GHSA-CC9H-5XHH-H7J7

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-20 18:32 – Updated: 2026-07-20 18:32
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

i2c: stub: Reject I2C block transfers with invalid length

The I2C_SMBUS_I2C_BLOCK_DATA case in stub_xfer() uses data->block[0] as the transfer length. The existing check only clamps it to avoid overrunning the chip->words[256] register array, but does not validate it against I2C_SMBUS_BLOCK_MAX (32), which is the limit of the union i2c_smbus_data.block buffer (34 bytes total). The driver is a development/test tool (CONFIG_I2C_STUB=m, not built by default) that must be loaded with a chip_addr= parameter.

A local user with access to /dev/i2c-* can issue an I2C_SMBUS ioctl with I2C_SMBUS_I2C_BLOCK_DATA and data->block[0] > 32, causing stub_xfer() to read or write past the end of the union i2c_smbus_data.block buffer:

BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in stub_xfer (drivers/i2c/i2c-stub.c:223) Read of size 1 at addr ffff88800abcfd92 by task exploit/81 Call Trace: stub_xfer (drivers/i2c/i2c-stub.c:223) __i2c_smbus_xfer (drivers/i2c/i2c-core-smbus.c:593) i2c_smbus_xfer (drivers/i2c/i2c-core-smbus.c:536) i2cdev_ioctl_smbus (drivers/i2c/i2c-dev.c:391) i2cdev_ioctl (drivers/i2c/i2c-dev.c:478) __x64_sys_ioctl (fs/ioctl.c:583) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130)

The bug exists because i2c-stub implements .smbus_xfer directly, bypassing the I2C_SMBUS_BLOCK_MAX validation in i2c_smbus_xfer_emulated(). The I2C_SMBUS_BLOCK_DATA case in the same function correctly validates against I2C_SMBUS_BLOCK_MAX, but the I2C_SMBUS_I2C_BLOCK_DATA case does not.

Fix by rejecting transfers with data->block[0] == 0 or data->block[0] > I2C_SMBUS_BLOCK_MAX with -EINVAL, consistent with both the I2C_SMBUS_BLOCK_DATA case in the same function and the I2C_SMBUS_I2C_BLOCK_DATA validation in i2c_smbus_xfer_emulated().

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-64191"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-20T17:18:22Z",
    "severity": null
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ni2c: stub: Reject I2C block transfers with invalid length\n\nThe I2C_SMBUS_I2C_BLOCK_DATA case in stub_xfer() uses data-\u003eblock[0]\nas the transfer length. The existing check only clamps it to avoid\noverrunning the chip-\u003ewords[256] register array, but does not validate\nit against I2C_SMBUS_BLOCK_MAX (32), which is the limit of the union\ni2c_smbus_data.block buffer (34 bytes total). The driver is a\ndevelopment/test tool (CONFIG_I2C_STUB=m, not built by default)\nthat must be loaded with a chip_addr= parameter.\n\nA local user with access to /dev/i2c-* can issue an I2C_SMBUS ioctl\nwith I2C_SMBUS_I2C_BLOCK_DATA and data-\u003eblock[0] \u003e 32, causing\nstub_xfer() to read or write past the end of the union\ni2c_smbus_data.block buffer:\n\n BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in stub_xfer (drivers/i2c/i2c-stub.c:223)\n Read of size 1 at addr ffff88800abcfd92 by task exploit/81\n Call Trace:\n  \u003cTASK\u003e\n  stub_xfer (drivers/i2c/i2c-stub.c:223)\n  __i2c_smbus_xfer (drivers/i2c/i2c-core-smbus.c:593)\n  i2c_smbus_xfer (drivers/i2c/i2c-core-smbus.c:536)\n  i2cdev_ioctl_smbus (drivers/i2c/i2c-dev.c:391)\n  i2cdev_ioctl (drivers/i2c/i2c-dev.c:478)\n  __x64_sys_ioctl (fs/ioctl.c:583)\n  do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94)\n  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130)\n  \u003c/TASK\u003e\n\nThe bug exists because i2c-stub implements .smbus_xfer directly,\nbypassing the I2C_SMBUS_BLOCK_MAX validation in\ni2c_smbus_xfer_emulated(). The I2C_SMBUS_BLOCK_DATA case in the same\nfunction correctly validates against I2C_SMBUS_BLOCK_MAX, but the\nI2C_SMBUS_I2C_BLOCK_DATA case does not.\n\nFix by rejecting transfers with data-\u003eblock[0] == 0 or\ndata-\u003eblock[0] \u003e I2C_SMBUS_BLOCK_MAX with -EINVAL, consistent with\nboth the I2C_SMBUS_BLOCK_DATA case in the same function and the\nI2C_SMBUS_I2C_BLOCK_DATA validation in i2c_smbus_xfer_emulated().",
  "id": "GHSA-cc9h-5xhh-h7j7",
  "modified": "2026-07-20T18:32:34Z",
  "published": "2026-07-20T18:32:33Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64191"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0526931b16e5a118d367b7bfce7d797e63f7ac69"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1c4ffe6b4f04365485ed58d64c9bb86b46fc9037"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/21e87f336ac6303fed54a69b1d0d79a23b25c8d0"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3fd225f3e4cd67ec8ddab1afed9da03c7c43537c"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4bd8635f28c135a08aac6badcd7d9b5cdb34335f"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5f4d2bd028ebb6e4c09a9d64842546022321d4a7"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6036b5067a8199ba7a2dc7b377d4b9dd276d5f9e"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7e9072dbd5f2f17934751873450d2c22080ead80"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}



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