GHSA-HF5G-MJ3F-66C7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-18 18:32 – Updated: 2026-10-18 18:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rtc: ac100: Assign .num before accessing .hws
Commit f316cdff8d67 ("clk: Annotate struct clk_hw_onecell_data with __counted_by") annotated the hws member of 'struct clk_hw_onecell_data' with __counted_by, which informs the bounds sanitizer (UBSAN_BOUNDS) about the number of elements in .hws[], so that it can warn when .hws[] is accessed out of bounds. As noted in that change, the __counted_by member must be initialized with the number of elements before the first array access happens, otherwise there will be a warning from each access prior to the initialization because the number of elements is zero. This occurs in ac100_rtc_register_clks() due to .num being assigned only after every clkout clock has been stored in .hws[]. With CONFIG_UBSAN_BOUNDS and a compiler that implements __counted_by (GCC 15.1+ or Clang 20.1+), this triggers an array-index-out-of-bounds report during probe, and with CONFIG_UBSAN_TRAP the first store traps.
Initialize .num with AC100_CLKOUT_NUM, the number of elements .hws[] was allocated with, right after the allocation. That is the value the loop counter ends up at on the success path anyway, so the provider's behaviour is unchanged.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-98848"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-18T16:17:39Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nrtc: ac100: Assign .num before accessing .hws\n\nCommit f316cdff8d67 (\"clk: Annotate struct clk_hw_onecell_data with\n__counted_by\") annotated the hws member of \u0027struct clk_hw_onecell_data\u0027\nwith __counted_by, which informs the bounds sanitizer (UBSAN_BOUNDS)\nabout the number of elements in .hws[], so that it can warn when .hws[]\nis accessed out of bounds. As noted in that change, the __counted_by\nmember must be initialized with the number of elements before the first\narray access happens, otherwise there will be a warning from each access\nprior to the initialization because the number of elements is zero.\nThis occurs in ac100_rtc_register_clks() due to .num being assigned only\nafter every clkout clock has been stored in .hws[]. With\nCONFIG_UBSAN_BOUNDS and a compiler that implements __counted_by (GCC\n15.1+ or Clang 20.1+), this triggers an array-index-out-of-bounds report\nduring probe, and with CONFIG_UBSAN_TRAP the first store traps.\n\nInitialize .num with AC100_CLKOUT_NUM, the number of elements .hws[] was\nallocated with, right after the allocation. That is the value the loop\ncounter ends up at on the success path anyway, so the provider\u0027s\nbehaviour is unchanged.",
"id": "GHSA-hf5g-mj3f-66c7",
"modified": "2026-10-18T18:32:06Z",
"published": "2026-10-18T18:32:06Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-98848"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/160619b38707241e22569f9c983a4b3d0890996a"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6a4117eee82dd85f11bf898bf66026764011eeb6"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6bb55381daf1a1bed0657189a1396e7467712525"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ad1bf77039cba83373bf1eff3784655e3e3ed2ab"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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