Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-9XHM-W3WJ-XHQH

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-22 20:37 – Updated: 2026-09-22 20:37

Summary

Tinyauth: Unauthenticated login attempts can trigger global login lockdown denial of service

Details

Summary

Tinyauth's login rate-limit bookkeeping can enter a global lockdown mode when its in-memory login-attempt map reaches 256 distinct identifiers. Because unauthenticated POST /api/user/login requests for unknown usernames are recorded in this same map, a remote unauthenticated attacker can submit 257 unique bogus usernames and cause valid credentials for unrelated users to be treated as locked until auth.loginTimeout expires.

This was confirmed against the stable v5.0.7 release. With default configuration, auth.loginTimeout is 300 seconds and auth.loginMaxRetries is 3, so the denial lasts about 5 minutes and can be repeated.

Details

In stable v5.0.7, the login endpoint is registered at internal/controller/user_controller.go:45 and accepts unauthenticated JSON credentials in loginHandler at internal/controller/user_controller.go:50. Before validating credentials, it calls controller.auth.IsAccountLocked(req.Username) at internal/controller/user_controller.go:65.

When a username does not exist, the login handler records a failed login attempt for the attacker-controlled username with controller.auth.RecordLoginAttempt(req.Username, false) at internal/controller/user_controller.go:83. Invalid passwords for existing users do the same at internal/controller/user_controller.go:94.

The rate-limit map has a hard cap of 256 records at internal/service/auth_service.go:29. RecordLoginAttempt checks len(auth.loginAttempts) >= MaxLoginAttemptRecords at internal/service/auth_service.go:261 and, once the cap is reached, launches auth.lockdownMode() at internal/service/auth_service.go:265 instead of evicting old identifiers or rejecting only the new identifier.

lockdownMode sets a global auth.lockdown value with Active: true and ActiveUntil: now + auth.config.LoginTimeout at internal/service/auth_service.go:790-804. IsAccountLocked checks this global lockdown before looking up the requested identifier at internal/service/auth_service.go:227-234, so every username is treated as locked while the global lockdown is active.

The default configuration enables this path with LoginTimeout: 300 and LoginMaxRetries: 3 at internal/config/config.go:23-24.

Source-to-sink path:

Unauthenticated POST /api/user/login JSON username
  -> loginHandler binds LoginRequest
  -> unknown username path records RecordLoginAttempt(attacker-chosen username, false)
  -> 257 unique identifiers fill loginAttempts beyond MaxLoginAttemptRecords
  -> RecordLoginAttempt starts lockdownMode()
  -> lockdownMode sets global auth.lockdown.Active = true
  -> IsAccountLocked returns locked for unrelated valid users
  -> login endpoint returns HTTP 429 for valid credentials until loginTimeout expires

Candidate score: 13/14. Reachability 2, attacker control 2, privilege required 2, sink impact 1, mitigation weakness 2, default exposure 2, safe reproduction feasibility 2.

PoC

This PoC is local and non-destructive. It was tested against stable tag v5.0.7. It proves that 257 distinct unknown-user identifiers trigger global lockdown for an unrelated valid user, while that user's password still verifies successfully.

Check out stable v5.0.7.
Create internal/service/login_lockdown_stable_poc_test.go:

package service

import (
    "fmt"
    "testing"
    "time"

    "github.com/steveiliop56/tinyauth/internal/config"
    "github.com/steveiliop56/tinyauth/internal/utils/tlog"
    "github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)

func TestPoCStableUnknownUsersTriggerGlobalLoginLockdown(t *testing.T) {
    tlog.NewTestLogger().Init()

    authServiceCfg := AuthServiceConfig{
        Users: []config.User{{
            Username: "testuser",
            Password: "$2a$10$ZwVYQH07JX2zq7Fjkt3gU.BjwvvwPeli4OqOno04RQIv0P7usBrXa", // password
        }},
        LoginTimeout:    2,
        LoginMaxRetries: 3,
    }

    authService := NewAuthService(authServiceCfg, &DockerService{}, &LdapService{}, nil, nil)
    t.Cleanup(authService.ClearRateLimitsTestingOnly)

    require.True(t, authService.VerifyUser(config.UserSearch{
        Username: "testuser",
        Type:     "local",
    }, "password"))

    for i := 0; i <= MaxLoginAttemptRecords; i++ {
        authService.RecordLoginAttempt(fmt.Sprintf("attacker-%03d", i), false)
    }

    require.Eventually(t, func() bool {
        locked, _ := authService.IsAccountLocked("testuser")
        return locked
    }, time.Second, 10*time.Millisecond)

    locked, remaining := authService.IsAccountLocked("testuser")
    require.True(t, locked)
    require.GreaterOrEqual(t, remaining, 0)

    require.True(t, authService.VerifyUser(config.UserSearch{
        Username: "testuser",
        Type:     "local",
    }, "password"))

    t.Logf("proof on v5.0.7: %d distinct failed unknown-user identifiers caused unrelated valid user testuser to be locked", MaxLoginAttemptRecords+1)
}

Run:

go test ./internal/service -run 'TestPoCStableUnknownUsersTriggerGlobalLoginLockdown' -count=1 -v

Observed output from this environment:

=== RUN   TestPoCStableUnknownUsersTriggerGlobalLoginLockdown
auth_service.go:798: Multiple login attempts detected, possibly DDOS attack. Activating temporary lockdown.
    login_lockdown_stable_poc_test.go:42: proof on v5.0.7: 257 distinct failed unknown-user identifiers caused unrelated valid user testuser to be locked
--- PASS: TestPoCStableUnknownUsersTriggerGlobalLoginLockdown (0.10s)
PASS
ok      github.com/steveiliop56/tinyauth/internal/service    0.111s

Cleanup:

rm internal/service/login_lockdown_stable_poc_test.go

Impact

A remote unauthenticated attacker who can reach Tinyauth's login endpoint can temporarily deny login for unrelated valid users by sending a small number of login attempts using unique nonexistent usernames.

With default configuration, the global lockdown lasts 300 seconds. The attack does not invalidate existing sessions, but users who need to log in during the lockdown window receive rate-limit responses even when providing valid credentials.

This affects availability of local login and any flow that depends on the same account-lock check. The issue is especially relevant for internet-exposed Tinyauth deployments where /api/user/login is reachable.

Suggested remediation: do not enter global lockdown because of attacker-controlled unknown usernames. Use bounded LRU eviction for old login-attempt records instead of global lockout; consider rate limiting by client IP plus normalized username; avoid counting unlimited nonexistent usernames toward a global security state. If a global safety mode is desired, require stronger signals such as source-based thresholds rather than only distinct username count.

Severity

5.3 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L

Show details on source website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/steveiliop56/tinyauth"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.0.1-0.20260715123057-dade1e2c8f27"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-77561"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-307"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-22T20:37:11Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-21T17:18:52Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nTinyauth\u0027s login rate-limit bookkeeping can enter a global lockdown mode when its in-memory login-attempt map reaches 256 distinct identifiers. Because unauthenticated `POST /api/user/login` requests for unknown usernames are recorded in this same map, a remote unauthenticated attacker can submit 257 unique bogus usernames and cause valid credentials for unrelated users to be treated as locked until `auth.loginTimeout` expires.\n\nThis was confirmed against the stable `v5.0.7` release. With default configuration, `auth.loginTimeout` is 300 seconds and `auth.loginMaxRetries` is 3, so the denial lasts about 5 minutes and can be repeated.\n\n### Details\n\nIn stable `v5.0.7`, the login endpoint is registered at `internal/controller/user_controller.go:45` and accepts unauthenticated JSON credentials in `loginHandler` at `internal/controller/user_controller.go:50`. Before validating credentials, it calls `controller.auth.IsAccountLocked(req.Username)` at `internal/controller/user_controller.go:65`.\n\nWhen a username does not exist, the login handler records a failed login attempt for the attacker-controlled username with `controller.auth.RecordLoginAttempt(req.Username, false)` at `internal/controller/user_controller.go:83`. Invalid passwords for existing users do the same at `internal/controller/user_controller.go:94`.\n\nThe rate-limit map has a hard cap of 256 records at `internal/service/auth_service.go:29`. `RecordLoginAttempt` checks `len(auth.loginAttempts) \u003e= MaxLoginAttemptRecords` at `internal/service/auth_service.go:261` and, once the cap is reached, launches `auth.lockdownMode()` at `internal/service/auth_service.go:265` instead of evicting old identifiers or rejecting only the new identifier.\n\n`lockdownMode` sets a global `auth.lockdown` value with `Active: true` and `ActiveUntil: now + auth.config.LoginTimeout` at `internal/service/auth_service.go:790-804`. `IsAccountLocked` checks this global lockdown before looking up the requested identifier at `internal/service/auth_service.go:227-234`, so every username is treated as locked while the global lockdown is active.\n\nThe default configuration enables this path with `LoginTimeout: 300` and `LoginMaxRetries: 3` at `internal/config/config.go:23-24`.\n\nSource-to-sink path:\n\n```text\nUnauthenticated POST /api/user/login JSON username\n  -\u003e loginHandler binds LoginRequest\n  -\u003e unknown username path records RecordLoginAttempt(attacker-chosen username, false)\n  -\u003e 257 unique identifiers fill loginAttempts beyond MaxLoginAttemptRecords\n  -\u003e RecordLoginAttempt starts lockdownMode()\n  -\u003e lockdownMode sets global auth.lockdown.Active = true\n  -\u003e IsAccountLocked returns locked for unrelated valid users\n  -\u003e login endpoint returns HTTP 429 for valid credentials until loginTimeout expires\n```\n\nCandidate score: 13/14. Reachability 2, attacker control 2, privilege required 2, sink impact 1, mitigation weakness 2, default exposure 2, safe reproduction feasibility 2.\n\n### PoC\n\nThis PoC is local and non-destructive. It was tested against stable tag `v5.0.7`. It proves that 257 distinct unknown-user identifiers trigger global lockdown for an unrelated valid user, while that user\u0027s password still verifies successfully.\n\n1. Check out stable `v5.0.7`.\n\n2. Create `internal/service/login_lockdown_stable_poc_test.go`:\n\n```go\npackage service\n\nimport (\n    \"fmt\"\n    \"testing\"\n    \"time\"\n\n    \"github.com/steveiliop56/tinyauth/internal/config\"\n    \"github.com/steveiliop56/tinyauth/internal/utils/tlog\"\n    \"github.com/stretchr/testify/require\"\n)\n\nfunc TestPoCStableUnknownUsersTriggerGlobalLoginLockdown(t *testing.T) {\n    tlog.NewTestLogger().Init()\n\n    authServiceCfg := AuthServiceConfig{\n        Users: []config.User{{\n            Username: \"testuser\",\n            Password: \"$2a$10$ZwVYQH07JX2zq7Fjkt3gU.BjwvvwPeli4OqOno04RQIv0P7usBrXa\", // password\n        }},\n        LoginTimeout:    2,\n        LoginMaxRetries: 3,\n    }\n\n    authService := NewAuthService(authServiceCfg, \u0026DockerService{}, \u0026LdapService{}, nil, nil)\n    t.Cleanup(authService.ClearRateLimitsTestingOnly)\n\n    require.True(t, authService.VerifyUser(config.UserSearch{\n        Username: \"testuser\",\n        Type:     \"local\",\n    }, \"password\"))\n\n    for i := 0; i \u003c= MaxLoginAttemptRecords; i++ {\n        authService.RecordLoginAttempt(fmt.Sprintf(\"attacker-%03d\", i), false)\n    }\n\n    require.Eventually(t, func() bool {\n        locked, _ := authService.IsAccountLocked(\"testuser\")\n        return locked\n    }, time.Second, 10*time.Millisecond)\n\n    locked, remaining := authService.IsAccountLocked(\"testuser\")\n    require.True(t, locked)\n    require.GreaterOrEqual(t, remaining, 0)\n\n    require.True(t, authService.VerifyUser(config.UserSearch{\n        Username: \"testuser\",\n        Type:     \"local\",\n    }, \"password\"))\n\n    t.Logf(\"proof on v5.0.7: %d distinct failed unknown-user identifiers caused unrelated valid user testuser to be locked\", MaxLoginAttemptRecords+1)\n}\n```\n\n3. Run:\n\n```bash\ngo test ./internal/service -run \u0027TestPoCStableUnknownUsersTriggerGlobalLoginLockdown\u0027 -count=1 -v\n```\n\nObserved output from this environment:\n\n```text\n=== RUN   TestPoCStableUnknownUsersTriggerGlobalLoginLockdown\nauth_service.go:798: Multiple login attempts detected, possibly DDOS attack. Activating temporary lockdown.\n    login_lockdown_stable_poc_test.go:42: proof on v5.0.7: 257 distinct failed unknown-user identifiers caused unrelated valid user testuser to be locked\n--- PASS: TestPoCStableUnknownUsersTriggerGlobalLoginLockdown (0.10s)\nPASS\nok      github.com/steveiliop56/tinyauth/internal/service    0.111s\n```\n\n4. Cleanup:\n\n```bash\nrm internal/service/login_lockdown_stable_poc_test.go\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nA remote unauthenticated attacker who can reach Tinyauth\u0027s login endpoint can temporarily deny login for unrelated valid users by sending a small number of login attempts using unique nonexistent usernames.\n\nWith default configuration, the global lockdown lasts 300 seconds. The attack does not invalidate existing sessions, but users who need to log in during the lockdown window receive rate-limit responses even when providing valid credentials.\n\nThis affects availability of local login and any flow that depends on the same account-lock check. The issue is especially relevant for internet-exposed Tinyauth deployments where `/api/user/login` is reachable.\n\nSuggested remediation: do not enter global lockdown because of attacker-controlled unknown usernames. Use bounded LRU eviction for old login-attempt records instead of global lockout; consider rate limiting by client IP plus normalized username; avoid counting unlimited nonexistent usernames toward a global security state. If a global safety mode is desired, require stronger signals such as source-based thresholds rather than only distinct username count.",
  "id": "GHSA-9xhm-w3wj-xhqh",
  "modified": "2026-09-22T20:37:11Z",
  "published": "2026-09-22T20:37:11Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/tinyauthapp/tinyauth/security/advisories/GHSA-9xhm-w3wj-xhqh"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-77561"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/tinyauthapp/tinyauth/pull/1008"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/tinyauthapp/tinyauth/pull/943"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/tinyauthapp/tinyauth/commit/654b5cc436fc67865c1f55edf9ba9fbded50b74f"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/tinyauthapp/tinyauth/commit/dade1e2c8f27a23df56ac216dcaf4b37081698e7"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/tinyauthapp/tinyauth"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/tinyauthapp/tinyauth/releases/tag/v5.1.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Tinyauth: Unauthenticated login attempts can trigger global login lockdown denial of service"
}

CVE-2026-77561 (GCVE-0-2026-77561)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-09-21 16:48 – Updated: 2026-09-24 22:23

Title

Tinyauth: Unauthenticated login attempts can trigger global login lockdown denial of service

Summary

Tinyauth is an authentication and authorization server. Prior to 5.1.0, an unauthenticated remote attacker can send POST /api/user/login requests with 257 distinct nonexistent usernames to fill MaxLoginAttemptRecords and activate a global login lockdown. internal/controller/user_controller.go loginHandler passes each attacker-controlled identifier to internal/service/auth_service.go RecordLoginAttempt, which invokes lockdownMode after the map reaches its cap. IsAccountLocked checks that global state before validating unrelated accounts, causing valid users to receive HTTP 429 until auth.loginTimeout expires, approximately 300 seconds by default. The attack can be repeated, but existing authenticated sessions are not invalidated. This issue is fixed in version 5.1.0.

Severity

5.3 (Medium)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L

SSVC

Exploitation: poc Automatable: yes Technical Impact: partial

CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)

Decision recorded 2026-09-24 22:22 UTC

CWE

CWE-307 - Improper Restriction of Excessive Authentication Attempts

Assigner

GitHub_M mitre root Scorecard

References

6 references

URL	Tags
https://github.com/tinyauthapp/tinyauth/security/…	x_refsource_CONFIRM
https://github.com/tinyauthapp/tinyauth/pull/1008	x_refsource_MISC
https://github.com/tinyauthapp/tinyauth/pull/943	x_refsource_MISC
https://github.com/tinyauthapp/tinyauth/commit/65…	x_refsource_MISC
https://github.com/tinyauthapp/tinyauth/commit/da…	x_refsource_MISC
https://github.com/tinyauthapp/tinyauth/releases/…	x_refsource_MISC

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version
tinyauthapp	tinyauth	Affected: < 5.1.0

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "containers": {
    "adp": [
      {
        "metrics": [
          {
            "other": {
              "content": {
                "id": "CVE-2026-77561",
                "options": [
                  {
                    "Exploitation": "poc"
                  },
                  {
                    "Automatable": "yes"
                  },
                  {
                    "Technical Impact": "partial"
                  }
                ],
                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                "timestamp": "2026-09-24T22:22:48.336829Z",
                "version": "2.0.3"
              },
              "type": "ssvc"
            }
          }
        ],
        "providerMetadata": {
          "dateUpdated": "2026-09-24T22:23:12.221Z",
          "orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
          "shortName": "CISA-ADP"
        },
        "references": [
          {
            "tags": [
              "exploit"
            ],
            "url": "https://github.com/tinyauthapp/tinyauth/security/advisories/GHSA-9xhm-w3wj-xhqh"
          }
        ],
        "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
      }
    ],
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "tinyauth",
          "vendor": "tinyauthapp",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c 5.1.0"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "Tinyauth is an authentication and authorization server. Prior to 5.1.0, an unauthenticated remote attacker can send POST /api/user/login requests with 257 distinct nonexistent usernames to fill MaxLoginAttemptRecords and activate a global login lockdown. internal/controller/user_controller.go loginHandler passes each attacker-controlled identifier to internal/service/auth_service.go RecordLoginAttempt, which invokes lockdownMode after the map reaches its cap. IsAccountLocked checks that global state before validating unrelated accounts, causing valid users to receive HTTP 429 until auth.loginTimeout expires, approximately 300 seconds by default. The attack can be repeated, but existing authenticated sessions are not invalidated. This issue is fixed in version 5.1.0."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV3_1": {
            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
            "attackVector": "NETWORK",
            "availabilityImpact": "LOW",
            "baseScore": 5.3,
            "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
            "confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
            "integrityImpact": "NONE",
            "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
            "scope": "UNCHANGED",
            "userInteraction": "NONE",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
            "version": "3.1"
          }
        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-307",
              "description": "CWE-307: Improper Restriction of Excessive Authentication Attempts",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-09-21T16:48:21.732Z",
        "orgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
        "shortName": "GitHub_M"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/tinyauthapp/tinyauth/security/advisories/GHSA-9xhm-w3wj-xhqh",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_CONFIRM"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/tinyauthapp/tinyauth/security/advisories/GHSA-9xhm-w3wj-xhqh"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/tinyauthapp/tinyauth/pull/1008",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/tinyauthapp/tinyauth/pull/1008"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/tinyauthapp/tinyauth/pull/943",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/tinyauthapp/tinyauth/pull/943"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/tinyauthapp/tinyauth/commit/654b5cc436fc67865c1f55edf9ba9fbded50b74f",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/tinyauthapp/tinyauth/commit/654b5cc436fc67865c1f55edf9ba9fbded50b74f"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/tinyauthapp/tinyauth/commit/dade1e2c8f27a23df56ac216dcaf4b37081698e7",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/tinyauthapp/tinyauth/commit/dade1e2c8f27a23df56ac216dcaf4b37081698e7"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/tinyauthapp/tinyauth/releases/tag/v5.1.0",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/tinyauthapp/tinyauth/releases/tag/v5.1.0"
        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "advisory": "GHSA-9xhm-w3wj-xhqh",
        "discovery": "UNKNOWN"
      },
      "title": "Tinyauth: Unauthenticated login attempts can trigger global login lockdown denial of service"
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
    "assignerShortName": "GitHub_M",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-77561",
    "datePublished": "2026-09-21T16:48:21.732Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-08-20T20:35:30.146Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-09-24T22:23:12.221Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.

Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.

Action not permitted

GHSA-9XHM-W3WJ-XHQH

Summary

Details

PoC

Impact

CVE-2026-77561 (GCVE-0-2026-77561)

Tags

Sightings

Nomenclature

Related by attack behaviour