GHSA-9GRV-W29F-QPM9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-01 15:30 – Updated: 2026-10-15 03:35In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: fix OOB read in smb2_ioctl_query_info QUERY_INFO path
smb2_ioctl_query_info() has two response-copy branches: PASSTHRU_FSCTL and the default QUERY_INFO path. The QUERY_INFO branch clamps qi.input_buffer_length to the server-reported OutputBufferLength and then copies qi.input_buffer_length bytes from qi_rsp->Buffer to userspace, but it never verifies that the flexible-array payload actually fits within rsp_iov[1].iov_len.
A malicious server can return OutputBufferLength larger than the actual QUERY_INFO response, causing copy_to_user() to walk past the response buffer and expose adjacent kernel heap to userspace.
Guard the QUERY_INFO copy with a bounds check on the actual Buffer payload. Use struct_size(qi_rsp, Buffer, qi.input_buffer_length) rather than an open-coded addition so the guard cannot overflow on 32-bit builds.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-31708"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-125"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-01T14:16:20Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nsmb: client: fix OOB read in smb2_ioctl_query_info QUERY_INFO path\n\nsmb2_ioctl_query_info() has two response-copy branches: PASSTHRU_FSCTL\nand the default QUERY_INFO path. The QUERY_INFO branch clamps\nqi.input_buffer_length to the server-reported OutputBufferLength and then\ncopies qi.input_buffer_length bytes from qi_rsp-\u003eBuffer to userspace, but\nit never verifies that the flexible-array payload actually fits within\nrsp_iov[1].iov_len.\n\nA malicious server can return OutputBufferLength larger than the actual\nQUERY_INFO response, causing copy_to_user() to walk past the response\nbuffer and expose adjacent kernel heap to userspace.\n\nGuard the QUERY_INFO copy with a bounds check on the actual Buffer\npayload. Use struct_size(qi_rsp, Buffer, qi.input_buffer_length)\nrather than an open-coded addition so the guard cannot overflow on\n32-bit builds.",
"id": "GHSA-9grv-w29f-qpm9",
"modified": "2026-10-15T03:35:46Z",
"published": "2026-05-01T15:30:33Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31708"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-784472.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/078fae8f50adebb903ccf2252b44391324571e78"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1dd757379997b71a328a4b591ffaf481acd0ead1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/85fd46ee26a11841c670449508025965f61ce131"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9e203dbb5402897c43130fb171a2617008a91f45"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a34d456934fe42e4da5d2cc07787bf418bee99c6"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a58c5af19ff0d6f44f6e9fe31e33a2c92223f77e"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ac2f14e4705d020f04e806efa0d49ab8dc2b145f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e66bdc0704977ecee667a81d38255b579c2353d0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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