GHSA-G6J7-PFFP-8WHG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-07 16:05 – Updated: 2026-10-07 16:05Summary
The deploy/api.py module generates Python server code by directly interpolating the agents_file parameter into an f-string that is then written to a file and executed via subprocess.Popen(). An attacker who controls the agents_file value (via CLI argument, configuration, or upstream API) can inject arbitrary Python code.
Details
src/praisonai/praisonai/deploy/api.py (line 80):
code = f'''...
praisonai = PraisonAI(agent_file="{agents_file}")
...
"agent_file": "{agents_file}"
...'''
The generated code is then executed (line 190):
subprocess.Popen(['python', server_file])
agents_file is never sanitized or validated. A malicious value breaks out of the string context:
agents_file = '"); import os; os.system("id"); #'
# Generated code becomes:
# praisonai = PraisonAI(agent_file=""); import os; os.system("id"); #")
The same pattern exists in deploy/docker.py (line 33) for Dockerfile generation.
PoC
# The injection:
agents_file = '"); import os; os.system("id"); #'
# What the generated code looks like:
template = f'praisonai = PraisonAI(agent_file="{agents_file}")'
print(template)
# Output: praisonai = PraisonAI(agent_file=""); import os; os.system("id"); #")
Impact
- Arbitrary code execution on the machine running the deploy command
- Supply chain risk if
agents_filecomes from a configuration file or CI/CD pipeline
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.6.77"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "PraisonAI"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.6.78"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-62176"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-94"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-07T16:05:53Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "### Summary\nThe `deploy/api.py` module generates Python server code by directly interpolating the `agents_file` parameter into an f-string that is then written to a file and executed via `subprocess.Popen()`. An attacker who controls the `agents_file` value (via CLI argument, configuration, or upstream API) can inject arbitrary Python code.\n\n### Details\n\n`src/praisonai/praisonai/deploy/api.py` (line 80):\n\n```python\ncode = f\u0027\u0027\u0027...\n praisonai = PraisonAI(agent_file=\"{agents_file}\")\n...\n \"agent_file\": \"{agents_file}\"\n...\u0027\u0027\u0027\n```\n\nThe generated code is then executed (line 190):\n```python\nsubprocess.Popen([\u0027python\u0027, server_file])\n```\n\n`agents_file` is never sanitized or validated. A malicious value breaks out of the string context:\n\n```python\nagents_file = \u0027\"); import os; os.system(\"id\"); #\u0027\n# Generated code becomes:\n# praisonai = PraisonAI(agent_file=\"\"); import os; os.system(\"id\"); #\")\n```\n\nThe same pattern exists in `deploy/docker.py` (line 33) for Dockerfile generation.\n\n\n### PoC\n\n```python\n# The injection:\nagents_file = \u0027\"); import os; os.system(\"id\"); #\u0027\n\n# What the generated code looks like:\ntemplate = f\u0027praisonai = PraisonAI(agent_file=\"{agents_file}\")\u0027\nprint(template)\n# Output: praisonai = PraisonAI(agent_file=\"\"); import os; os.system(\"id\"); #\")\n```\n\n### Impact\n- **Arbitrary code execution** on the machine running the deploy command\n- **Supply chain risk** if `agents_file` comes from a configuration file or CI/CD pipeline",
"id": "GHSA-g6j7-pffp-8whg",
"modified": "2026-10-07T16:05:53Z",
"published": "2026-10-07T16:05:53Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-g6j7-pffp-8whg"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "PraisonAI: Code Injection via f-string Interpolation in Deploy API Server Generation"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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