GHSA-CF2M-953H-3XW9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-19 15:31 – Updated: 2026-11-19 15:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
thunderbolt: Do not RPM complete unrelated subtrees on unplug
When a Thunderbolt device is unplugged, that switch and every switch
subsequent to it on the bus device list is complete()d, not just its
child devices. In the case of multiple domains, it may cause, eg, an
attempt to complete() the uninitialized domain 1 root switch RPM
completion on unplug of a switch from domain 0 (though ordering is not
guaranteed numerically sorted).
I initially noticed this issue on a Dell XPS9720 when the system would
seem to sporadically not wake after unplugging a Thunderbolt dock. I
tried multiple kernel versions including v7.2.7 and v7.3-rc4 to see if
that resolved the issue, but the issue persisted. Eventually I found
that I could consistently generate a kernel Oops reporting a page fault
at 0xffff_ffff_ffff_fff8 on unplug from one side of the laptop and went
bug hunting. I became suspicious of the bus_for_each_dev() walk that I
ultimately ended up changing. To confirm this issue, I did an eBPF trace
of bus_for_each_dev(), complete_rpm(), and complete() while
unplugging in a variety of situations and found that an unplug from
domain 0 tries to complete_rpm() domain 1's switch, whose RPM
completion is not initialized and thus is holding a null wait-list
pointer, triggering the page fault.
Here are the key sections of that eBPF trace. Note that HEAD denotes the completion's own wait-list HEAD:
RESCAN_ENTER domain=0
COMPLETE rescan_domain=0 target=0-1 target_domain=0
route=0x1 parent=0-0 unplugged=1
COMPLETION done=0 head=HEAD next=HEAD prev=HEAD
BUS_WALK domain=0 start=0-1 callback=complete_rpm
CALLBACK_ENTER rescan_domain=0 dev=1-0 parent=domain1 is_switch=1
COMPLETE rescan_domain=0 target=1-0 target_domain=1
route=0x0 parent=domain1 unplugged=0
COMPLETION done=0 head=HEAD next=0 prev=0
complete+5
complete_rpm+43
bus_for_each_dev+133
icm_free_unplugged_children+250
icm_rescan_work+42
This patch gates the complete() on an additional condition - that the
Thunderbolt domain matches the domain of the device that was unplugged.
I only have a single system with multiple Thunderbolt domains - the Dell XPS9720. I am consistently able to reproduce the Oops on that system. Since running with this patch, I have not seen the Oops reoccur. I have also tested it on a Thinkpad X1-Gen12, and that system boots and runs well with it, but it only has a single Thunderbolt domain, so it does not exercise the multi-domain failure case.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-99547"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-11-19T15:18:10Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nthunderbolt: Do not RPM complete unrelated subtrees on unplug\n\nWhen a Thunderbolt device is unplugged, that switch and every switch\nsubsequent to it on the bus device list is `complete()`d, not just its\nchild devices. In the case of multiple domains, it may cause, eg, an\nattempt to `complete()` the uninitialized domain 1 root switch RPM\ncompletion on unplug of a switch from domain 0 (though ordering is not\nguaranteed numerically sorted).\n\nI initially noticed this issue on a Dell XPS9720 when the system would\nseem to sporadically not wake after unplugging a Thunderbolt dock. I\ntried multiple kernel versions including v7.2.7 and v7.3-rc4 to see if\nthat resolved the issue, but the issue persisted. Eventually I found\nthat I could consistently generate a kernel Oops reporting a page fault\nat 0xffff_ffff_ffff_fff8 on unplug from one side of the laptop and went\nbug hunting. I became suspicious of the `bus_for_each_dev()` walk that I\nultimately ended up changing. To confirm this issue, I did an eBPF trace\nof `bus_for_each_dev()`, `complete_rpm()`, and `complete()` while\nunplugging in a variety of situations and found that an unplug from\ndomain 0 tries to `complete_rpm()` domain 1\u0027s switch, whose RPM\ncompletion is not initialized and thus is holding a null wait-list\npointer, triggering the page fault.\n\nHere are the key sections of that eBPF trace. Note that HEAD denotes the\ncompletion\u0027s own wait-list HEAD:\n\n```\nRESCAN_ENTER domain=0\n\nCOMPLETE rescan_domain=0 target=0-1 target_domain=0\n route=0x1 parent=0-0 unplugged=1\nCOMPLETION done=0 head=HEAD next=HEAD prev=HEAD\n\nBUS_WALK domain=0 start=0-1 callback=complete_rpm\nCALLBACK_ENTER rescan_domain=0 dev=1-0 parent=domain1 is_switch=1\n\nCOMPLETE rescan_domain=0 target=1-0 target_domain=1\n route=0x0 parent=domain1 unplugged=0\nCOMPLETION done=0 head=HEAD next=0 prev=0\n\n complete+5\n complete_rpm+43\n bus_for_each_dev+133\n icm_free_unplugged_children+250\n icm_rescan_work+42\n```\n\nThis patch gates the `complete()` on an additional condition - that the\nThunderbolt domain matches the domain of the device that was unplugged.\n\nI only have a single system with multiple Thunderbolt domains - the Dell\nXPS9720. I am consistently able to reproduce the Oops on that system.\nSince running with this patch, I have not seen the Oops reoccur. I have\nalso tested it on a Thinkpad X1-Gen12, and that system boots and runs\nwell with it, but it only has a single Thunderbolt domain, so it does\nnot exercise the multi-domain failure case.",
"id": "GHSA-cf2m-953h-3xw9",
"modified": "2026-11-19T15:31:28Z",
"published": "2026-11-19T15:31:28Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-99547"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/85a8777c7ec5e17b999b4c9eb0c8cbf4ab936998"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/96a8479804e3f7af43e639e9df39f562f1a75fd5"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a7f354751b05ead5538176deadb9bc5b1fda0a3c"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e45356d83adce72fd99f57763eb3456c7c560857"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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