GHSA-8C3C-2HVV-F3JX

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-19 15:31 – Updated: 2026-11-19 15:31
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

Drivers: hv: vmbus: Bounds check the shared ring buffer indices

In a CoCo VM the host is untrusted. Since the VMBus ring buffer read and write indices live in shared memory, the guest has to treat both as potentially malicious.

hv_ringbuffer_write() copies into the ring at write_index with no bounds checking, so the host can make the guest write packet data at any offset up to 4 GiB past the start of the ring buffer. read_index matters too: the available space derived from both indices is the only bound on how much is copied, and an out-of-range index can make it far larger than the ring.

The fix is to validate both indices before use and to use the validated snapshot instead of re-accessing. For invalid indices, hv_ringbuffer_write() logs and returns -EIO.

One re-read of write_index is left unchecked in this patch: hv_get_ring_bufferindices() fetches it again for the prev_indices trailer. The value is only returned to the host and is not used as an offset or length for indexing. Since this is not a security issue, it is addressed later in the series.

Open-coding the bytes available arithmetic keeps the fix free of prerequisites; a later patch refactors it into a helper function.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-99544"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-11-19T15:18:10Z",
    "severity": null
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nDrivers: hv: vmbus: Bounds check the shared ring buffer indices\n\nIn a CoCo VM the host is untrusted. Since the VMBus ring buffer read and\nwrite indices live in shared memory, the guest has to treat both as\npotentially malicious.\n\nhv_ringbuffer_write() copies into the ring at write_index with no bounds\nchecking, so the host can make the guest write packet data at any offset\nup to 4 GiB past the start of the ring buffer. read_index matters too:\nthe available space derived from both indices is the only bound on how\nmuch is copied, and an out-of-range index can make it far larger than\nthe ring.\n\nThe fix is to validate both indices before use and to use the validated\nsnapshot instead of re-accessing. For invalid indices,\nhv_ringbuffer_write() logs and returns -EIO.\n\nOne re-read of write_index is left unchecked in this patch:\nhv_get_ring_bufferindices() fetches it again for the prev_indices\ntrailer. The value is only returned to the host and is not used as an\noffset or length for indexing. Since this is not a security issue, it is\naddressed later in the series.\n\nOpen-coding the bytes available arithmetic keeps the fix free of\nprerequisites; a later patch refactors it into a helper function.",
  "id": "GHSA-8c3c-2hvv-f3jx",
  "modified": "2026-11-19T15:31:28Z",
  "published": "2026-11-19T15:31:28Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-99544"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1611ce4dc6cbace75f27db6a559af8d391a06118"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1d287c17cc5bfd6386fe0770999be410b248d021"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cdb9126a79b608b4331dfdc03beb05be8d2563be"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f204bb7c5d10482067e095af567c391bc88ecb44"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}



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