GHSA-G2WM-735Q-3F56
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-11 21:31 – Updated: 2026-05-18 17:48Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences ('CRLF Injection') vulnerability in ninenines cowlib allows HTTP request splitting and cookie smuggling via unvalidated cookie name and value fields.
cow_cookie:cookie/1 in cowlib builds a client-side Cookie: request header from a list of name-value pairs without validating either field. An attacker who controls the cookie names or values passed to this function can inject ;, ,, CR, LF, or TAB characters into the serialized header. This enables two classes of attack: cookie smuggling within a single header (e.g. injecting "; admin=1" to introduce a phantom cookie that the receiving server treats as authentic) and HTTP request header splitting (injecting CRLF to append arbitrary headers or smuggle a complete second request against a shared upstream proxy). The decoder side (parse_cookie_name/1, parse_cookie_value/1) and setcookie/3 already validate and reject these characters; the encoder alone is missing the check.
This issue affects cowlib from 2.9.0.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Hex",
"name": "cowlib"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.9.0"
},
{
"last_affected": "2.16.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-43969"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-93"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-18T17:48:35Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-11T19:16:25Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences (\u0027CRLF Injection\u0027) vulnerability in ninenines cowlib allows HTTP request splitting and cookie smuggling via unvalidated cookie name and value fields.\n\ncow_cookie:cookie/1 in cowlib builds a client-side Cookie: request header from a list of name-value pairs without validating either field. An attacker who controls the cookie names or values passed to this function can inject ;, ,, CR, LF, or TAB characters into the serialized header. This enables two classes of attack: cookie smuggling within a single header (e.g. injecting \"; admin=1\" to introduce a phantom cookie that the receiving server treats as authentic) and HTTP request header splitting (injecting CRLF to append arbitrary headers or smuggle a complete second request against a shared upstream proxy). The decoder side (parse_cookie_name/1, parse_cookie_value/1) and setcookie/3 already validate and reject these characters; the encoder alone is missing the check.\n\nThis issue affects cowlib from 2.9.0.",
"id": "GHSA-g2wm-735q-3f56",
"modified": "2026-05-18T17:48:35Z",
"published": "2026-05-11T21:31:34Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-43969"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/erlef/cowlib/commit/177953dd51540da11090666c1f007214127a1144"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-43969.html"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/ninenines/cowlib"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-43969"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:L/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "cowlib: Cookie Request Header Injection via Unvalidated Encoder in cow_cookie:cookie/1"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.