GHSA-824X-88XG-CWRV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-01-05 20:02 – Updated: 2026-01-08 20:07Summary
Authenticated users with backup permissions can read arbitrary files within the webroot via path traversal in the Backup addon's file export functionality.
Details
The Backup addon does not validate the EXPDIR POST parameter against the UI-generated allowlist of permitted directories.
An attacker can supply relative paths containing ../ sequences (or even absolute paths inside the document root) to include any readable file in the generated .tar.gz archive.
Vulnerable code:
- redaxo/src/addons/backup/pages/export.php (lines 72-76) – directly uses $_POST['EXPDIR']
- redaxo/src/addons/backup/lib/backup.php (lines ~413 & ~427) – concatenates unsanitized user input with base path
This allows disclosure of sensitive files such as:
- redaxo/data/core/config.yml → database credentials + password hashes of all backend users
- .env, custom configuration files, logs, uploaded malicious files, etc.
Affected versions
≤ 5.20.1 (confirmed working)
Patched versions
None (as of 2025-12-09)
PoC – Extracting database credentials and password hashes
- Log in as any user with Backup permission
- Go to Backup → Export → Files
- Intercept the request with Burp Suite
- Change one
EXPDIR[]value to../../../../var/www/html/redaxo/data/core
-
Send request → download archive
-
Extract and open
data/core/config.yml
Result: plaintext database password
Impact
Full compromise of the REDAXO installation: - Database takeover - Password hash extraction → offline cracking → admin access - When combined with other vulnerabilities → RCE
CVSS 4.0 vector & score below.
Credits
Discovered by: Łukasz Rybak
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 5.20.1"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "redaxo/source"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.20.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-21857"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-24"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-01-05T20:02:58Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-01-07T23:15:50Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\nAuthenticated users with backup permissions can read arbitrary files within the webroot via path traversal in the Backup addon\u0027s file export functionality.\n\u003cimg width=\"664\" height=\"899\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/fd1ca69e-b275-4daf-9a62-621cde6525f5\" /\u003e\n\u003cimg width=\"2358\" height=\"445\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/fad81152-9e1b-413e-9823-09540a23e2fb\" /\u003e\n\n\n### Details\nThe Backup addon does not validate the `EXPDIR` POST parameter against the UI-generated allowlist of permitted directories. \nAn attacker can supply relative paths containing `../` sequences (or even absolute paths inside the document root) to include any readable file in the generated `.tar.gz` archive.\n\nVulnerable code:\n- `redaxo/src/addons/backup/pages/export.php` (lines 72-76) \u2013 directly uses `$_POST[\u0027EXPDIR\u0027]`\n- `redaxo/src/addons/backup/lib/backup.php` (lines ~413 \u0026 ~427) \u2013 concatenates unsanitized user input with base path\n\nThis allows disclosure of sensitive files such as:\n- `redaxo/data/core/config.yml` \u2192 database credentials + password hashes of all backend users\n- `.env`, custom configuration files, logs, uploaded malicious files, etc.\n\n### Affected versions\n\u2264 5.20.1 (confirmed working)\n\n### Patched versions\nNone (as of 2025-12-09)\n\n### PoC \u2013 Extracting database credentials and password hashes\n1. Log in as any user with Backup permission\n2. Go to Backup \u2192 Export \u2192 Files\n\n\u003cimg width=\"1240\" height=\"960\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/bc05ba18-9664-4be2-b637-4fec3a0f409a\" /\u003e\n\n3. Intercept the request with Burp Suite \n\n\u003cimg width=\"2184\" height=\"478\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/9fa754a1-2cd0-4d3d-a5cc-cfa34c8a1718\" /\u003e\n\n4. Change one `EXPDIR[]` value to `../../../../var/www/html/redaxo/data/core`\n\n\u003cimg width=\"978\" height=\"591\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/d15f5c7f-b72c-44cc-9be2-da8d3f26f124\" /\u003e\n\n5. Send request \u2192 download archive\n\u003cimg width=\"423\" height=\"131\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/db8a8bda-cdaf-4dea-812f-1e312da908e2\" /\u003e\n\n6. Extract and open `data/core/config.yml`\n\u003cimg width=\"859\" height=\"281\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/c8112ce1-5a1d-435f-953b-7eb4e711e042\" /\u003e\n\nResult: plaintext database password \n\u003cimg width=\"2534\" height=\"1198\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/218ae917-868a-437e-98b0-6471b82c0b10\" /\u003e\n\n### Impact\nFull compromise of the REDAXO installation:\n- Database takeover\n- Password hash extraction \u2192 offline cracking \u2192 admin access\n- When combined with other vulnerabilities \u2192 RCE\n\nCVSS 4.0 vector \u0026 score below.\n\n### Credits\nDiscovered by: \u0141ukasz Rybak",
"id": "GHSA-824x-88xg-cwrv",
"modified": "2026-01-08T20:07:42Z",
"published": "2026-01-05T20:02:58Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/redaxo/redaxo/security/advisories/GHSA-824x-88xg-cwrv"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-21857"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/redaxo/redaxo"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/redaxo/redaxo/releases/tag/5.20.2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Redaxo has Path Traversal in Backup Addon Leading to Arbitrary File Read"
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.