GHSA-C3H4-9GC2-F7H4

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-07-29 16:44 – Updated: 2024-07-29 16:44
VLAI
Summary
tgstation-server's DreamMaker environment files outside the deployment directory can be compiled and ran by insufficiently permissioned users
Details

Impact

What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?

Low permission users using the "Set .dme Path" privilege could potentially set malicious .dme files existing on the host machine to be compiled and executed.

These .dme files could be uploaded via tgstation-server (requiring a separate, isolated privilege) or some other means.

A server configured to execute in BYOND's trusted security level (requiring a third separate, isolated privilege OR being set by another user) could lead to this escalating into remote code execution via BYOND's shell() proc.

The ability to execute this kind of attack is a known side effect of having privileged TGS users, but normally requires multiple privileges with known weaknesses. This vector is not intentional as it does not require control over the where deployment code is sourced from and may not require remote write access to an instance's Configuration directory.

Patches

Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?

This problem is patched by pull request #1835 and fixed in versions 6.8.0 and above.

Workarounds

Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?

Do not give un-trusted users the Deployment permission to set a .dme path on instances.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "Tgstation.Server.Api"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "4.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.8.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "Tgstation.Server.Host"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "4.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.8.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-41799"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2024-07-29T16:44:15Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-07-29T15:15:16Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n_What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?_\n\nLow permission users using the \"Set .dme Path\" privilege could potentially set malicious .dme files existing on the host machine to be compiled and executed. \n\nThese .dme files could be uploaded via tgstation-server (requiring a separate, isolated privilege) or some other means.\n\nA server configured to execute in BYOND\u0027s trusted security level (requiring a third separate, isolated privilege OR being set by another user) could lead to this escalating into remote code execution via BYOND\u0027s shell() proc.\n\nThe ability to execute this kind of attack is a known side effect of having privileged TGS users, but normally requires multiple privileges with known weaknesses. This vector is not intentional as it does not require control over the where deployment code is sourced from and _may_ not require remote write access to an instance\u0027s `Configuration` directory.\n\n### Patches\n_Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?_\n\nThis problem is patched by pull request #1835 and fixed in versions 6.8.0 and above.\n\n### Workarounds\n_Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?_\n\nDo not give un-trusted users the Deployment permission to set a .dme path on instances.\n",
  "id": "GHSA-c3h4-9gc2-f7h4",
  "modified": "2024-07-29T16:44:15Z",
  "published": "2024-07-29T16:44:15Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/tgstation/tgstation-server/security/advisories/GHSA-c3h4-9gc2-f7h4"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-41799"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/tgstation/tgstation-server/pull/1835"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/tgstation/tgstation-server/commit/374852fe5ae306415eb5aafb2d16b06897d7afe4"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/tgstation/tgstation-server"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:H/SC:H/SI:L/SA:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "tgstation-server\u0027s DreamMaker environment files outside the deployment directory can be compiled and ran by insufficiently permissioned users"
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

JSON
How durations are calculated

Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.

Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.

Events included in the timeline

Loading timeline…


    Loading…

    Loading…

    Loading…

    Related by attack behaviour

    Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.