GHSA-GC3M-RHHG-QFW6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-01 15:30 – Updated: 2026-05-03 09:33In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vt: discard stale unicode buffer on alt screen exit after resize
When enter_alt_screen() saves vc_uni_lines into vc_saved_uni_lines and sets vc_uni_lines to NULL, a subsequent console resize via vc_do_resize() skips reallocating the unicode buffer because vc_uni_lines is NULL. However, vc_saved_uni_lines still points to the old buffer allocated for the original dimensions.
When leave_alt_screen() later restores vc_saved_uni_lines, the buffer dimensions no longer match vc_rows/vc_cols. Any operation that iterates over the unicode buffer using the current dimensions (e.g. csi_J clearing the screen) will access memory out of bounds, causing a kernel oops:
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 0x0000002000000020 RIP: 0010:csi_J+0x133/0x2d0
The faulting address 0x0000002000000020 is two adjacent u32 space characters (0x20) interpreted as a pointer, read from the row data area past the end of the 25-entry pointer array in a buffer allocated for 80x25 but accessed with 240x67 dimensions.
Fix this by checking whether the console dimensions changed while in the alternate screen. If they did, free the stale saved buffer instead of restoring it. The unicode screen will be lazily rebuilt via vc_uniscr_check() when next needed.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-31742"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-125"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-01T15:16:36Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nvt: discard stale unicode buffer on alt screen exit after resize\n\nWhen enter_alt_screen() saves vc_uni_lines into vc_saved_uni_lines and\nsets vc_uni_lines to NULL, a subsequent console resize via vc_do_resize()\nskips reallocating the unicode buffer because vc_uni_lines is NULL.\nHowever, vc_saved_uni_lines still points to the old buffer allocated for\nthe original dimensions.\n\nWhen leave_alt_screen() later restores vc_saved_uni_lines, the buffer\ndimensions no longer match vc_rows/vc_cols. Any operation that iterates\nover the unicode buffer using the current dimensions (e.g. csi_J clearing\nthe screen) will access memory out of bounds, causing a kernel oops:\n\n BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 0x0000002000000020\n RIP: 0010:csi_J+0x133/0x2d0\n\nThe faulting address 0x0000002000000020 is two adjacent u32 space\ncharacters (0x20) interpreted as a pointer, read from the row data area\npast the end of the 25-entry pointer array in a buffer allocated for\n80x25 but accessed with 240x67 dimensions.\n\nFix this by checking whether the console dimensions changed while in the\nalternate screen. If they did, free the stale saved buffer instead of\nrestoring it. The unicode screen will be lazily rebuilt via\nvc_uniscr_check() when next needed.",
"id": "GHSA-gc3m-rhhg-qfw6",
"modified": "2026-05-03T09:33:10Z",
"published": "2026-05-01T15:30:34Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31742"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/40014493cece72a0be5672cd86763e53fb3ec613"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/428fdf55301e6c8fa5a36b426240797b1cf86570"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/891d790fdb5c96c6e1d2841e06ee6c360f2d1288"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.