy.c:26 copy_to_user ../include/linux/uaccess.h:236 [inline] sev_ioctl_do_pek_csr+0x31f/0x590 ../drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c:1872 sev_ioctl+0x3a4/0x490 ../drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c:2562 vfs_ioctl ../fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline] __do_sys_ioctl ../fs/ioctl.c:597 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl+0x11d/0x1b0 ../fs/ioctl.c:583 do_syscall_x64 ../arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xe0/0x800 ../arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
WARN if the driver says the command succeeded, but the firmware error code says otherwise, as __sev_do_cmd_locked() is expected to return -EIO on any firwmware error.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-31699"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-125",
"CWE-787"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-01T14:16:19Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ncrypto: ccp: Don\u0027t attempt to copy CSR to userspace if PSP command failed\n\nWhen retrieving the PEK CSR, don\u0027t attempt to copy the blob to userspace\nif the firmware command failed. If the failure was due to an invalid\nlength, i.e. the userspace buffer+length was too small, copying the number\nof bytes _firmware_ requires will overflow the kernel-allocated buffer and\nleak data to userspace.\n\n BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in instrument_copy_to_user ../include/linux/instrumented.h:129 [inline]\n BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _inline_copy_to_user ../include/linux/uaccess.h:205 [inline]\n BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _copy_to_user+0x66/0xa0 ../lib/usercopy.c:26\n Read of size 2084 at addr ffff898144612e20 by task syz.9.219/21405\n\n CPU: 14 UID: 0 PID: 21405 Comm: syz.9.219 Tainted: G U O 7.0.0-smp-DEV #28 PREEMPTLAZY\n Tainted: [U]=USER, [O]=OOT_MODULE\n Hardware name: Google, Inc. Arcadia_IT_80/Arcadia_IT_80, BIOS 12.62.0-0 11/19/2025\n Call Trace:\n \u003cTASK\u003e\n dump_stack_lvl+0xc5/0x110 ../lib/dump_stack.c:120\n print_address_description ../mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline]\n print_report+0xbc/0x260 ../mm/kasan/report.c:482\n kasan_report+0xa2/0xe0 ../mm/kasan/report.c:595\n check_region_inline ../mm/kasan/generic.c:-1 [inline]\n kasan_check_range+0x264/0x2c0 ../mm/kasan/generic.c:200\n instrument_copy_to_user ../include/linux/instrumented.h:129 [inline]\n _inline_copy_to_user ../include/linux/uaccess.h:205 [inline]\n _copy_to_user+0x66/0xa0 ../lib/usercopy.c:26\n copy_to_user ../include/linux/uaccess.h:236 [inline]\n sev_ioctl_do_pek_csr+0x31f/0x590 ../drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c:1872\n sev_ioctl+0x3a4/0x490 ../drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c:2562\n vfs_ioctl ../fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]\n __do_sys_ioctl ../fs/ioctl.c:597 [inline]\n __se_sys_ioctl+0x11d/0x1b0 ../fs/ioctl.c:583\n do_syscall_x64 ../arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]\n do_syscall_64+0xe0/0x800 ../arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e\n \u003c/TASK\u003e\n\nWARN if the driver says the command succeeded, but the firmware error code\nsays otherwise, as __sev_do_cmd_locked() is expected to return -EIO on any\nfirwmware error.",
"id": "GHSA-hwrp-qj75-rgxm",
"modified": "2026-10-15T03:35:45Z",
"published": "2026-05-01T15:30:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31699"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-784472.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0fb87e44b81385f940b482cba5b3f0bd18fb8185"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/111dcc6d0f016076745824a787d25609d0022f4c"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/372116eece159adff631b1508344c8b85ebf9559"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3b4fd8f15765d9a3105b834dba8a05d025e5e16e"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/502d10a1d9d477e6c7fc7021a2dac7018f4ab8b5"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/59e9ae81f8670ccc780bc75f45a355736f640ec9"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/607ba280f2adb5092cf5386c3935afac2ca0031a"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/abe4a6d6f606113251868c2c4a06ba904bb41eed"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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