GHSA-9XG4-QHM4-G43W
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-16 19:08 – Updated: 2026-06-16 19:08Summary
node:crypto.checkPrime(candidate[, options][, callback]) and crypto.checkPrimeSync(candidate[, options]) ran no Miller-Rabin rounds at all when the caller left options.checks at its default of 0. In that mode, the only test applied to the candidate was trial division by the primes up to 17,863. Any composite whose smallest prime factor exceeds that bound — for example the product of two primes just above it, such as 17,881 × 17,891 — was reported as true ("probably prime").
The same divergence affected the lower-level op_node_check_prime / op_node_check_prime_bytes paths that the polyfill calls into.
Node.js itself does not have this problem: it forwards checks = 0 to OpenSSL's BN_check_prime, which substitutes a sensible default number of rounds based on the candidate's bit length (per FIPS 186-4 Appendix C.3 Table C.1). Deno's Rust implementation had no equivalent fallback, so count = 0 meant "skip the loop entirely."
Affected APIs
crypto.checkPrime(candidate)(callback form, default options)crypto.checkPrime(candidate, { checks: 0 }, callback)crypto.checkPrimeSync(candidate)(default options)crypto.checkPrimeSync(candidate, { checks: 0 })
Callers who explicitly passed checks >= 1 were less affected, the loop ran the number of rounds they asked for, but were still receiving fewer rounds than Node would have applied for the same bit length. With the patched version they get at least the FIPS minimum.
Not affected
- Deno's prime generation (
crypto.generatePrime,crypto.generatePrimeSync, and the DH parameter generation path). Those routes go throughPrime::generate_with_optionsinext/node_crypto/primes.rs, which hardcodes20Miller-Rabin rounds and never reads a user-controlledchecksvalue, so the bug never reached them. - Any other Deno-internal use of primality testing —
is_probably_primeis not called from elsewhere in the runtime withcount = 0. - Web Crypto (
crypto.subtle.*), which uses entirely separate code paths and does not expose a primality test.
Impact
The realistic exposure is application-level: a Deno program that calls crypto.checkPrime (or its sync variant) with default options to validate an externally-supplied bignum, for example checking a peer-provided Diffie-Hellman prime, validating a prime read from configuration, or sanity-checking an RSA factor, will accept crafted composites as prime. The composite is trivial to construct: any product of two primes greater than 17,863 works.
Downstream consequences depend on what the program does with the "verified" prime. If the prime is fed into a key exchange, signature verification, or factorization-style check, the security guarantees of that protocol collapse to whatever the attacker engineered into the composite.
The CVSS impact is bounded by the requirement that the victim application both (a) calls checkPrime with default options and (b) acts on the result for security-relevant input it does not control.
Reproduction
import { checkPrimeSync } from "node:crypto";
// 17881 and 17891 are both prime and both above the trial-division
// ceiling used by Deno's implementation.
const composite = 17881n * 17891n;
// Affected versions print `true`; the patched version prints `false`.
console.log(checkPrimeSync(composite));
The same result is reproducible from Rust against the internal helper:
use num_bigint::BigInt;
let composite = BigInt::from(17881u32) * BigInt::from(17891u32);
assert!(!is_probably_prime(&composite, 0)); // fails on affected versions
Fix
PR #34391 introduces a
helper min_miller_rabin_rounds_for_bits(bits) that returns the FIPS
186-4 Appendix C.3 round counts, matching the defaults OpenSSL uses
inside BN_check_prime. is_probably_prime then clamps the loop bound
to count.max(min_miller_rabin_rounds_for_bits(n.bits())). The
probabilistic loop now always executes, regardless of what checks
value the caller supplied, with a round count strong enough to keep the
false-positive probability below 2^-80. Callers that pass a larger
explicit checks still get exactly that many rounds.
Unit tests under ext/node_crypto/primes.rs cover the
17,881 × 17,891 case, a larger 64-bit composite, and the FIPS lookup
table itself.
Workarounds
If you cannot upgrade immediately:
- Pass an explicit
checksvalue when callingcrypto.checkPrimeorcrypto.checkPrimeSync. A value of64is conservative for any reasonable bit length and keeps the loop running. - Do not rely on
crypto.checkPrimeto validate attacker-influenced bignums in security-critical paths until you are on the patched release.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.8.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "deno"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.8.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-49440"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-325"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-16T19:08:55Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\n`node:crypto.checkPrime(candidate[, options][, callback])` and `crypto.checkPrimeSync(candidate[, options])` ran no Miller-Rabin rounds at all when the caller left `options.checks` at its default of `0`. In that mode, the only test applied to the candidate was trial division by the primes up to `17,863`. Any composite whose smallest prime factor exceeds that bound \u2014 for example the product of two primes just above it, such as `17,881 \u00d7 17,891` \u2014 was reported as `true` (\"probably prime\").\n\nThe same divergence affected the lower-level `op_node_check_prime` / `op_node_check_prime_bytes` paths that the polyfill calls into.\n\nNode.js itself does not have this problem: it forwards `checks = 0` to OpenSSL\u0027s `BN_check_prime`, which substitutes a sensible default number of rounds based on the candidate\u0027s bit length (per FIPS 186-4 Appendix C.3 Table C.1). Deno\u0027s Rust implementation had no equivalent fallback, so `count = 0` meant \"skip the loop entirely.\"\n\n## Affected APIs\n\n- `crypto.checkPrime(candidate)` (callback form, default options)\n- `crypto.checkPrime(candidate, { checks: 0 }, callback)`\n- `crypto.checkPrimeSync(candidate)` (default options)\n- `crypto.checkPrimeSync(candidate, { checks: 0 })`\n\nCallers who explicitly passed `checks \u003e= 1` were less affected, the loop ran the number of rounds they asked for, but were still receiving fewer rounds than Node would have applied for the same bit length. With the patched version they get at least the FIPS minimum.\n\n## Not affected\n\n- Deno\u0027s prime *generation* (`crypto.generatePrime`, `crypto.generatePrimeSync`, and the DH parameter generation path). Those routes go through `Prime::generate_with_options` in `ext/node_crypto/primes.rs`, which hardcodes `20` Miller-Rabin rounds and never reads a user-controlled `checks` value, so the bug never reached them.\n- Any other Deno-internal use of primality testing \u2014 `is_probably_prime` is not called from elsewhere in the runtime with `count = 0`. \n- Web Crypto (`crypto.subtle.*`), which uses entirely separate code paths and does not expose a primality test.\n\n## Impact\n\nThe realistic exposure is application-level: a Deno program that calls `crypto.checkPrime` (or its sync variant) with default options to validate an externally-supplied bignum, for example checking a peer-provided Diffie-Hellman prime, validating a prime read from configuration, or sanity-checking an RSA factor, will accept crafted composites as prime. The composite is trivial to construct: any product of two primes greater than `17,863` works.\n\nDownstream consequences depend on what the program does with the \"verified\" prime. If the prime is fed into a key exchange, signature verification, or factorization-style check, the security guarantees of that protocol collapse to whatever the attacker engineered into the composite.\n\nThe CVSS impact is bounded by the requirement that the victim application both (a) calls `checkPrime` with default options and (b) acts on the result for security-relevant input it does not control.\n\n## Reproduction\n\n```ts\nimport { checkPrimeSync } from \"node:crypto\";\n\n// 17881 and 17891 are both prime and both above the trial-division\n// ceiling used by Deno\u0027s implementation.\nconst composite = 17881n * 17891n;\n\n// Affected versions print `true`; the patched version prints `false`.\nconsole.log(checkPrimeSync(composite));\n```\n\nThe same result is reproducible from Rust against the internal helper:\n\n```rust\nuse num_bigint::BigInt;\nlet composite = BigInt::from(17881u32) * BigInt::from(17891u32);\nassert!(!is_probably_prime(\u0026composite, 0)); // fails on affected versions\n```\n\n## Fix\n\nPR [#34391](https://github.com/denoland/deno/pull/34391) introduces a\nhelper `min_miller_rabin_rounds_for_bits(bits)` that returns the FIPS\n186-4 Appendix C.3 round counts, matching the defaults OpenSSL uses\ninside `BN_check_prime`. `is_probably_prime` then clamps the loop bound\nto `count.max(min_miller_rabin_rounds_for_bits(n.bits()))`. The\nprobabilistic loop now always executes, regardless of what `checks`\nvalue the caller supplied, with a round count strong enough to keep the\nfalse-positive probability below 2^-80. Callers that pass a larger\nexplicit `checks` still get exactly that many rounds.\n\nUnit tests under `ext/node_crypto/primes.rs` cover the\n`17,881 \u00d7 17,891` case, a larger 64-bit composite, and the FIPS lookup\ntable itself.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nIf you cannot upgrade immediately:\n\n- **Pass an explicit `checks` value** when calling `crypto.checkPrime` or `crypto.checkPrimeSync`. A value of `64` is conservative for any reasonable bit length and keeps the loop running.\n- **Do not rely on `crypto.checkPrime` to validate attacker-influenced bignums** in security-critical paths until you are on the patched release.",
"id": "GHSA-9xg4-qhm4-g43w",
"modified": "2026-06-16T19:08:55Z",
"published": "2026-06-16T19:08:55Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/denoland/deno/security/advisories/GHSA-9xg4-qhm4-g43w"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/denoland/deno/pull/34391"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/denoland/deno"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Deno: Miller-Rabin Primality Test Allows Zero Rounds"
}
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