GHSA-CWRH-575J-8VR3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-01-03 16:15 – Updated: 2025-01-03 19:25Impact
What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?
Both in karmadactl and karmada-operator, it is possible to supply a filesystem path, or an HTTP(s) URL to retrieve the custom resource definitions(CRDs) needed by karmada. The CRDs are downloaded as a gzipped tarfile and are vulnerable to a TarSlip vulnerability. An attacker able to supply a malicious CRD file into a karmada initialization could write arbitrary files in arbitrary paths of the filesystem.
Patches
Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?
From karmada version v1.12.0, when processing custom CRDs files, CRDs archive verification is utilized to enhance file system robustness.
Workarounds
Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?
When using karmadactl init to set up Karmada, if you need to set flag --crd to customize the CRD files required for karmada initialization, you can manually inspect the CRD files to check whether they contain sequences such as ../ that would alter file paths, to determine if they potentially include malicious files.
When using karmada-operator to set up Karmada, you must upgrade your karmada-operator to one of the fixed versions.
References
Are there any links users can visit to find out more?
- Enhancements made from the Karmada community: https://github.com/karmada-io/karmada/pull/5713, https://github.com/karmada-io/karmada/pull/5703
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/karmada-io/karmada"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.12.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-56514"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-01-03T16:15:54Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-01-03T17:15:09Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Impact\n_What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?_\n\nBoth in karmadactl and karmada-operator, it is possible to supply a filesystem path, or an HTTP(s) URL to retrieve the custom resource definitions(CRDs) needed by karmada. The CRDs are downloaded as a gzipped tarfile and are vulnerable to a TarSlip vulnerability. An attacker able to supply a malicious CRD file into a karmada initialization could write arbitrary files in arbitrary paths of the filesystem.\n\n### Patches\n_Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?_\n\nFrom karmada version v1.12.0, when processing custom CRDs files, CRDs archive verification is utilized to enhance file system robustness.\n\n### Workarounds\n_Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?_\n\nWhen using `karmadactl init` to set up Karmada, if you need to set flag `--crd` to customize the CRD files required for karmada initialization, you can manually inspect the CRD files to check whether they contain sequences such as `../` that would alter file paths, to determine if they potentially include malicious files. \n\nWhen using karmada-operator to set up Karmada, you must upgrade your karmada-operator to one of the fixed versions.\n\n### References\n_Are there any links users can visit to find out more?_\n\n1. Enhancements made from the Karmada community: https://github.com/karmada-io/karmada/pull/5713, https://github.com/karmada-io/karmada/pull/5703\n",
"id": "GHSA-cwrh-575j-8vr3",
"modified": "2025-01-03T19:25:56Z",
"published": "2025-01-03T16:15:54Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/karmada-io/karmada/security/advisories/GHSA-cwrh-575j-8vr3"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-56514"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/karmada-io/karmada/pull/5703"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/karmada-io/karmada/pull/5713"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/karmada-io/karmada/commit/40ec488b18a461ab0f871d2c9ec8665b361f0d50"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/karmada-io/karmada/commit/f78e7e2a3d02bed04e9bc7abd3ae7b3ac56862d2"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/karmada-io/karmada"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Karmada Tar Slips in CRDs archive extraction"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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Related by attack behaviour
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