GHSA-7X45-PHMR-9WQP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-03-30 20:16 – Updated: 2024-10-01 19:20Summary
An unsafe extraction is being performed using shutil.unpack_archive() from a remotely retrieved tarball. Which may lead to the writing of the extracted files to an unintended location. This vulnerability is sometimes called a TarSlip or a ZipSlip variant.
Details
Unpacking files using the high-level function shutil.unpack_archive() from a potentially malicious tarball without validating that the destination file path remained within the intended destination directory may cause files to be overwritten outside the destination directory.
As can be seen in the vulnerable snippet code source, an archive is being retrieved using the download_file() function from a remote location which is a user-provided permanent storage bucket s3. Immediately after being retrieved, the tarball is unsafely unpacked using the function shutil.unpack_archive().
The vulnerable code is L128..L129 in fs.py file.
def __init__(self):
super().__init__()
if 's3_credentials' in self.config['permanent_storage']:
self.s3 = boto3.client('s3', **self.config['permanent_storage']['s3_credentials'])
else:
self.s3 = boto3.client('s3')
# User provided remote storage!
self.bucket = self.config['permanent_storage']['bucket']
def get(self, local_name, base_dir):
remote_name = local_name
remote_ziped_name = f'{remote_name}.tar.gz'
local_ziped_name = f'{local_name}.tar.gz'
local_ziped_path = os.path.join(base_dir, local_ziped_name)
os.makedirs(base_dir, exist_ok=True)
# Retrieve a potentially malicious tarball
self.s3.download_file(self.bucket, remote_ziped_name, local_ziped_path)
# Perform an unsafe extraction
shutil.unpack_archive(local_ziped_path, base_dir)
os.system(f'chmod -R 777 {base_dir}')
os.remove(local_ziped_path)
PoC
The following PoC is provided for illustration purposes only. It showcases the risk of extracting a non-harmless text file sim4n6.txt to one of the parent locations rather than the intended current folder.
> tar --list -f archive.tar
tar: Removing leading "../../../" from member names
../../../sim4n6.txt
> python3
Python 3.10.6 (main, Nov 2 2022, 18:53:38) [GCC 11.3.0] on linux
Type "help", "copyright", "credits" or "license" for more information.
>>> import shutil
>>> shutil.unpack_archive("archive.tar")
>>> exit()
> test -f ../../../sim4n6.txt && echo "sim4n6.txt exists"
sim4n6.txt exists
Attack Scenario
An attacker could craft a malicious tarball with a filename path, such as ../../../../../../../../etc/passwd, and then serve the archive remotely using a personal bucket s3, thus, retrieve the tarball through mindsdb and overwrite the system files of the hosting server.
Mitigation
Potential mitigation could be to:
- Use a safer module, like zipfile.
- Validate the location of the extracted files and discard those with malicious paths such as relative path .. or absolute path such as /etc/password.
- Perform a checksum verification for the retrieved archive, but hard-coding the hashes may be cumbersome and difficult to manage.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "mindsdb"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "22.11.4.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-23522"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2023-03-30T20:16:33Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2023-03-30T19:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nAn unsafe extraction is being performed using `shutil.unpack_archive()` from a remotely retrieved tarball. Which may lead to the writing of the extracted files to an unintended location. This vulnerability is sometimes called a **TarSlip** or a **ZipSlip variant**.\n\n### Details\n\nUnpacking files using the high-level function `shutil.unpack_archive()` from a potentially malicious tarball without validating that the destination file path remained within the intended destination directory may cause files to be overwritten outside the destination directory.\n\nAs can be seen in the vulnerable snippet code source, an archive is being retrieved using the `download_file()` function from a remote location which is a user-provided permanent storage bucket `s3`. Immediately after being retrieved, the tarball is unsafely unpacked using the function `shutil.unpack_archive()`.\n\nThe vulnerable code is [L128..L129](https://github.com/mindsdb/mindsdb/blob/69c76e727b8067f32b06ab83bb835a8c416c4f21/mindsdb/interfaces/storage/fs.py#L128..L129) in [fs.py](https://github.com/mindsdb/mindsdb/blob/69c76e727b8067f32b06ab83bb835a8c416c4f21/mindsdb/interfaces/storage/fs.py) file.\n\n```python3\n def __init__(self):\n super().__init__()\n if \u0027s3_credentials\u0027 in self.config[\u0027permanent_storage\u0027]:\n self.s3 = boto3.client(\u0027s3\u0027, **self.config[\u0027permanent_storage\u0027][\u0027s3_credentials\u0027])\n else:\n self.s3 = boto3.client(\u0027s3\u0027)\n \n # User provided remote storage!\n self.bucket = self.config[\u0027permanent_storage\u0027][\u0027bucket\u0027] \n\n def get(self, local_name, base_dir):\n remote_name = local_name\n remote_ziped_name = f\u0027{remote_name}.tar.gz\u0027\n local_ziped_name = f\u0027{local_name}.tar.gz\u0027\n local_ziped_path = os.path.join(base_dir, local_ziped_name)\n os.makedirs(base_dir, exist_ok=True)\n \n # Retrieve a potentially malicious tarball\n self.s3.download_file(self.bucket, remote_ziped_name, local_ziped_path)\n\n # Perform an unsafe extraction\n shutil.unpack_archive(local_ziped_path, base_dir)\n\n os.system(f\u0027chmod -R 777 {base_dir}\u0027)\n os.remove(local_ziped_path)\n``` \n\n### PoC\n\nThe following PoC is provided for illustration purposes only. It showcases the risk of extracting a non-harmless text file `sim4n6.txt` to one of the parent locations rather than the intended current folder.\n\n```bash\n\u003e tar --list -f archive.tar\ntar: Removing leading \"../../../\" from member names\n../../../sim4n6.txt\n\n\u003e python3 \nPython 3.10.6 (main, Nov 2 2022, 18:53:38) [GCC 11.3.0] on linux\nType \"help\", \"copyright\", \"credits\" or \"license\" for more information.\n\u003e\u003e\u003e import shutil\n\u003e\u003e\u003e shutil.unpack_archive(\"archive.tar\")\n\u003e\u003e\u003e exit()\n\n\u003e test -f ../../../sim4n6.txt \u0026\u0026 echo \"sim4n6.txt exists\"\nsim4n6.txt exists\n```\n\n### Attack Scenario\n\nAn attacker could craft a malicious tarball with a filename path, such as `../../../../../../../../etc/passwd`, and then serve the archive remotely using a personal bucket `s3`, thus, retrieve the tarball through **mindsdb** and overwrite the system files of the hosting server. \n\n### Mitigation\n\nPotential mitigation could be to:\n - Use a safer module, like `zipfile`.\n - Validate the location of the extracted files and discard those with malicious paths such as relative path `..` or absolute path such as `/etc/password`.\n - Perform a checksum verification for the retrieved archive, but hard-coding the hashes may be cumbersome and difficult to manage.",
"id": "GHSA-7x45-phmr-9wqp",
"modified": "2024-10-01T19:20:52Z",
"published": "2023-03-30T20:16:33Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/mindsdb/mindsdb/security/advisories/GHSA-7x45-phmr-9wqp"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-23522"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/mindsdb/mindsdb"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/mindsdb/mindsdb/blob/69c76e727b8067f32b06ab83bb835a8c416c4f21/mindsdb/interfaces/storage/fs.py"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/mindsdb/mindsdb/blob/69c76e727b8067f32b06ab83bb835a8c416c4f21/mindsdb/interfaces/storage/fs.py#L128..L129"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/mindsdb/mindsdb/releases/tag/v22.11.4.3"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/mindsdb/PYSEC-2023-26.yaml"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:L/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Arbitrary file write in mindsdb when Extracting Tarballs retrieved from a remote location "
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.