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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
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    <lastBuildDate>Fri, 20 Nov 2026 21:24:14 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-99544 — Drivers: hv: vmbus: Bounds check the shared ring buffer indices</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-99544</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Drivers: hv: vmbus: Bounds check the shared ring buffer indices&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In a CoCo VM the host is untrusted. Since the VMBus ring buffer read and
write indices live in shared memory, the guest has to treat both as
potentially malicious.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;hv_ringbuffer_write() copies into the ring at write_index with no bounds
checking, so the host can make the guest write packet data at any offset
up to 4 GiB past the start of the ring buffer. read_index matters too:
the available space derived from both indices is the only bound on how
much is copied, and an out-of-range index can make it far larger than
the ring.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The fix is to validate both indices before use and to use the validated
snapshot instead of re-accessing. For invalid indices,
hv_ringbuffer_write() logs and returns -EIO.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;One re-read of write_index is left unchecked in this patch:
hv_get_ring_bufferindices() fetches it again for the prev_indices
trailer. The value is only returned to the host and is not used as an
offset or length for indexing. Since this is not a security issue, it is
addressed later in the series.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Open-coding the bytes available arithmetic keeps the fix free of
prerequisites; a later patch refactors it into a helper function.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Drivers: hv: vmbus: Bounds check the shared ring buffer indices&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In a CoCo VM the host is untrusted. Since the VMBus ring buffer read and
write indices live in shared memory, the guest has to treat both as
potentially malicious.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;hv_ringbuffer_write() copies into the ring at write_index with no bounds
checking, so the host can make the guest write packet data at any offset
up to 4 GiB past the start of the ring buffer. read_index matters too:
the available space derived from both indices is the only bound on how
much is copied, and an out-of-range index can make it far larger than
the ring.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The fix is to validate both indices before use and to use the validated
snapshot instead of re-accessing. For invalid indices,
hv_ringbuffer_write() logs and returns -EIO.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;One re-read of write_index is left unchecked in this patch:
hv_get_ring_bufferindices() fetches it again for the prev_indices
trailer. The value is only returned to the host and is not used as an
offset or length for indexing. Since this is not a security issue, it is
addressed later in the series.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Open-coding the bytes available arithmetic keeps the fix free of
prerequisites; a later patch refactors it into a helper function.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-99544</guid>
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