GHSA-9JFP-C25Q-RF5Q
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-19 12:32 – Updated: 2026-10-19 12:32Improper Handling of Case Sensitivity vulnerability in Apache Camel Platform HTTP component.
This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.0.0 before 4.18.5, from 4.19.0 before 4.22.1.
The guard that prevents a request header being reflected into the response compared header names case sensitively, while HTTP header names are case insensitive. A caller could therefore defeat the suppression simply by varying the case of the header name. HTTP/2 makes the problem unconditional rather than optional: the protocol requires header names to be lowercase on the wire, so the comparison never matched and the suppression was inert for every request on an HTTP/2 connection. The consequence is that content the caller chose is echoed back in the response, which is the basis for response-splitting and cache-poisoning style attacks against whatever sits in front of the Camel endpoint.
Upgrade to Apache Camel 4.23.0, which fixes the issue. Users on the 4.18.x LTS releases stream should upgrade to 4.18.5. Users on the 4.22.x LTS releases stream should upgrade to 4.22.1. Request header names are now compared case insensitively, so the suppression holds regardless of casing and works under HTTP/2. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, strip the headers in question in front of the Camel endpoint, or remove them from the response in the route rather than relying on the built-in suppression.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-85254"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-178"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-19T11:17:23Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Improper Handling of Case Sensitivity vulnerability in Apache Camel Platform HTTP component.\n\nThis issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.0.0 before 4.18.5, from 4.19.0 before 4.22.1.\n\nThe guard that prevents a request header being reflected into the response compared header names case sensitively, while HTTP header names are case insensitive. A caller could therefore defeat the suppression simply by varying the case of the header name. HTTP/2 makes the problem unconditional rather than optional: the protocol requires header names to be lowercase on the wire, so the comparison never matched and the suppression was inert for every request on an HTTP/2 connection. The consequence is that content the caller chose is echoed back in the response, which is the basis for response-splitting and cache-poisoning style attacks against whatever sits in front of the Camel endpoint.\n\nUpgrade to Apache Camel 4.23.0, which fixes the issue. Users on the 4.18.x LTS releases stream should upgrade to 4.18.5. Users on the 4.22.x LTS releases stream should upgrade to 4.22.1. Request header names are now compared case insensitively, so the suppression holds regardless of casing and works under HTTP/2. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, strip the headers in question in front of the Camel endpoint, or remove them from the response in the route rather than relying on the built-in suppression.",
"id": "GHSA-9jfp-c25q-rf5q",
"modified": "2026-10-19T12:32:51Z",
"published": "2026-10-19T12:32:51Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-85254"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/apache/camel/pull/25831"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/apache/camel/pull/25940"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/apache/camel/pull/25942"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://camel.apache.org/security/CVE-2026-85254.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/CAMEL-24453"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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