GHSA-HFCP-QWVJ-9247
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-25 12:31 – Updated: 2026-07-27 06:30In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: arm64: Bound used_lrs when flushing the pKVM hyp vCPU
flush_hyp_vcpu() copies the host vGIC state into the hyp's private vCPU on every run. The vGIC list register save and restore use used_lrs as their loop bound and expect it to stay within the number of implemented list registers. While this is generally the case, flush_hyp_vcpu() copies vgic_v3 verbatim and does not enforce this, so a value provided by the host is used at EL2 to index vgic_lr[] and access ICH_LR_EL2 (host -> EL2).
Fix by clamping used_lrs to the number of implemented list registers after the copy, as the trusted path already does in vgic_flush_lr_state(). The number of implemented list registers is constant after init, so it is replicated once from kvm_vgic_global_state.nr_lr into hyp_gicv3_nr_lr rather than read on every entry.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-64287"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-125"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-25T10:17:09Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nKVM: arm64: Bound used_lrs when flushing the pKVM hyp vCPU\n\nflush_hyp_vcpu() copies the host vGIC state into the hyp\u0027s private vCPU\non every run. The vGIC list register save and restore use used_lrs as\ntheir loop bound and expect it to stay within the number of implemented\nlist registers. While this is generally the case, flush_hyp_vcpu()\ncopies vgic_v3 verbatim and does not enforce this, so a value provided\nby the host is used at EL2 to index vgic_lr[] and access ICH_LR\u003cn\u003e_EL2\n(host -\u003e EL2).\n\nFix by clamping used_lrs to the number of implemented list registers\nafter the copy, as the trusted path already does in\nvgic_flush_lr_state(). The number of implemented list registers is\nconstant after init, so it is replicated once from\nkvm_vgic_global_state.nr_lr into hyp_gicv3_nr_lr rather than read on\nevery entry.",
"id": "GHSA-hfcp-qwvj-9247",
"modified": "2026-07-27T06:30:31Z",
"published": "2026-07-25T12:31:29Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64287"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2c5e72b9fbf83fdfa724e9f1af0f418ccf8739b8"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7fca3fcef81c713bc82a37bf741e0f28e6d04a6f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8cc8bbbfab14c22c5551d0dd19b208a44b141c76"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9fa301d8298778dd799fa4dcf7a7f440715d146e"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c646431865f4b1a5b14067233fa27b11e05e0d46"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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