GHSA-CW47-5XMH-QVQ4

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-04 18:30 – Updated: 2026-03-18 21:32
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

wifi: rsi: Fix memory corruption due to not set vif driver data size

The struct ieee80211_vif contains trailing space for vif driver data, when struct ieee80211_vif is allocated, the total memory size that is allocated is sizeof(struct ieee80211_vif) + size of vif driver data. The size of vif driver data is set by each WiFi driver as needed.

The RSI911x driver does not set vif driver data size, no trailing space for vif driver data is therefore allocated past struct ieee80211_vif . The RSI911x driver does however use the vif driver data to store its vif driver data structure "struct vif_priv". An access to vif->drv_priv leads to access out of struct ieee80211_vif bounds and corruption of some memory.

In case of the failure observed locally, rsi_mac80211_add_interface() would write struct vif_priv *vif_info = (struct vif_priv *)vif->drv_priv; vif_info->vap_id = vap_idx. This write corrupts struct fq_tin member struct list_head new_flows . The flow = list_first_entry(head, struct fq_flow, flowchain); in fq_tin_reset() then reports non-NULL bogus address, which when accessed causes a crash.

The trigger is very simple, boot the machine with init=/bin/sh , mount devtmpfs, sysfs, procfs, and then do "ip link set wlan0 up", "sleep 1", "ip link set wlan0 down" and the crash occurs.

Fix this by setting the correct size of vif driver data, which is the size of "struct vif_priv", so that memory is allocated and the driver can store its driver data in it, instead of corrupting memory around it.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-23073"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-787"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-02-04T17:16:18Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nwifi: rsi: Fix memory corruption due to not set vif driver data size\n\nThe struct ieee80211_vif contains trailing space for vif driver data,\nwhen struct ieee80211_vif is allocated, the total memory size that is\nallocated is sizeof(struct ieee80211_vif) + size of vif driver data.\nThe size of vif driver data is set by each WiFi driver as needed.\n\nThe RSI911x driver does not set vif driver data size, no trailing space\nfor vif driver data is therefore allocated past struct ieee80211_vif .\nThe RSI911x driver does however use the vif driver data to store its\nvif driver data structure \"struct vif_priv\". An access to vif-\u003edrv_priv\nleads to access out of struct ieee80211_vif bounds and corruption of\nsome memory.\n\nIn case of the failure observed locally, rsi_mac80211_add_interface()\nwould write struct vif_priv *vif_info = (struct vif_priv *)vif-\u003edrv_priv;\nvif_info-\u003evap_id = vap_idx. This write corrupts struct fq_tin member\nstruct list_head new_flows . The flow = list_first_entry(head, struct\nfq_flow, flowchain); in fq_tin_reset() then reports non-NULL bogus\naddress, which when accessed causes a crash.\n\nThe trigger is very simple, boot the machine with init=/bin/sh , mount\ndevtmpfs, sysfs, procfs, and then do \"ip link set wlan0 up\", \"sleep 1\",\n\"ip link set wlan0 down\" and the crash occurs.\n\nFix this by setting the correct size of vif driver data, which is the\nsize of \"struct vif_priv\", so that memory is allocated and the driver\ncan store its driver data in it, instead of corrupting memory around\nit.",
  "id": "GHSA-cw47-5xmh-qvq4",
  "modified": "2026-03-18T21:32:57Z",
  "published": "2026-02-04T18:30:43Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23073"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0d7c9e793e351cbbe9e06a9ca47d77b6ad288fb0"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/31efbcff90884ea5f65bf3d1de01267db51ee3d1"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/49ef094fdbc3526e5db2aebb404b84f79c5603dc"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4f431d88ea8093afc7ba55edf4652978c5a68f33"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7761d7801f40e61069b4df3db88b36d80d089f8a"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7c54d0c3e2cad4300be721ec2aecfcf8a63bc9f4"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/99129d80a5d4989ef8566f434f3589f60f28042b"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}



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