GHSA-H6V6-RG66-FQJ4

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-12 20:52 – Updated: 2026-11-12 20:52
VLAI
Summary
Loofah: Mutation XSS in the HTML5 scrubbers through unescaped attribute values
Details

Summary

Loofah's HTML5 scrubbers could emit output that a browser parses into different markup, allowing mutation XSS. Nokogiri < 1.19.5 did not escape < and > in attribute values. When the output contained certain MathML, a browser treated markup inside an allowed attribute as live HTML. The :strip scrubber is affected in every browser. The :prune and :escape scrubbers are affected in WebKit browsers such as Safari.

Nokogiri 1.19.5 escapes < and > in attribute values, as the HTML standard requires. Loofah 2.25.3 requires Nokogiri >= 1.19.5.

Impact

Applications that sanitize untrusted HTML with Loofah's HTML5 API (Loofah.html5_fragment, Loofah.html5_document and the scrub_html5_* methods) and display the result to other people are affected, including with the default allowlist.

Not affected: Loofah's HTML4 API (including Loofah::Helpers.sanitize), the :whitewash scrubber, rails-html-sanitizer's default configuration, and JRuby.

Mitigation

Upgrade to Loofah >= 2.25.3, or upgrade Nokogiri to >= 1.19.5.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "RubyGems",
        "name": "loofah"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.21.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.25.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-126203"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-116",
      "CWE-79"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-11-12T20:52:09Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nLoofah\u0027s HTML5 scrubbers could emit output that a browser parses into different markup, allowing mutation XSS. Nokogiri \u003c 1.19.5 did not escape `\u003c` and `\u003e` in attribute values. When the output contained certain MathML, a browser treated markup inside an allowed attribute as live HTML. The `:strip` scrubber is affected in every browser. The `:prune` and `:escape` scrubbers are affected in WebKit browsers such as Safari.\n\nNokogiri 1.19.5 escapes `\u003c` and `\u003e` in attribute values, as the HTML standard requires. Loofah 2.25.3 requires Nokogiri \u003e= 1.19.5.\n\n## Impact\n\nApplications that sanitize untrusted HTML with Loofah\u0027s HTML5 API (`Loofah.html5_fragment`, `Loofah.html5_document` and the `scrub_html5_*` methods) and display the result to other people are affected, including with the default allowlist.\n\nNot affected: Loofah\u0027s HTML4 API (including `Loofah::Helpers.sanitize`), the `:whitewash` scrubber, rails-html-sanitizer\u0027s default configuration, and JRuby.\n\n## Mitigation\n\nUpgrade to Loofah \u003e= 2.25.3, or upgrade Nokogiri to \u003e= 1.19.5.",
  "id": "GHSA-h6v6-rg66-fqj4",
  "modified": "2026-11-12T20:52:09Z",
  "published": "2026-11-12T20:52:09Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/flavorjones/loofah/security/advisories/GHSA-h6v6-rg66-fqj4"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/flavorjones/loofah/pull/324"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/sparklemotion/nokogiri/pull/3741"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/flavorjones/loofah/commit/7ba1e7b77e043fb7dc832ef746fcbf83137135e6"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/sparklemotion/nokogiri/commit/635abc8d65c75d594ddf8957fbfbfd822c2c0dbd"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/flavorjones/loofah"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/flavorjones/loofah/releases/tag/v2.25.3"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/rubysec/ruby-advisory-db/blob/master/gems/loofah/GHSA-h6v6-rg66-fqj4.yml"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/sparklemotion/nokogiri/releases/tag/v1.19.5"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Loofah: Mutation XSS in the HTML5 scrubbers through unescaped attribute values"
}



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