GHSA-8R9Q-7V3J-JR4G
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-01-05 21:30 – Updated: 2026-07-15 18:32Impact
A ReDoS vulnerability in the UriTemplate class allows attackers to cause denial of service. The partToRegExp() function generates a regex pattern with nested quantifiers (([^/]+(?:,[^/]+)*)) for exploded template variables (e.g., {/id*}, {?tags*}), causing catastrophic backtracking on malicious input.
Who is affected: MCP servers that register resource templates with exploded array patterns and accept requests from untrusted clients.
Attack result: An attacker sends a crafted URI via resources/read request, causing 100% CPU utilization, server hang/crash, and denial of service for all clients.
Affected Versions
All versions of @modelcontextprotocol/sdk prior to the patched release.
Patches
v1.25.2 contains b392f02ffcf37c088dbd114fedf25026ec3913d3 the fix modifies the regex pattern to prevent backtracking.
Workarounds
- Avoid using exploded patterns (
{/id*},{?tags*}) in resource templates - Implement request timeouts and rate limiting
- Validate URIs before processing to reject suspicious patterns
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@modelcontextprotocol/sdk"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.3.0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.25.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-0621"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1333"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-01-06T21:20:37Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-01-05T21:16:14Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nA ReDoS vulnerability in the `UriTemplate` class allows attackers to cause denial of service. The `partToRegExp()` function generates a regex pattern with nested quantifiers (`([^/]+(?:,[^/]+)*)`) for exploded template variables (e.g., `{/id*}`, `{?tags*}`), causing catastrophic backtracking on malicious input.\n\n**Who is affected:** MCP servers that register resource templates with exploded array patterns and accept requests from untrusted clients.\n\n**Attack result:** An attacker sends a crafted URI via `resources/read` request, causing 100% CPU utilization, server hang/crash, and denial of service for all clients.\n\n### Affected Versions\n\nAll versions of `@modelcontextprotocol/sdk` prior to the patched release.\n\n### Patches\n\nv1.25.2 contains b392f02ffcf37c088dbd114fedf25026ec3913d3 the fix modifies the regex pattern to prevent backtracking.\n\n### Workarounds\n\n- Avoid using exploded patterns (`{/id*}`, `{?tags*}`) in resource templates\n- Implement request timeouts and rate limiting\n- Validate URIs before processing to reject suspicious patterns",
"id": "GHSA-8r9q-7v3j-jr4g",
"modified": "2026-07-15T18:32:03Z",
"published": "2026-01-05T21:30:33Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/typescript-sdk/security/advisories/GHSA-cqwc-fm46-7fff"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-0621"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/typescript-sdk/issues/965"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/typescript-sdk/commit/7f0cf730"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/typescript-sdk/commit/b392f02ffcf37c088dbd114fedf25026ec3913d3"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/typescript-sdk"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/typescript-sdk/releases/tag/v1.25.2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/mcp-typescript-sdk-uritemplate-exploded-array-pattern-redos"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Anthropic\u0027s MCP TypeScript SDK has a ReDoS vulnerability"
}
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