{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "mcp-memory-keeper"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.13.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-54561"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-209",
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-17T19:23:07Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n\n`context_import` passed the caller-supplied `filePath` directly to `fs.readFileSync` with no path confinement. A malicious MCP client \u2014 or an LLM agent that is prompt-injected into calling the tool \u2014 could point `filePath` at **any file readable by the server process**, outside any session or export directory:\n\n- **Full disclosure (JSON files):** a valid-JSON target (e.g. another user\u0027s exported session, or a `*.json` credential / service-account file) is parsed and imported into the caller\u0027s session, then retrievable verbatim via `context_get` / `context_export`.\n- **Partial disclosure (any file):** for a non-JSON target (e.g. `/etc/passwd`, an SSH key, a `.env`), `JSON.parse` throws and V8 includes a snippet of the file\u0027s leading bytes in the `SyntaxError` message, which was returned verbatim to the caller.\n\nBoth `../` traversal and absolute paths worked \u2014 there was no path confinement of any kind.\n\nIn a typical MCP deployment the server runs on the developer\u0027s machine, so the reachable set includes other users\u0027 exported memory sessions, JSON credential/config files, and (in leading-bytes form) `.env` files, SSH keys, and `/etc/passwd`. The trigger is a tool argument, so the realistic threat model is an LLM agent prompt-injected into calling `context_import`, or any MCP client connected to the server.\n\n### Patches\n\nFixed in **0.13.0** (PR #36):\n\n- Imports are confined to a server-owned exports directory (`\u003cDATA_DIR\u003e/exports`, overridable via `MEMORY_KEEPER_EXPORT_DIR`), resolved with `realpathSync`. `../` traversal, absolute paths outside the directory, and symlink escapes are all rejected.\n- File read and `JSON.parse` are separate operations; read/parse failures return a generic message and never echo file bytes (the `SyntaxError`-message leak is gone). The database-write path is likewise generic.\n- An E2E security regression suite covers the reported arbitrary-read and traversal vectors, plus symlink escape, the directory-prefix boundary, and a no-existence-oracle check.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nUpgrade to **`\u003e= 0.13.0`**. There is no configuration-only workaround for affected versions.\n\n### Resources\n\n- Report: GitHub issue #35\n- Fix: PR #36\n\n### Credit\n\nReported by Zhihao Zhang ([@mcfly-zzh](https://github.com/mcfly-zzh)).",
  "id": "GHSA-f7wf-v2vw-mpcx",
  "modified": "2026-07-17T19:23:07Z",
  "published": "2026-07-17T19:23:07Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/mkreyman/mcp-memory-keeper/security/advisories/GHSA-f7wf-v2vw-mpcx"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/mkreyman/mcp-memory-keeper/issues/35"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/mkreyman/mcp-memory-keeper/pull/36"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/mkreyman/mcp-memory-keeper/commit/84f6dfa692736a34ff36e2d2cf2188b71facf73b"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/mkreyman/mcp-memory-keeper"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/mkreyman/mcp-memory-keeper/releases/tag/v0.13.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "mcp-memory-keeper: Arbitrary local file read in context_import via unvalidated filePath"
}