GHSA-86R8-P43M-77RX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-05 15:32 – Updated: 2026-11-05 15:32In Eclipse BaSyx Helm Charts version 2.2.0 of the aas-basyx-v2-full chart, deployments with the bundled Keycloak enabled store the client secret of the basyx-technical-user OAuth2 client in cleartext in a Kubernetes ConfigMap. This client uses the client-credentials grant and its service account holds the realm admin role.
The chart correctly writes keycloak.technicalUser.clientSecret to a Kubernetes Secret, but the template basyx-keycloak-realm.yaml also substitutes the same value into the Keycloak realm-import JSON, which is stored in the ConfigMap <keycloak.fullnameOverride>-realm. A principal that can read ConfigMaps but not Secrets in the release namespace, such as a holder of the built-in Kubernetes view ClusterRole, can read the client secret from the ConfigMap. They can then exchange it at the Keycloak token endpoint for an access token with the admin role. That token grants full create, read, update, delete and execute rights on all BaSyx repositories and registries in the deployment.
The bundled Keycloak is disabled by default. No fixed release of the aas-basyx-v2-full chart exists. Affected users should migrate to the basyx chart, or deploy without the bundled Keycloak and rotate the basyx-technical-user client secret.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-123059"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-312"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-11-05T14:17:04Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In Eclipse BaSyx Helm Charts version 2.2.0 of the `aas-basyx-v2-full` chart, deployments with the bundled Keycloak enabled store the client secret of the `basyx-technical-user` OAuth2 client in cleartext in a Kubernetes ConfigMap. This client uses the client-credentials grant and its service account holds the realm `admin` role.\n\n\n\nThe chart correctly writes `keycloak.technicalUser.clientSecret` to a Kubernetes Secret, but the template `basyx-keycloak-realm.yaml` also substitutes the same value into the Keycloak realm-import JSON, which is stored in the ConfigMap `\u003ckeycloak.fullnameOverride\u003e-realm`. A principal that can read ConfigMaps but not Secrets in the release namespace, such as a holder of the built-in Kubernetes `view` ClusterRole, can read the client secret from the ConfigMap. They can then exchange it at the Keycloak token endpoint for an access token with the `admin` role. That token grants full create, read, update, delete and execute rights on all BaSyx repositories and registries in the deployment.\n\n\n\nThe bundled Keycloak is disabled by default. No fixed release of the `aas-basyx-v2-full` chart exists. Affected users should migrate to the `basyx` chart, or deploy without the bundled Keycloak and rotate the `basyx-technical-user` client secret.",
"id": "GHSA-86r8-p43m-77rx",
"modified": "2026-11-05T15:32:36Z",
"published": "2026-11-05T15:32:36Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/eclipse-basyx/charts/security/advisories/GHSA-6438-759f-6f8v"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-123059"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/eclipse-basyx/charts/pull/46"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/eclipse-basyx/charts/releases/tag/aas-basyx-v2-full-2.2.0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://gitlab.eclipse.org/security/cve-assignment/-/work_items/546"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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