GHSA-HHMC-Q9HP-R662

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-07 18:23 – Updated: 2026-08-07 18:23
VLAI
Summary
CodeIgniter: Path traversal in UploadedFile::move() when using client-provided filenames
Details

Impact

In affected versions, calling UploadedFile::move() without a second argument uses the client-provided filename without sanitization. Depending on the destination path and server configuration, an attacker can supply a filename containing path traversal sequences (e.g. ../../public/shell.php) to write uploaded content outside the intended upload directory.

The patch sanitizes this default (no-argument) path.

Note: The patch only sanitizes the filename when no second argument is passed. If your application explicitly passes a client-provided name as the second argument, you remain responsible for sanitizing it - the patch does not (and cannot) sanitize a caller-supplied filename:

// Unsafe - even after upgrading:
$file->move(WRITEPATH . 'uploads', $file->getName());
$file->move(WRITEPATH . 'uploads', $file->getClientName());

Patches

Upgrade to v4.7.4 or later.

Workarounds

If you cannot upgrade immediately, use a generated filename or sanitize the client filename before passing it to move().

Use a generated filename:

$file->move(WRITEPATH . 'uploads', $file->getRandomName());

Or sanitize the client filename before passing it to move():

helper('security');

$name = sanitize_filename($file->getClientName());
$file->move(WRITEPATH . 'uploads', $name);
Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "codeigniter4/framework"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.7.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-63222"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-07T18:23:46Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-31T06:16:31Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\nIn affected versions, calling `UploadedFile::move()` **without a second argument** uses the client-provided filename without sanitization. Depending on the destination path and server configuration, an attacker can supply a filename containing path traversal sequences (e.g. `../../public/shell.php`) to write uploaded content outside the intended upload directory.\n\nThe patch sanitizes this default (no-argument) path.\n\n**Note:** The patch only sanitizes the filename when no second argument is passed. If your application **explicitly** passes a client-provided name as the second argument, you remain responsible for sanitizing it - the patch does not (and cannot) sanitize a caller-supplied filename:\n```php\n// Unsafe - even after upgrading:\n$file-\u003emove(WRITEPATH . \u0027uploads\u0027, $file-\u003egetName());\n$file-\u003emove(WRITEPATH . \u0027uploads\u0027, $file-\u003egetClientName());\n```\n\n### Patches\nUpgrade to v4.7.4 or later.\n\n### Workarounds\nIf you cannot upgrade immediately, use a generated filename or sanitize the client filename before passing it to `move()`.\n\nUse a generated filename:\n```php\n$file-\u003emove(WRITEPATH . \u0027uploads\u0027, $file-\u003egetRandomName());\n```\nOr sanitize the client filename before passing it to `move()`:\n```php\nhelper(\u0027security\u0027);\n\n$name = sanitize_filename($file-\u003egetClientName());\n$file-\u003emove(WRITEPATH . \u0027uploads\u0027, $name);\n```",
  "id": "GHSA-hhmc-q9hp-r662",
  "modified": "2026-08-07T18:23:46Z",
  "published": "2026-08-07T18:23:46Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/codeigniter4/CodeIgniter4/security/advisories/GHSA-hhmc-q9hp-r662"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-63222"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/codeigniter4/CodeIgniter4/commit/20ebcf4694d96d3c97fbc3938e360730e4f54618"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/codeigniter4/CodeIgniter4"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/codeigniter4/CodeIgniter4/releases/tag/v4.7.4"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "CodeIgniter: Path traversal in UploadedFile::move() when using client-provided filenames"
}



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