Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-7RH5-MV9F-P27Q

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-14 15:31 – Updated: 2026-11-14 15:31

Details

The Cloud Storage Manager for Fluent Forms – Google Drive, Dropbox, OneDrive, S3 Uploads plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Arbitrary File Write in all versions up to, and including, 1.2.0. This is due to missing authorization checks on the connection/{driver}/save and /download/single-file REST endpoints, combined with insufficient path validation in the Google Drive downloadFile() function, where the Google Drive metadata name value is concatenated into a local path without basename(), sanitize_file_name(), or canonical path validation. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to store attacker-controlled Google Drive credentials, trigger a download of an attacker-owned file whose provider-returned filename contains path traversal, and write attacker-controlled content outside the intended downloads directory. When the written file has a PHP extension and lands in a web-accessible location, this can lead to remote code execution.

Severity

9.8 (Critical)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Show details on source website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-120522"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-11-14T13:17:20Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "The Cloud Storage Manager for Fluent Forms \u2013 Google Drive, Dropbox, OneDrive, S3 Uploads plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Arbitrary File Write in all versions up to, and including, 1.2.0. This is due to missing authorization checks on the `connection/{driver}/save` and `/download/single-file` REST endpoints, combined with insufficient path validation in the Google Drive `downloadFile()` function, where the Google Drive metadata `name` value is concatenated into a local path without `basename()`, `sanitize_file_name()`, or canonical path validation. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to store attacker-controlled Google Drive credentials, trigger a download of an attacker-owned file whose provider-returned filename contains path traversal, and write attacker-controlled content outside the intended `downloads` directory. When the written file has a PHP extension and lands in a web-accessible location, this can lead to remote code execution.",
  "id": "GHSA-7rh5-mv9f-p27q",
  "modified": "2026-11-14T15:31:43Z",
  "published": "2026-11-14T15:31:43Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-120522"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3656663/cloud-storage-manager"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/58fd04ae-fff2-42b1-ae98-168195d84290?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

CVE-2026-120522 (GCVE-0-2026-120522)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-14 12:33 – Updated: 2026-11-14 12:33

Title

Cloud Storage Manager for Fluent Forms <= 1.2.0 - Unauthenticated Arbitrary File Write via Google Drive Filename Path Traversal

Summary

The Cloud Storage Manager for Fluent Forms – Google Drive, Dropbox, OneDrive, S3 Uploads plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Arbitrary File Write in all versions up to, and including, 1.2.0. This is due to missing authorization checks on the `connection/{driver}/save` and `/download/single-file` REST endpoints, combined with insufficient path validation in the Google Drive `downloadFile()` function, where the Google Drive metadata `name` value is concatenated into a local path without `basename()`, `sanitize_file_name()`, or canonical path validation. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to store attacker-controlled Google Drive credentials, trigger a download of an attacker-owned file whose provider-returned filename contains path traversal, and write attacker-controlled content outside the intended `downloads` directory. When the written file has a PHP extension and lands in a web-accessible location, this can lead to remote code execution.

Severity

9.8 (Critical)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

CWE

CWE-22 - Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory

Assigner

Wordfence CNA under the mitre root

CNA scorecard C 65/100 over 2461 records in the last 180 days details

References

2 references

URL	Tags
https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabil…
https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3656…

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version
fluentwiz	Cloud Storage Manager for Fluent Forms – Google Drive, Dropbox, OneDrive, S3 Uploads	Affected: 0 , ≤ 1.2.0 (semver)

Credits

Adam Rayyan Aryasatya

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "containers": {
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Cloud Storage Manager for Fluent Forms \u2013 Google Drive, Dropbox, OneDrive, S3 Uploads",
          "vendor": "fluentwiz",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "1.2.0",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "credits": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "type": "finder",
          "value": "Adam Rayyan Aryasatya"
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "The Cloud Storage Manager for Fluent Forms \u2013 Google Drive, Dropbox, OneDrive, S3 Uploads plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Arbitrary File Write in all versions up to, and including, 1.2.0. This is due to missing authorization checks on the `connection/{driver}/save` and `/download/single-file` REST endpoints, combined with insufficient path validation in the Google Drive `downloadFile()` function, where the Google Drive metadata `name` value is concatenated into a local path without `basename()`, `sanitize_file_name()`, or canonical path validation. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to store attacker-controlled Google Drive credentials, trigger a download of an attacker-owned file whose provider-returned filename contains path traversal, and write attacker-controlled content outside the intended `downloads` directory. When the written file has a PHP extension and lands in a web-accessible location, this can lead to remote code execution."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV3_1": {
            "baseScore": 9.8,
            "baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
            "version": "3.1"
          }
        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-22",
              "description": "CWE-22 Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-11-14T12:33:22.808Z",
        "orgId": "b15e7b5b-3da4-40ae-a43c-f7aa60e62599",
        "shortName": "Wordfence"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/58fd04ae-fff2-42b1-ae98-168195d84290?source=cve"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3656663/cloud-storage-manager"
        }
      ],
      "timeline": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "time": "2026-11-14T00:23:38.000Z",
          "value": "Disclosed"
        }
      ],
      "title": "Cloud Storage Manager for Fluent Forms \u003c= 1.2.0 - Unauthenticated Arbitrary File Write via Google Drive Filename Path Traversal"
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "b15e7b5b-3da4-40ae-a43c-f7aa60e62599",
    "assignerShortName": "Wordfence",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-120522",
    "datePublished": "2026-11-14T12:33:22.808Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-11-02T16:17:03.789Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-11-14T12:33:22.808Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

Order JSON

How durations are calculated

Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.

Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.

Publication & reservation Sightings KEV catalogs Other timestamps

Loading timeline…

The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.

Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.

Action not permitted