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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://db.gcve.eu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 19 Oct 2026 23:37:45 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-98848 — rtc: ac100: Assign .num before accessing .hws</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-98848</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;rtc: ac100: Assign .num before accessing .hws&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Commit f316cdff8d67 (&amp;#34;clk: Annotate struct clk_hw_onecell_data with
__counted_by&amp;#34;) annotated the hws member of &amp;#39;struct clk_hw_onecell_data&amp;#39;
with __counted_by, which informs the bounds sanitizer (UBSAN_BOUNDS)
about the number of elements in .hws[], so that it can warn when .hws[]
is accessed out of bounds. As noted in that change, the __counted_by
member must be initialized with the number of elements before the first
array access happens, otherwise there will be a warning from each access
prior to the initialization because the number of elements is zero.
This occurs in ac100_rtc_register_clks() due to .num being assigned only
after every clkout clock has been stored in .hws[]. With
CONFIG_UBSAN_BOUNDS and a compiler that implements __counted_by (GCC
15.1+ or Clang 20.1+), this triggers an array-index-out-of-bounds report
during probe, and with CONFIG_UBSAN_TRAP the first store traps.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Initialize .num with AC100_CLKOUT_NUM, the number of elements .hws[] was
allocated with, right after the allocation. That is the value the loop
counter ends up at on the success path anyway, so the provider&amp;#39;s
behaviour is unchanged.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;rtc: ac100: Assign .num before accessing .hws&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Commit f316cdff8d67 (&amp;#34;clk: Annotate struct clk_hw_onecell_data with
__counted_by&amp;#34;) annotated the hws member of &amp;#39;struct clk_hw_onecell_data&amp;#39;
with __counted_by, which informs the bounds sanitizer (UBSAN_BOUNDS)
about the number of elements in .hws[], so that it can warn when .hws[]
is accessed out of bounds. As noted in that change, the __counted_by
member must be initialized with the number of elements before the first
array access happens, otherwise there will be a warning from each access
prior to the initialization because the number of elements is zero.
This occurs in ac100_rtc_register_clks() due to .num being assigned only
after every clkout clock has been stored in .hws[]. With
CONFIG_UBSAN_BOUNDS and a compiler that implements __counted_by (GCC
15.1+ or Clang 20.1+), this triggers an array-index-out-of-bounds report
during probe, and with CONFIG_UBSAN_TRAP the first store traps.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Initialize .num with AC100_CLKOUT_NUM, the number of elements .hws[] was
allocated with, right after the allocation. That is the value the loop
counter ends up at on the success path anyway, so the provider&amp;#39;s
behaviour is unchanged.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-98848</guid>
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