GHSA-CPMG-R9CR-Q8PJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-03 18:31 – Updated: 2026-04-27 15:30In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: L2CAP: Validate L2CAP_INFO_RSP payload length before access
l2cap_information_rsp() checks that cmd_len covers the fixed l2cap_info_rsp header (type + result, 4 bytes) but then reads rsp->data without verifying that the payload is present:
-
L2CAP_IT_FEAT_MASK calls get_unaligned_le32(rsp->data), which reads 4 bytes past the header (needs cmd_len >= 8).
-
L2CAP_IT_FIXED_CHAN reads rsp->data[0], 1 byte past the header (needs cmd_len >= 5).
A truncated L2CAP_INFO_RSP with result == L2CAP_IR_SUCCESS triggers an out-of-bounds read of adjacent skb data.
Guard each data access with the required payload length check. If the payload is too short, skip the read and let the state machine complete with safe defaults (feat_mask and remote_fixed_chan remain zero from kzalloc), so the info timer cleanup and l2cap_conn_start() still run and the connection is not stalled.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-31393"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-125"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-03T16:16:37Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nBluetooth: L2CAP: Validate L2CAP_INFO_RSP payload length before access\n\nl2cap_information_rsp() checks that cmd_len covers the fixed\nl2cap_info_rsp header (type + result, 4 bytes) but then reads\nrsp-\u003edata without verifying that the payload is present:\n\n - L2CAP_IT_FEAT_MASK calls get_unaligned_le32(rsp-\u003edata), which reads\n 4 bytes past the header (needs cmd_len \u003e= 8).\n\n - L2CAP_IT_FIXED_CHAN reads rsp-\u003edata[0], 1 byte past the header\n (needs cmd_len \u003e= 5).\n\nA truncated L2CAP_INFO_RSP with result == L2CAP_IR_SUCCESS triggers an\nout-of-bounds read of adjacent skb data.\n\nGuard each data access with the required payload length check. If the\npayload is too short, skip the read and let the state machine complete\nwith safe defaults (feat_mask and remote_fixed_chan remain zero from\nkzalloc), so the info timer cleanup and l2cap_conn_start() still run\nand the connection is not stalled.",
"id": "GHSA-cpmg-r9cr-q8pj",
"modified": "2026-04-27T15:30:31Z",
"published": "2026-04-03T18:31:23Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31393"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/187e6fe939295be36063a1d91f8bebee04399a8c"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3b646516cba2ebc4b51a72954903326e7c1e443f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5229e7d15771eac2b5886bfb1f976aea0c1eec14"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/807bd1258453c4c83f6ae9dbc1e7b44860ff40d0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9aeacde4da0f02d42fd968fd32f245828b230171"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/db2872d054e467810078e2b9f440a5b326a601b2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dd815e6e3918dc75a49aaabac36e4f024d675101"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e7ff754e339e3d5ce29aa9f95352d0186df8fbd9"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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