GHSA-CW6X-M8JW-QMRH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-02 14:33 – Updated: 2026-09-02 14:33Summary
nltk.featstruct.FeatStructReader (used by FeatStruct(str) and by FeatureGrammar.fromstring()) parses feature-structure strings such as [a=1] with a recursive-descent parser that has no nesting-depth limit. A small, trivially-crafted input (~700 bytes) with deeply nested brackets drives the parser past Python's recursion limit and raises an unhandled RecursionError instead of the library's normal, catchable ValueError/LogicalExpressionException. Any application that parses user-supplied feature-structure or feature-grammar text (e.g. NLP teaching tools, grammar "playgrounds", unification-grammar-based NLU pipelines) can be crashed by an unauthenticated input with no special privileges. This is a Denial of Service issue (CWE-674, Uncontrolled Recursion), not a memory-safety or code-execution issue.
This appears to be the same bug class as two issues already fixed elsewhere in the codebase — nltk/jsontags.py (JSONTaggedDecoder.decode_obj, guarded by MAX_DECODE_DEPTH = 200) and nltk/sem/logic.py (LogicParser, guarded by MAX_PARSE_DEPTH = 200) — but nltk/featstruct.py does not have an equivalent guard.
Details
The recursive call chain (current develop branch, nltk/featstruct.py):
FeatStructReader.fromstring()(featstruct.py:2184) callsread_partial()→_read_partial()(featstruct.py:2250)._read_partial()dispatches to_read_partial_featdict(), which calls_read_value()(featstruct.py:2436) for each feature's value._read_value()callsread_value()(featstruct.py:2442), which matches the value againstVALUE_HANDLERS(featstruct.py:2478).- If the value itself starts with
[(a nested feature structure), the matched handler isread_fstruct_value(featstruct.py:2479, defined atfeatstruct.py:2495):python def read_fstruct_value(self, s, position, reentrances, match): return self.read_partial(s, position, reentrances)This callsread_partial()again, which re-enters_read_partial()— the same function from step 1.
This closes a recursive cycle (_read_partial → _read_value → read_value → read_fstruct_value → read_partial → _read_partial → ...) with no depth counter, no MAX_*_DEPTH constant, and no try/except RecursionError anywhere in the class. Each additional [ in the input adds one more full cycle of Python stack frames. Once the input nests deeply enough, Python's own recursion-limit protection fires and raises RecursionError, which is not a subclass of ValueError (the exception type this parser's own _error() helper raises for normal, well-formed parse errors) and therefore propagates uncaught through this API.
For comparison, nltk/sem/logic.py's LogicParser was hardened against exactly this class of issue:
#: Maximum expression-nesting depth the recursive-descent parser will
#: descend to. Deeply nested input would otherwise recurse until Python
#: raises an uncaught RecursionError and crashes the caller
#: (uncontrolled recursion, CWE-674); past this depth a normal
#: LogicalExpressionException is raised instead. Configurable.
MAX_PARSE_DEPTH = 200
(nltk/sem/logic.py:102-107), and nltk/jsontags.py's JSONTaggedDecoder similarly has MAX_DECODE_DEPTH = 200 with an explicit depth check. nltk/featstruct.py has no analogous protection.
FeatureGrammar.fromstring() (nltk/grammar.py) parses feature structures embedded in FCFG grammar rules via the same FeatStructReader, so the same crash is reachable through grammar-string parsing as well as through FeatStruct() directly.
PoC
Verified against the current develop branch in a clean virtualenv (Python 3.12, NLTK installed from this checkout via pip install -e .):
from nltk.featstruct import FeatStruct
depth = 167
payload = "[a=" * depth + "1" + "]" * depth # 669 bytes
FeatStruct(payload)
Result:
Traceback (most recent call last):
...
File ".../nltk/featstruct.py", line 2310, in _read_partial_featdict
value, position = self._read_value(name, s, position, reentrances)
File ".../nltk/featstruct.py", line 2440, in _read_value
return self.read_value(s, position, reentrances)
File ".../nltk/featstruct.py", line 2446, in read_value
return handler_func(s, position, reentrances, match)
[... repeats ~167 times ...]
RecursionError: maximum recursion depth exceeded
- Crash threshold: nesting depth 167 (binary-searched between 50 and 200).
- Payload size: 669 bytes — fits trivially in a single HTTP request body/query parameter.
- Time to crash: <2ms — no resource exhaustion is needed, only recursion depth.
Minimal reproduction (no server required):
python3 -c "
from nltk.featstruct import FeatStruct
FeatStruct('[a=' * 200 + '1' + ']' * 200)
"
Illustrative server-side context (not part of NLTK itself, but representative of how the bug becomes reachable):
from flask import Flask, request
from nltk.featstruct import FeatStruct
app = Flask(__name__)
@app.route("/parse", methods=["POST"])
def parse_grammar():
return {"result": str(FeatStruct(request.json["grammar"]))}
A POST of {"grammar": "[a=" * 200 + "1" + "]" * 200} to this endpoint raises the uncaught RecursionError inside the request handler.
Impact
Vulnerability type: Denial of Service via uncontrolled recursion (CWE-674). This is not a memory-corruption bug and does not lead to code execution or data disclosure — Python's own recursion-limit safety net converts what would be a C-level stack overflow into a catchable (but here, uncaught) RecursionError.
Who is affected: Any application that passes externally-supplied text into nltk.featstruct.FeatStruct() or nltk.grammar.FeatureGrammar.fromstring() — for example, NLP/computational-linguistics teaching tools, unification-grammar demo services, or NLU pipelines that accept user-authored feature grammars. This is a narrower slice of NLTK's user base than, e.g., tokenization or POS tagging, since feature-structure/unification-grammar parsing is a more specialized part of the library.
Practical severity depends on deployment:
- In typical WSGI-style web frameworks (Flask/Django/FastAPI behind gunicorn/uwsgi), an uncaught exception inside a request handler is caught at the framework/server boundary: the single request fails (HTTP 500), the worker process itself survives, and unaffected requests are unimpacted.
- In single-threaded or per-task-unprotected contexts (e.g. a queue-consuming worker without per-task exception isolation), the uncaught RecursionError can terminate the entire process; without a process supervisor that auto-restarts it, this is a persistent outage until manually restarted. An attacker who repeats the payload can keep such a worker in a crash loop for as long as the attack continues.
Suggested fix: Add a depth counter and a MAX_PARSE_DEPTH-style constant to FeatStructReader, mirroring the existing fix in nltk/sem/logic.py, and raise the library's normal ValueError-based parse error once the limit is exceeded instead of letting RecursionError propagate.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.10.2"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "nltk"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.10.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-81724"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-674"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-02T14:33:22Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\n`nltk.featstruct.FeatStructReader` (used by `FeatStruct(str)` and by `FeatureGrammar.fromstring()`) parses feature-structure strings such as `[a=1]` with a recursive-descent parser that has no nesting-depth limit. A small, trivially-crafted input (~700 bytes) with deeply nested brackets drives the parser past Python\u0027s recursion limit and raises an **unhandled `RecursionError`** instead of the library\u0027s normal, catchable `ValueError`/`LogicalExpressionException`. Any application that parses user-supplied feature-structure or feature-grammar text (e.g. NLP teaching tools, grammar \"playgrounds\", unification-grammar-based NLU pipelines) can be crashed by an unauthenticated input with no special privileges. This is a Denial of Service issue (CWE-674, Uncontrolled Recursion), not a memory-safety or code-execution issue.\n\nThis appears to be the same bug class as two issues already fixed elsewhere in the codebase \u2014 `nltk/jsontags.py` (`JSONTaggedDecoder.decode_obj`, guarded by `MAX_DECODE_DEPTH = 200`) and `nltk/sem/logic.py` (`LogicParser`, guarded by `MAX_PARSE_DEPTH = 200`) \u2014 but `nltk/featstruct.py` does not have an equivalent guard.\n\n### Details\n\nThe recursive call chain (current `develop` branch, `nltk/featstruct.py`):\n\n1. `FeatStructReader.fromstring()` ([`featstruct.py:2184`](nltk/featstruct.py#L2184)) calls `read_partial()` \u2192 `_read_partial()` ([`featstruct.py:2250`](nltk/featstruct.py#L2250)).\n2. `_read_partial()` dispatches to `_read_partial_featdict()`, which calls `_read_value()` ([`featstruct.py:2436`](nltk/featstruct.py#L2436)) for each feature\u0027s value.\n3. `_read_value()` calls `read_value()` ([`featstruct.py:2442`](nltk/featstruct.py#L2442)), which matches the value against `VALUE_HANDLERS` ([`featstruct.py:2478`](nltk/featstruct.py#L2478)).\n4. If the value itself starts with `[` (a nested feature structure), the matched handler is `read_fstruct_value` ([`featstruct.py:2479`](nltk/featstruct.py#L2479), defined at [`featstruct.py:2495`](nltk/featstruct.py#L2495)):\n ```python\n def read_fstruct_value(self, s, position, reentrances, match):\n return self.read_partial(s, position, reentrances)\n ```\n This calls `read_partial()` again, which re-enters `_read_partial()` \u2014 the same function from step 1.\n\nThis closes a recursive cycle (`_read_partial \u2192 _read_value \u2192 read_value \u2192 read_fstruct_value \u2192 read_partial \u2192 _read_partial \u2192 ...`) with **no depth counter, no `MAX_*_DEPTH` constant, and no `try/except RecursionError`** anywhere in the class. Each additional `[` in the input adds one more full cycle of Python stack frames. Once the input nests deeply enough, Python\u0027s own recursion-limit protection fires and raises `RecursionError`, which is not a subclass of `ValueError` (the exception type this parser\u0027s own `_error()` helper raises for normal, well-formed parse errors) and therefore propagates uncaught through this API.\n\nFor comparison, `nltk/sem/logic.py`\u0027s `LogicParser` was hardened against exactly this class of issue:\n```python\n#: Maximum expression-nesting depth the recursive-descent parser will\n#: descend to. Deeply nested input would otherwise recurse until Python\n#: raises an uncaught RecursionError and crashes the caller\n#: (uncontrolled recursion, CWE-674); past this depth a normal\n#: LogicalExpressionException is raised instead. Configurable.\nMAX_PARSE_DEPTH = 200\n```\n(`nltk/sem/logic.py:102-107`), and `nltk/jsontags.py`\u0027s `JSONTaggedDecoder` similarly has `MAX_DECODE_DEPTH = 200` with an explicit depth check. `nltk/featstruct.py` has no analogous protection.\n\n`FeatureGrammar.fromstring()` (`nltk/grammar.py`) parses feature structures embedded in FCFG grammar rules via the same `FeatStructReader`, so the same crash is reachable through grammar-string parsing as well as through `FeatStruct()` directly.\n\n### PoC\n\nVerified against the current `develop` branch in a clean virtualenv (Python 3.12, NLTK installed from this checkout via `pip install -e .`):\n\n```python\nfrom nltk.featstruct import FeatStruct\n\ndepth = 167\npayload = \"[a=\" * depth + \"1\" + \"]\" * depth # 669 bytes\nFeatStruct(payload)\n```\n\nResult:\n```\nTraceback (most recent call last):\n ...\n File \".../nltk/featstruct.py\", line 2310, in _read_partial_featdict\n value, position = self._read_value(name, s, position, reentrances)\n File \".../nltk/featstruct.py\", line 2440, in _read_value\n return self.read_value(s, position, reentrances)\n File \".../nltk/featstruct.py\", line 2446, in read_value\n return handler_func(s, position, reentrances, match)\n [... repeats ~167 times ...]\nRecursionError: maximum recursion depth exceeded\n```\n\n- Crash threshold: nesting depth 167 (binary-searched between 50 and 200).\n- Payload size: 669 bytes \u2014 fits trivially in a single HTTP request body/query parameter.\n- Time to crash: \u003c2ms \u2014 no resource exhaustion is needed, only recursion depth.\n\nMinimal reproduction (no server required):\n```bash\npython3 -c \"\nfrom nltk.featstruct import FeatStruct\nFeatStruct(\u0027[a=\u0027 * 200 + \u00271\u0027 + \u0027]\u0027 * 200)\n\"\n```\n\nIllustrative server-side context (not part of NLTK itself, but representative of how the bug becomes reachable):\n```python\nfrom flask import Flask, request\nfrom nltk.featstruct import FeatStruct\n\napp = Flask(__name__)\n\n@app.route(\"/parse\", methods=[\"POST\"])\ndef parse_grammar():\n return {\"result\": str(FeatStruct(request.json[\"grammar\"]))}\n```\nA POST of `{\"grammar\": \"[a=\" * 200 + \"1\" + \"]\" * 200}` to this endpoint raises the uncaught `RecursionError` inside the request handler.\n\n### Impact\n\n**Vulnerability type:** Denial of Service via uncontrolled recursion (CWE-674). This is not a memory-corruption bug and does not lead to code execution or data disclosure \u2014 Python\u0027s own recursion-limit safety net converts what would be a C-level stack overflow into a catchable (but here, uncaught) `RecursionError`.\n\n**Who is affected:** Any application that passes externally-supplied text into `nltk.featstruct.FeatStruct()` or `nltk.grammar.FeatureGrammar.fromstring()` \u2014 for example, NLP/computational-linguistics teaching tools, unification-grammar demo services, or NLU pipelines that accept user-authored feature grammars. This is a narrower slice of NLTK\u0027s user base than, e.g., tokenization or POS tagging, since feature-structure/unification-grammar parsing is a more specialized part of the library.\n\n**Practical severity depends on deployment:**\n- In typical WSGI-style web frameworks (Flask/Django/FastAPI behind gunicorn/uwsgi), an uncaught exception inside a request handler is caught at the framework/server boundary: the single request fails (HTTP 500), the worker process itself survives, and unaffected requests are unimpacted.\n- In single-threaded or per-task-unprotected contexts (e.g. a queue-consuming worker without per-task exception isolation), the uncaught `RecursionError` can terminate the entire process; without a process supervisor that auto-restarts it, this is a persistent outage until manually restarted. An attacker who repeats the payload can keep such a worker in a crash loop for as long as the attack continues.\n\n**Suggested fix:** Add a depth counter and a `MAX_PARSE_DEPTH`-style constant to `FeatStructReader`, mirroring the existing fix in `nltk/sem/logic.py`, and raise the library\u0027s normal `ValueError`-based parse error once the limit is exceeded instead of letting `RecursionError` propagate.",
"id": "GHSA-cw6x-m8jw-qmrh",
"modified": "2026-09-02T14:33:22Z",
"published": "2026-09-02T14:33:22Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nltk/nltk/security/advisories/GHSA-cw6x-m8jw-qmrh"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-81724"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nltk/nltk/commit/43c7b78cc8ea37e5cd3a129e27e32c415ea21cf1"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/nltk/nltk"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nltk/nltk/releases/tag/v3.10.3"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/nltk/PYSEC-2026-3739.yaml"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/nltk-before-3.10.3-denial-of-service-via-uncontrolled-recursion"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "NLTK: Uncontrolled recursion in nltk.featstruct.FeatStructReader causes unhandled RecursionError (DoS) via deeply nested feature-structure input"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.