GHSA-H67P-54HQ-RP68

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-15 17:15 – Updated: 2026-06-29 15:05
VLAI
Summary
JS-YAML: Quadratic-complexity DoS in merge key handling via repeated aliases
Details

Summary

A crafted YAML document can trigger algorithmic CPU exhaustion in js-yaml merge-key processing (<<) by repeating the same alias many times in a merge sequence.
This causes quadratic parse-time behavior relative to input size and can block a Node.js worker/event loop for seconds with a relatively small payload (tens of KB), resulting in denial of service.

Details

The issue is in merge handling inside lib/loader.js:

  • storeMappingPair(...) iterates every element of a merge sequence when key tag is tag:yaml.org,2002:merge.
  • For each element, it calls mergeMappings(...).
  • mergeMappings(...) computes Object.keys(source) and performs _hasOwnProperty.call(destination, key) checks for each key.

When input is of the form:

a: &a {k0:0, k1:0, ..., kK:0} b: {<<: [*a, *a, *a, ... repeated M times ...]} all *a entries refer to the same anchored object. After the first merge, subsequent merges are semantically no-ops, but the parser still reprocesses all keys each time. Resulting work is O(K * M), while input size is O(K + M), giving quadratic scaling as payload grows. Relevant code path: lib/loader.js in storeMappingPair(...) merge branch (keyTag === 'tag:yaml.org,2002:merge') lib/loader.js mergeMappings(...)

Root cause

File: lib/loader.js Function: storeMappingPair(state, _result, overridableKeys, keyTag, keyNode, valueNode, startLine, startLineStart, startPos) Lines: ~359-366

if (keyTag === 'tag:yaml.org,2002:merge') {
  if (Array.isArray(valueNode)) {
    for (index = 0, quantity = valueNode.length; index < quantity; index += 1) {
      mergeMappings(state, _result, valueNode[index], overridableKeys);
    }
  } else {
    mergeMappings(state, _result, valueNode, overridableKeys);
  }
}

When the merge value is a sequence (YAML 1.1 <<: [ *a, *a, ... ]), each element is handed to mergeMappings() without deduplication. mergeMappings() then does

sourceKeys = Object.keys(source);
for (index = 0; index < sourceKeys.length; index += 1) {
  key = sourceKeys[index];
  if (!_hasOwnProperty.call(destination, key)) {
    setProperty(destination, key, source[key]);
    overridableKeys[key] = true;
  }
}

Every alias reference in the sequence resolves (by design) to the SAME object via state.anchorMap. After the first merge, every subsequent merge of that same reference is a pure no-op semantically, but still performs:

  • one Object.keys(source) call (O(K))
  • K _hasOwnProperty.call checks on the destination

Total: M * K hasOwnProperty checks + M Object.keys allocations, while the final object and all observable side effects are identical to a single merge.

YAML semantics for <<: are idempotent and commutative over duplicate sources, so collapsing duplicates preserves behavior exactly; this isn't a spec trade-off.

PoC

Environment: js-yaml version: 4.1.1 Node.js: v24.5.0 Platform: arm64 macOS (reproduced consistently) Reproduction script: Create many keys in one anchored map (&a). Merge that same alias repeatedly via <<: [*a, *a, ...]. Measure parse time and compare with control payload using single merge (<<: *a). Observed repeated runs (same machine): K=M=1000, input 9,909 bytes: ~33–36 ms K=M=2000, input 20,909 bytes: ~121–123 ms K=M=4000, input 42,909 bytes: ~524–537 ms K=M=6000, input 64,909 bytes: ~1,608–1,829 ms K=M=8000, input 86,909 bytes: ~3,395–3,565 ms Control (single merge, similar key counts): K=2000: ~1–2 ms K=4000: ~3 ms K=8000: ~5 ms Also verified: repeated-merge output equals single-merge output (same key count and same JSON), confirming excess time is redundant computation.

Impact

This is a denial-of-service vulnerability (CPU exhaustion / algorithmic complexity). Any service parsing untrusted YAML with js-yaml can be impacted, including API backends, CI tools, config processors, and automation services. An attacker can submit crafted YAML to significantly increase CPU time and reduce availability.

Suggested fix:

Dedupe the merge source list by reference before invoking mergeMappings. Any of the following are minimal and preserve YAML 1.1 merge semantics:

dedupe in storeMappingPair:

if (keyTag === 'tag:yaml.org,2002:merge') {
  if (Array.isArray(valueNode)) {
    var seen = new Set();
    for (index = 0, quantity = valueNode.length; index < quantity; index += 1) {
      var src = valueNode[index];
      if (seen.has(src)) continue;   // idempotent; skip redundant alias
      seen.add(src);
      mergeMappings(state, _result, src, overridableKeys);
    }
  } else {
    mergeMappings(state, _result, valueNode, overridableKeys);
  }
}
Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.1.1"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "js-yaml"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "4.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.2.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "js-yaml"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.15.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-53550"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-407"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-15T17:15:07Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-22T16:16:38Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nA crafted YAML document can trigger algorithmic CPU exhaustion in `js-yaml` merge-key processing (`\u003c\u003c`) by repeating the same alias many times in a merge sequence.  \nThis causes quadratic parse-time behavior relative to input size and can block a Node.js worker/event loop for seconds with a relatively small payload (tens of KB), resulting in denial of service.\n\n### Details\nThe issue is in merge handling inside `lib/loader.js`:\n\n- `storeMappingPair(...)` iterates every element of a merge sequence when key tag is `tag:yaml.org,2002:merge`.\n- For each element, it calls `mergeMappings(...)`.\n- `mergeMappings(...)` computes `Object.keys(source)` and performs `_hasOwnProperty.call(destination, key)` checks for each key.\n\nWhen input is of the form:\n\na: \u0026a {k0:0, k1:0, ..., kK:0}\nb: {\u003c\u003c: [*a, *a, *a, ... repeated M times ...]}\nall *a entries refer to the same anchored object. After the first merge, subsequent merges are semantically no-ops, but the parser still reprocesses all keys each time.\nResulting work is O(K * M), while input size is O(K + M), giving quadratic scaling as payload grows.\nRelevant code path:\nlib/loader.js in storeMappingPair(...) merge branch (keyTag === \u0027tag:yaml.org,2002:merge\u0027)\nlib/loader.js mergeMappings(...)\n\n\n### Root cause\nFile:       lib/loader.js\nFunction:   storeMappingPair(state, _result, overridableKeys, keyTag, keyNode,\n                             valueNode, startLine, startLineStart, startPos)\nLines:      ~359-366\n\n    if (keyTag === \u0027tag:yaml.org,2002:merge\u0027) {\n      if (Array.isArray(valueNode)) {\n        for (index = 0, quantity = valueNode.length; index \u003c quantity; index += 1) {\n          mergeMappings(state, _result, valueNode[index], overridableKeys);\n        }\n      } else {\n        mergeMappings(state, _result, valueNode, overridableKeys);\n      }\n    }\n\nWhen the merge value is a sequence (YAML 1.1 \u003c\u003c: [ *a, *a, ... ]), each element\nis handed to mergeMappings() without deduplication. mergeMappings() then does\n\n    sourceKeys = Object.keys(source);\n    for (index = 0; index \u003c sourceKeys.length; index += 1) {\n      key = sourceKeys[index];\n      if (!_hasOwnProperty.call(destination, key)) {\n        setProperty(destination, key, source[key]);\n        overridableKeys[key] = true;\n      }\n    }\n\nEvery alias reference in the sequence resolves (by design) to the SAME object\nvia state.anchorMap. After the first merge, every subsequent merge of that same\nreference is a pure no-op semantically, but still performs:\n\n  * one Object.keys(source) call (O(K))\n  * K _hasOwnProperty.call checks on the destination\n\nTotal: M * K hasOwnProperty checks + M Object.keys allocations, while the final\nobject and all observable side effects are identical to a single merge.\n\nYAML semantics for `\u003c\u003c:` are idempotent and commutative over duplicate sources,\nso collapsing duplicates preserves behavior exactly; this isn\u0027t a spec trade-off.\n\n\n### PoC\nEnvironment:\njs-yaml version: 4.1.1\nNode.js: v24.5.0\nPlatform: arm64 macOS (reproduced consistently)\nReproduction script:\nCreate many keys in one anchored map (\u0026a).\nMerge that same alias repeatedly via \u003c\u003c: [*a, *a, ...].\nMeasure parse time and compare with control payload using single merge (\u003c\u003c: *a).\nObserved repeated runs (same machine):\nK=M=1000, input 9,909 bytes: ~33\u201336 ms\nK=M=2000, input 20,909 bytes: ~121\u2013123 ms\nK=M=4000, input 42,909 bytes: ~524\u2013537 ms\nK=M=6000, input 64,909 bytes: ~1,608\u20131,829 ms\nK=M=8000, input 86,909 bytes: ~3,395\u20133,565 ms\nControl (single merge, similar key counts):\nK=2000: ~1\u20132 ms\nK=4000: ~3 ms\nK=8000: ~5 ms\nAlso verified: repeated-merge output equals single-merge output (same key count and same JSON), confirming excess time is redundant computation.\n\n\n### Impact\nThis is a denial-of-service vulnerability (CPU exhaustion / algorithmic complexity).\nAny service parsing untrusted YAML with js-yaml can be impacted, including API backends, CI tools, config processors, and automation services. An attacker can submit crafted YAML to significantly increase CPU time and reduce availability.\n\n### Suggested fix:\nDedupe the merge source list by reference before invoking mergeMappings. Any of\nthe following are minimal and preserve YAML 1.1 merge semantics:\n\ndedupe in storeMappingPair:\n\n    if (keyTag === \u0027tag:yaml.org,2002:merge\u0027) {\n      if (Array.isArray(valueNode)) {\n        var seen = new Set();\n        for (index = 0, quantity = valueNode.length; index \u003c quantity; index += 1) {\n          var src = valueNode[index];\n          if (seen.has(src)) continue;   // idempotent; skip redundant alias\n          seen.add(src);\n          mergeMappings(state, _result, src, overridableKeys);\n        }\n      } else {\n        mergeMappings(state, _result, valueNode, overridableKeys);\n      }\n    }",
  "id": "GHSA-h67p-54hq-rp68",
  "modified": "2026-06-29T15:05:57Z",
  "published": "2026-06-15T17:15:07Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nodeca/js-yaml/security/advisories/GHSA-h67p-54hq-rp68"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-53550"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/nodeca/js-yaml"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "JS-YAML: Quadratic-complexity DoS in merge key handling via repeated aliases"
}



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