GHSA-G2WM-735Q-3F56

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-11 21:31 – Updated: 2026-05-18 17:48
VLAI
Summary
cowlib: Cookie Request Header Injection via Unvalidated Encoder in cow_cookie:cookie/1
Details

Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences ('CRLF Injection') vulnerability in ninenines cowlib allows HTTP request splitting and cookie smuggling via unvalidated cookie name and value fields.

cow_cookie:cookie/1 in cowlib builds a client-side Cookie: request header from a list of name-value pairs without validating either field. An attacker who controls the cookie names or values passed to this function can inject ;, ,, CR, LF, or TAB characters into the serialized header. This enables two classes of attack: cookie smuggling within a single header (e.g. injecting "; admin=1" to introduce a phantom cookie that the receiving server treats as authentic) and HTTP request header splitting (injecting CRLF to append arbitrary headers or smuggle a complete second request against a shared upstream proxy). The decoder side (parse_cookie_name/1, parse_cookie_value/1) and setcookie/3 already validate and reject these characters; the encoder alone is missing the check.

This issue affects cowlib from 2.9.0.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Hex",
        "name": "cowlib"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.9.0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "2.16.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-43969"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-93"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-18T17:48:35Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-11T19:16:25Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences (\u0027CRLF Injection\u0027) vulnerability in ninenines cowlib allows HTTP request splitting and cookie smuggling via unvalidated cookie name and value fields.\n\ncow_cookie:cookie/1 in cowlib builds a client-side Cookie: request header from a list of name-value pairs without validating either field. An attacker who controls the cookie names or values passed to this function can inject ;, ,, CR, LF, or TAB characters into the serialized header. This enables two classes of attack: cookie smuggling within a single header (e.g. injecting \"; admin=1\" to introduce a phantom cookie that the receiving server treats as authentic) and HTTP request header splitting (injecting CRLF to append arbitrary headers or smuggle a complete second request against a shared upstream proxy). The decoder side (parse_cookie_name/1, parse_cookie_value/1) and setcookie/3 already validate and reject these characters; the encoder alone is missing the check.\n\nThis issue affects cowlib from 2.9.0.",
  "id": "GHSA-g2wm-735q-3f56",
  "modified": "2026-05-18T17:48:35Z",
  "published": "2026-05-11T21:31:34Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-43969"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/erlef/cowlib/commit/177953dd51540da11090666c1f007214127a1144"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-43969.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/ninenines/cowlib"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-43969"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:L/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "cowlib: Cookie Request Header Injection via Unvalidated Encoder in cow_cookie:cookie/1"
}


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