Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-9MGQ-6R88-PGHR

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-26 09:31 – Updated: 2026-10-26 09:31

Details

Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal') vulnerability in Apache Camel Docling component.

This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.15.0 before 4.18.5, from 4.19.0 before 4.22.2.

DoclingProducer runs the external docling tool in CLI mode, the default, and tells it where to write the converted document through the --output flag. When the CamelDoclingOutputFilePath header was set, addOutputDirectoryArguments handed its value to that flag verbatim: the value was not normalized, an absolute path or a path containing .. segments was accepted as given, and no endpoint option could confine it to a directory. The custom-argument validation added by the fix for CVE-2026-40047 refuses the --output and -o flags in the CamelDoclingCustomArguments header and tells callers to choose the output directory with this header instead, so the one value that decides where docling writes reached the command line without any of the checks applied to custom arguments. Docling writes the conversion result, as Markdown, HTML, JSON or text, into that directory, naming the file after the input file, and the producer afterwards removes only its own temporary directory, so the file is left in place. A party able to set the header could therefore have conversion output created in any directory the Camel process can write to. The content of such a file is the conversion of the document carried by the message, so it is shaped by whoever supplies that document without being written byte for byte, and when the document content arrives in the message body the producer stores it under a random temporary name, which the output file then carries. The header belongs to the Camel header namespace, which consumers applying Camel's default header filtering, such as the JMS and Kafka consumers, remove from incoming messages, so the issue is reached where a route forwards externally influenced values into the header or where a consumer maps incoming headers without that filtering. The docling-serve mode does not use the header.

Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.23.0, which fixes the issue. If users are on the 4.22.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.22.2. If users are on the 4.18.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.18.5. The fix adds an outputBaseDirectory endpoint option that is unset by default, so after upgrading, set it on every docling endpoint whose CamelDoclingOutputFilePath header can carry a value influenced from outside the deployment; without it the header is normalized but can still name any directory. The 4.15.x to 4.17.x and 4.19.x to 4.21.x release lines reached end of life before this issue was resolved and will not receive a fix, so deployments on them must move to a supported release. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, do not build the CamelDoclingOutputFilePath header from values that originate outside the deployment, remove that header from messages that arrive from outside before they reach a docling endpoint, and make sure that consumers which map incoming message headers drop the Camel header namespace, so that only the route itself chooses the output directory.

Severity

5.4 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L

Show details on source website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-95629"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-10-26T09:16:36Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory (\u0027Path Traversal\u0027) vulnerability in Apache Camel Docling component.\n\n\n\nThis issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.15.0 before 4.18.5, from 4.19.0 before 4.22.2.\n\n\n\nDoclingProducer runs the external docling tool in CLI mode, the default, and tells it where to write the converted document through the --output flag. When the CamelDoclingOutputFilePath header was set, addOutputDirectoryArguments handed its value to that flag verbatim: the value was not normalized, an absolute path or a path containing .. segments was accepted as given, and no endpoint option could confine it to a directory. The custom-argument validation added by the fix for CVE-2026-40047 refuses the --output and -o flags in the CamelDoclingCustomArguments header and tells callers to choose the output directory with this header instead, so the one value that decides where docling writes reached the command line without any of the checks applied to custom arguments. Docling writes the conversion result, as Markdown, HTML, JSON or text, into that directory, naming the file after the input file, and the producer afterwards removes only its own temporary directory, so the file is left in place. A party able to set the header could therefore have conversion output created in any directory the Camel process can write to. The content of such a file is the conversion of the document carried by the message, so it is shaped by whoever supplies that document without being written byte for byte, and when the document content arrives in the message body the producer stores it under a random temporary name, which the output file then carries. The header belongs to the Camel header namespace, which consumers applying Camel\u0027s default header filtering, such as the JMS and Kafka consumers, remove from incoming messages, so the issue is reached where a route forwards externally influenced values into the header or where a consumer maps incoming headers without that filtering. The docling-serve mode does not use the header.\n\n\n\nUsers are recommended to upgrade to version 4.23.0, which fixes the issue. If users are on the 4.22.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.22.2. If users are on the 4.18.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.18.5. The fix adds an outputBaseDirectory endpoint option that is unset by default, so after upgrading, set it on every docling endpoint whose CamelDoclingOutputFilePath header can carry a value influenced from outside the deployment; without it the header is normalized but can still name any directory. The 4.15.x to 4.17.x and 4.19.x to 4.21.x release lines reached end of life before this issue was resolved and will not receive a fix, so deployments on them must move to a supported release. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, do not build the CamelDoclingOutputFilePath header from values that originate outside the deployment, remove that header from messages that arrive from outside before they reach a docling endpoint, and make sure that consumers which map incoming message headers drop the Camel header namespace, so that only the route itself chooses the output directory.",
  "id": "GHSA-9mgq-6r88-pghr",
  "modified": "2026-10-26T09:31:12Z",
  "published": "2026-10-26T09:31:12Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-95629"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/apache/camel/pull/26737"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/apache/camel/pull/27362"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/apache/camel/pull/27365"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://camel.apache.org/security/CVE-2026-40047.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://camel.apache.org/security/CVE-2026-78163.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://camel.apache.org/security/CVE-2026-95629.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/CAMEL-24894"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

CVE-2026-95629 (GCVE-0-2026-95629)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-10-26 08:44 – Updated: 2026-10-26 08:44

Title

Apache Camel: Camel-Docling Unvalidated Output Path Header Enables Writing Conversion Output to an Arbitrary Directory

Summary

Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal') vulnerability in Apache Camel Docling component. This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.15.0 before 4.18.5, from 4.19.0 before 4.22.2. DoclingProducer runs the external docling tool in CLI mode, the default, and tells it where to write the converted document through the --output flag. When the CamelDoclingOutputFilePath header was set, addOutputDirectoryArguments handed its value to that flag verbatim: the value was not normalized, an absolute path or a path containing .. segments was accepted as given, and no endpoint option could confine it to a directory. The custom-argument validation added by the fix for CVE-2026-40047 refuses the --output and -o flags in the CamelDoclingCustomArguments header and tells callers to choose the output directory with this header instead, so the one value that decides where docling writes reached the command line without any of the checks applied to custom arguments. Docling writes the conversion result, as Markdown, HTML, JSON or text, into that directory, naming the file after the input file, and the producer afterwards removes only its own temporary directory, so the file is left in place. A party able to set the header could therefore have conversion output created in any directory the Camel process can write to. The content of such a file is the conversion of the document carried by the message, so it is shaped by whoever supplies that document without being written byte for byte, and when the document content arrives in the message body the producer stores it under a random temporary name, which the output file then carries. The header belongs to the Camel header namespace, which consumers applying Camel's default header filtering, such as the JMS and Kafka consumers, remove from incoming messages, so the issue is reached where a route forwards externally influenced values into the header or where a consumer maps incoming headers without that filtering. The docling-serve mode does not use the header. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.23.0, which fixes the issue. If users are on the 4.22.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.22.2. If users are on the 4.18.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.18.5. The fix adds an outputBaseDirectory endpoint option that is unset by default, so after upgrading, set it on every docling endpoint whose CamelDoclingOutputFilePath header can carry a value influenced from outside the deployment; without it the header is normalized but can still name any directory. The 4.15.x to 4.17.x and 4.19.x to 4.21.x release lines reached end of life before this issue was resolved and will not receive a fix, so deployments on them must move to a supported release. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, do not build the CamelDoclingOutputFilePath header from values that originate outside the deployment, remove that header from messages that arrive from outside before they reach a docling endpoint, and make sure that consumers which map incoming message headers drop the Camel header namespace, so that only the route itself chooses the output directory.

Severity

5.4 (Medium)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L

CWE

CWE-22 - Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')

Assigner

apache CNA under the mitre root

CNA scorecard B 76/100 over 1088 records in the last 180 days details

References

7 references

URL	Tags
https://camel.apache.org/security/CVE-2026-95629.html	vendor-advisory
https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/CAMEL-24894	issue-tracking
https://github.com/apache/camel/pull/26737	patch
https://github.com/apache/camel/pull/27365	patch
https://github.com/apache/camel/pull/27362	patch
https://camel.apache.org/security/CVE-2026-40047.html	related
https://camel.apache.org/security/CVE-2026-78163.html	related

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version
Apache Software Foundation	Apache Camel	Affected: 4.15.0 , < 4.18.5 (maven) Affected: 4.19.0 , < 4.22.2 (maven)

Credits

Zhixi "Jace" Sun, independent security researcher Andrea Cosentino

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "containers": {
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "collectionURL": "https://repo.maven.apache.org/maven2",
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "packageName": "org.apache.camel:camel-docling",
          "packageURL": "pkg:maven/org.apache.camel/camel-docling",
          "product": "Apache Camel",
          "vendor": "Apache Software Foundation",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "4.18.5",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "4.15.0",
              "versionType": "maven"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "4.22.2",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "4.19.0",
              "versionType": "maven"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "credits": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "type": "finder",
          "value": "Zhixi \"Jace\" Sun, independent security researcher"
        },
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "type": "remediation developer",
          "value": "Andrea Cosentino"
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "supportingMedia": [
            {
              "base64": false,
              "type": "text/html",
              "value": "\u003cp\u003eImproper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory (\u0027Path Traversal\u0027) vulnerability in Apache Camel Docling component.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThis issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.15.0 before 4.18.5, from 4.19.0 before 4.22.2.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eDoclingProducer runs the external docling tool in CLI mode, the default, and tells it where to write the converted document through the --output flag. When the CamelDoclingOutputFilePath header was set, addOutputDirectoryArguments handed its value to that flag verbatim: the value was not normalized, an absolute path or a path containing .. segments was accepted as given, and no endpoint option could confine it to a directory. The custom-argument validation added by the fix for CVE-2026-40047 refuses the --output and -o flags in the CamelDoclingCustomArguments header and tells callers to choose the output directory with this header instead, so the one value that decides where docling writes reached the command line without any of the checks applied to custom arguments. Docling writes the conversion result, as Markdown, HTML, JSON or text, into that directory, naming the file after the input file, and the producer afterwards removes only its own temporary directory, so the file is left in place. A party able to set the header could therefore have conversion output created in any directory the Camel process can write to. The content of such a file is the conversion of the document carried by the message, so it is shaped by whoever supplies that document without being written byte for byte, and when the document content arrives in the message body the producer stores it under a random temporary name, which the output file then carries. The header belongs to the Camel header namespace, which consumers applying Camel\u0027s default header filtering, such as the JMS and Kafka consumers, remove from incoming messages, so the issue is reached where a route forwards externally influenced values into the header or where a consumer maps incoming headers without that filtering. The docling-serve mode does not use the header.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eUsers are recommended to upgrade to version 4.23.0, which fixes the issue. If users are on the 4.22.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.22.2. If users are on the 4.18.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.18.5. The fix adds an outputBaseDirectory endpoint option that is unset by default, so after upgrading, set it on every docling endpoint whose CamelDoclingOutputFilePath header can carry a value influenced from outside the deployment; without it the header is normalized but can still name any directory. The 4.15.x to 4.17.x and 4.19.x to 4.21.x release lines reached end of life before this issue was resolved and will not receive a fix, so deployments on them must move to a supported release. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, do not build the CamelDoclingOutputFilePath header from values that originate outside the deployment, remove that header from messages that arrive from outside before they reach a docling endpoint, and make sure that consumers which map incoming message headers drop the Camel header namespace, so that only the route itself chooses the output directory.\u003c/p\u003e"
            }
          ],
          "value": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory (\u0027Path Traversal\u0027) vulnerability in Apache Camel Docling component.\n\n\n\nThis issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.15.0 before 4.18.5, from 4.19.0 before 4.22.2.\n\n\n\nDoclingProducer runs the external docling tool in CLI mode, the default, and tells it where to write the converted document through the --output flag. When the CamelDoclingOutputFilePath header was set, addOutputDirectoryArguments handed its value to that flag verbatim: the value was not normalized, an absolute path or a path containing .. segments was accepted as given, and no endpoint option could confine it to a directory. The custom-argument validation added by the fix for CVE-2026-40047 refuses the --output and -o flags in the CamelDoclingCustomArguments header and tells callers to choose the output directory with this header instead, so the one value that decides where docling writes reached the command line without any of the checks applied to custom arguments. Docling writes the conversion result, as Markdown, HTML, JSON or text, into that directory, naming the file after the input file, and the producer afterwards removes only its own temporary directory, so the file is left in place. A party able to set the header could therefore have conversion output created in any directory the Camel process can write to. The content of such a file is the conversion of the document carried by the message, so it is shaped by whoever supplies that document without being written byte for byte, and when the document content arrives in the message body the producer stores it under a random temporary name, which the output file then carries. The header belongs to the Camel header namespace, which consumers applying Camel\u0027s default header filtering, such as the JMS and Kafka consumers, remove from incoming messages, so the issue is reached where a route forwards externally influenced values into the header or where a consumer maps incoming headers without that filtering. The docling-serve mode does not use the header.\n\n\n\nUsers are recommended to upgrade to version 4.23.0, which fixes the issue. If users are on the 4.22.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.22.2. If users are on the 4.18.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.18.5. The fix adds an outputBaseDirectory endpoint option that is unset by default, so after upgrading, set it on every docling endpoint whose CamelDoclingOutputFilePath header can carry a value influenced from outside the deployment; without it the header is normalized but can still name any directory. The 4.15.x to 4.17.x and 4.19.x to 4.21.x release lines reached end of life before this issue was resolved and will not receive a fix, so deployments on them must move to a supported release. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, do not build the CamelDoclingOutputFilePath header from values that originate outside the deployment, remove that header from messages that arrive from outside before they reach a docling endpoint, and make sure that consumers which map incoming message headers drop the Camel header namespace, so that only the route itself chooses the output directory."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV3_1": {
            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
            "attackVector": "NETWORK",
            "availabilityImpact": "LOW",
            "baseScore": 5.4,
            "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
            "confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
            "integrityImpact": "LOW",
            "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
            "scope": "UNCHANGED",
            "userInteraction": "NONE",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L",
            "version": "3.1"
          },
          "format": "CVSS",
          "scenarios": [
            {
              "lang": "en",
              "value": "GENERAL"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-22",
              "description": "CWE-22 Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory (\u0027Path Traversal\u0027)",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-10-26T08:44:22.849Z",
        "orgId": "f0158376-9dc2-43b6-827c-5f631a4d8d09",
        "shortName": "apache"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "name": "Apache Camel Security Advisory - CVE-2026-95629",
          "tags": [
            "vendor-advisory"
          ],
          "url": "https://camel.apache.org/security/CVE-2026-95629.html"
        },
        {
          "name": "CAMEL-24894",
          "tags": [
            "issue-tracking"
          ],
          "url": "https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/CAMEL-24894"
        },
        {
          "name": "Fix on main, released in 4.23.0 (commit 48485d408f190c46ef408ba4ba75e45b4e8ffb04)",
          "tags": [
            "patch"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/apache/camel/pull/26737"
        },
        {
          "name": "Backport to camel-4.22.x for 4.22.2 (commit 4f8eb14999163523af6b77d08bfd1b9e79ee49c0)",
          "tags": [
            "patch"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/apache/camel/pull/27365"
        },
        {
          "name": "Backport to camel-4.18.x, released in 4.18.5 (commit 54552df4b9e512cb2025fad22b88429ef0e0169c)",
          "tags": [
            "patch"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/apache/camel/pull/27362"
        },
        {
          "name": "CVE-2026-40047, whose custom-argument validation directs callers to the header described here",
          "tags": [
            "related"
          ],
          "url": "https://camel.apache.org/security/CVE-2026-40047.html"
        },
        {
          "name": "CVE-2026-78163, whose fix introduced the inputBaseDirectory option that outputBaseDirectory mirrors",
          "tags": [
            "related"
          ],
          "url": "https://camel.apache.org/security/CVE-2026-78163.html"
        }
      ],
      "solutions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "supportingMedia": [
            {
              "base64": false,
              "type": "text/html",
              "value": "\u003cp\u003eUpgrade to Apache Camel 4.23.0, which fixes the issue. Users on the 4.22.x stream should upgrade to 4.22.2 and users on the 4.18.x stream should upgrade to 4.18.5. The CamelDoclingOutputFilePath header is now normalized before it reaches docling, and a new outputBaseDirectory endpoint option confines it: when the option is set, a value that resolves outside that directory, including an absolute path, is rejected with an IOException before docling is started. The option is unset by default, so it must be set after upgrading wherever the header can carry a value influenced from outside the deployment; without it the header is normalized but can still name any directory. The 4.15.x to 4.17.x and 4.19.x to 4.21.x release lines reached end of life before this issue was resolved and will not receive a fix, so deployments on them must move to a supported release.\u003c/p\u003e"
            }
          ],
          "value": "Upgrade to Apache Camel 4.23.0, which fixes the issue. Users on the 4.22.x stream should upgrade to 4.22.2 and users on the 4.18.x stream should upgrade to 4.18.5. The CamelDoclingOutputFilePath header is now normalized before it reaches docling, and a new outputBaseDirectory endpoint option confines it: when the option is set, a value that resolves outside that directory, including an absolute path, is rejected with an IOException before docling is started. The option is unset by default, so it must be set after upgrading wherever the header can carry a value influenced from outside the deployment; without it the header is normalized but can still name any directory. The 4.15.x to 4.17.x and 4.19.x to 4.21.x release lines reached end of life before this issue was resolved and will not receive a fix, so deployments on them must move to a supported release."
        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "discovery": "UNKNOWN"
      },
      "title": "Apache Camel: Camel-Docling Unvalidated Output Path Header Enables Writing Conversion Output to an Arbitrary Directory",
      "workarounds": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "supportingMedia": [
            {
              "base64": false,
              "type": "text/html",
              "value": "\u003cp\u003eDo not build the CamelDoclingOutputFilePath header from values that originate outside the deployment, remove that header from messages that arrive from outside before they reach a docling endpoint, and make sure that consumers which map incoming message headers drop the Camel header namespace, so that only the route itself chooses the output directory.\u003c/p\u003e"
            }
          ],
          "value": "Do not build the CamelDoclingOutputFilePath header from values that originate outside the deployment, remove that header from messages that arrive from outside before they reach a docling endpoint, and make sure that consumers which map incoming message headers drop the Camel header namespace, so that only the route itself chooses the output directory."
        }
      ],
      "x_generator": {
        "engine": "Vulnogram 1.0.3"
      }
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "f0158376-9dc2-43b6-827c-5f631a4d8d09",
    "assignerShortName": "apache",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-95629",
    "datePublished": "2026-10-26T08:44:22.849Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-09-22T11:04:06.573Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-10-26T08:44:22.849Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

Order JSON

Publication & reservation Sightings KEV catalogs Other timestamps

Loading timeline…

The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.

Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.

Action not permitted