GHSA-F6GV-HH8J-Q8VQ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-12-15 02:45 – Updated: 2023-12-15 02:45Impact
The clients may override named path parameter values from previous requests if the application is using TrieRouter. So, there is a risk that a privileged user may use unintended parameters when deleting REST API resources.
TrieRouter is used either explicitly or when the application matches a pattern that is not supported by the default RegExpRouter.
The code to reproduce it. The server side application:
import { Hono } from 'hono'
import { TrieRouter } from 'hono/router/trie-router'
const wait = async (ms: number) => {
return new Promise((resolve) => {
setTimeout(resolve, ms)
})
}
const app = new Hono({ router: new TrieRouter() })
app.use('*', async (c, next) => {
await wait(Math.random() * 200)
return next()
})
app.get('/modules/:id/versions/:version', async (c) => {
const id = c.req.param('id')
const version = c.req.param('version')
console.log('path', c.req.path)
console.log('version', version)
return c.json({
id,
version,
})
})
export default app
The client code which makes requests to the server application:
const examples = [
'http://localhost:8787/modules/first/versions/first',
'http://localhost:8787/modules/second/versions/second',
'http://localhost:8787/modules/third/versions/third',
]
const test = () => {
for (const example of examples) {
fetch(example)
.then((response) => response.json())
.then((data) => {
const splitted = example.split('/')
const expected = splitted[splitted.length - 1]
if (expected !== data.version) {
console.error(`Error: exprected ${expected} but got ${data.version} - url was ${example}`)
}
})
}
}
test()
The results:
Error: exprected second but got third - url was http://localhost:8787/modules/second/versions/second
Error: exprected first but got third - url was http://localhost:8787/modules/first/versions/first
Patches
"v3.11.7" includes the change to fix this issue.
Workarounds
Don't use TrieRouter directly.
// DON'T USE TrieRouter
import { TrieRouter } from 'hono/router/trie-router'
const app = new Hono({ router: new TrieRouter() })
References
Router options on the Hono website: https://hono.dev/api/hono#router-option
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "hono"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.11.7"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-50710"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-94"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2023-12-15T02:45:54Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2023-12-14T18:15:45Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nThe clients may override named path parameter values from previous requests if the application is using TrieRouter. So, there is a risk that a privileged user may use unintended parameters when deleting REST API resources.\n\nTrieRouter is used either explicitly or when the application matches a pattern that is not supported by the default RegExpRouter.\n\nThe code to reproduce it. The server side application:\n\n```ts\nimport { Hono } from \u0027hono\u0027\nimport { TrieRouter } from \u0027hono/router/trie-router\u0027\n\nconst wait = async (ms: number) =\u003e {\n return new Promise((resolve) =\u003e {\n setTimeout(resolve, ms)\n })\n}\n\nconst app = new Hono({ router: new TrieRouter() })\n\napp.use(\u0027*\u0027, async (c, next) =\u003e {\n await wait(Math.random() * 200)\n return next()\n})\n\napp.get(\u0027/modules/:id/versions/:version\u0027, async (c) =\u003e {\n const id = c.req.param(\u0027id\u0027)\n const version = c.req.param(\u0027version\u0027)\n\n console.log(\u0027path\u0027, c.req.path)\n console.log(\u0027version\u0027, version)\n\n return c.json({\n id,\n version,\n })\n})\n\nexport default app\n```\n\nThe client code which makes requests to the server application:\n\n```ts\nconst examples = [\n \u0027http://localhost:8787/modules/first/versions/first\u0027,\n \u0027http://localhost:8787/modules/second/versions/second\u0027,\n \u0027http://localhost:8787/modules/third/versions/third\u0027,\n]\n\nconst test = () =\u003e {\n for (const example of examples) {\n fetch(example)\n .then((response) =\u003e response.json())\n .then((data) =\u003e {\n const splitted = example.split(\u0027/\u0027)\n const expected = splitted[splitted.length - 1]\n\n if (expected !== data.version) {\n console.error(`Error: exprected ${expected} but got ${data.version} - url was ${example}`)\n }\n })\n }\n}\n\ntest()\n```\n\nThe results:\n\n```txt\nError: exprected second but got third - url was http://localhost:8787/modules/second/versions/second\nError: exprected first but got third - url was http://localhost:8787/modules/first/versions/first\n```\n\n### Patches\n\n\"v3.11.7\" includes the change to fix this issue.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nDon\u0027t use TrieRouter directly.\n\n```ts\n// DON\u0027T USE TrieRouter\nimport { TrieRouter } from \u0027hono/router/trie-router\u0027\nconst app = new Hono({ router: new TrieRouter() })\n```\n\n### References\n\nRouter options on the Hono website: https://hono.dev/api/hono#router-option",
"id": "GHSA-f6gv-hh8j-q8vq",
"modified": "2023-12-15T02:45:54Z",
"published": "2023-12-15T02:45:54Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/honojs/hono/security/advisories/GHSA-f6gv-hh8j-q8vq"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-50710"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/honojs/hono/commit/8e2b6b08518998783f66d31db4f21b1b1eecc4c8"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/honojs/hono"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/honojs/hono/releases/tag/v3.11.7"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Named path parameters can be overridden in TrieRouter"
}
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