GHSA-HF5G-MJ3F-66C7

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-18 18:32 – Updated: 2026-10-18 18:32
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

rtc: ac100: Assign .num before accessing .hws

Commit f316cdff8d67 ("clk: Annotate struct clk_hw_onecell_data with __counted_by") annotated the hws member of 'struct clk_hw_onecell_data' with __counted_by, which informs the bounds sanitizer (UBSAN_BOUNDS) about the number of elements in .hws[], so that it can warn when .hws[] is accessed out of bounds. As noted in that change, the __counted_by member must be initialized with the number of elements before the first array access happens, otherwise there will be a warning from each access prior to the initialization because the number of elements is zero. This occurs in ac100_rtc_register_clks() due to .num being assigned only after every clkout clock has been stored in .hws[]. With CONFIG_UBSAN_BOUNDS and a compiler that implements __counted_by (GCC 15.1+ or Clang 20.1+), this triggers an array-index-out-of-bounds report during probe, and with CONFIG_UBSAN_TRAP the first store traps.

Initialize .num with AC100_CLKOUT_NUM, the number of elements .hws[] was allocated with, right after the allocation. That is the value the loop counter ends up at on the success path anyway, so the provider's behaviour is unchanged.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-98848"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-10-18T16:17:39Z",
    "severity": null
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nrtc: ac100: Assign .num before accessing .hws\n\nCommit f316cdff8d67 (\"clk: Annotate struct clk_hw_onecell_data with\n__counted_by\") annotated the hws member of \u0027struct clk_hw_onecell_data\u0027\nwith __counted_by, which informs the bounds sanitizer (UBSAN_BOUNDS)\nabout the number of elements in .hws[], so that it can warn when .hws[]\nis accessed out of bounds. As noted in that change, the __counted_by\nmember must be initialized with the number of elements before the first\narray access happens, otherwise there will be a warning from each access\nprior to the initialization because the number of elements is zero.\nThis occurs in ac100_rtc_register_clks() due to .num being assigned only\nafter every clkout clock has been stored in .hws[]. With\nCONFIG_UBSAN_BOUNDS and a compiler that implements __counted_by (GCC\n15.1+ or Clang 20.1+), this triggers an array-index-out-of-bounds report\nduring probe, and with CONFIG_UBSAN_TRAP the first store traps.\n\nInitialize .num with AC100_CLKOUT_NUM, the number of elements .hws[] was\nallocated with, right after the allocation. That is the value the loop\ncounter ends up at on the success path anyway, so the provider\u0027s\nbehaviour is unchanged.",
  "id": "GHSA-hf5g-mj3f-66c7",
  "modified": "2026-10-18T18:32:06Z",
  "published": "2026-10-18T18:32:06Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-98848"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/160619b38707241e22569f9c983a4b3d0890996a"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6a4117eee82dd85f11bf898bf66026764011eeb6"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6bb55381daf1a1bed0657189a1396e7467712525"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ad1bf77039cba83373bf1eff3784655e3e3ed2ab"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}



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