GHSA-7CGW-456X-7466

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-03-12 00:31 – Updated: 2025-03-12 00:31
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

powerpc/xive/spapr: correct bitmap allocation size

kasan detects access beyond the end of the xibm->bitmap allocation:

BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _find_first_zero_bit+0x40/0x140 Read of size 8 at addr c00000001d1d0118 by task swapper/0/1

CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.19.0-rc2-00001-g90df023b36dd #28 Call Trace: [c00000001d98f770] [c0000000012baab8] dump_stack_lvl+0xac/0x108 (unreliable) [c00000001d98f7b0] [c00000000068faac] print_report+0x37c/0x710 [c00000001d98f880] [c0000000006902c0] kasan_report+0x110/0x354 [c00000001d98f950] [c000000000692324] __asan_load8+0xa4/0xe0 [c00000001d98f970] [c0000000011c6ed0] _find_first_zero_bit+0x40/0x140 [c00000001d98f9b0] [c0000000000dbfbc] xive_spapr_get_ipi+0xcc/0x260 [c00000001d98fa70] [c0000000000d6d28] xive_setup_cpu_ipi+0x1e8/0x450 [c00000001d98fb30] [c000000004032a20] pSeries_smp_probe+0x5c/0x118 [c00000001d98fb60] [c000000004018b44] smp_prepare_cpus+0x944/0x9ac [c00000001d98fc90] [c000000004009f9c] kernel_init_freeable+0x2d4/0x640 [c00000001d98fd90] [c0000000000131e8] kernel_init+0x28/0x1d0 [c00000001d98fe10] [c00000000000cd54] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x5c/0x64

Allocated by task 0: kasan_save_stack+0x34/0x70 __kasan_kmalloc+0xb4/0xf0 __kmalloc+0x268/0x540 xive_spapr_init+0x4d0/0x77c pseries_init_irq+0x40/0x27c init_IRQ+0x44/0x84 start_kernel+0x2a4/0x538 start_here_common+0x1c/0x20

The buggy address belongs to the object at c00000001d1d0118 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-8 of size 8 The buggy address is located 0 bytes inside of 8-byte region [c00000001d1d0118, c00000001d1d0120)

The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page:c00c000000074740 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xc00000001d1d0558 pfn:0x1d1d flags: 0x7ffff000000200(slab|node=0|zone=0|lastcpupid=0x7ffff) raw: 007ffff000000200 c00000001d0003c8 c00000001d0003c8 c00000001d010480 raw: c00000001d1d0558 0000000001e1000a 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

Memory state around the buggy address: c00000001d1d0000: fc 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc c00000001d1d0080: fc fc 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc

c00000001d1d0100: fc fc fc 02 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ^ c00000001d1d0180: fc fc fc fc 04 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc c00000001d1d0200: fc fc fc fc fc 04 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc

This happens because the allocation uses the wrong unit (bits) when it should pass (BITS_TO_LONGS(count) * sizeof(long)) or equivalent. With small numbers of bits, the allocated object can be smaller than sizeof(long), which results in invalid accesses.

Use bitmap_zalloc() to allocate and initialize the irq bitmap, paired with bitmap_free() for consistency.

Severity
7.1 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-49623"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-125"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-02-26T07:01:37Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\npowerpc/xive/spapr: correct bitmap allocation size\n\nkasan detects access beyond the end of the xibm-\u003ebitmap allocation:\n\nBUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _find_first_zero_bit+0x40/0x140\nRead of size 8 at addr c00000001d1d0118 by task swapper/0/1\n\nCPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.19.0-rc2-00001-g90df023b36dd #28\nCall Trace:\n[c00000001d98f770] [c0000000012baab8] dump_stack_lvl+0xac/0x108 (unreliable)\n[c00000001d98f7b0] [c00000000068faac] print_report+0x37c/0x710\n[c00000001d98f880] [c0000000006902c0] kasan_report+0x110/0x354\n[c00000001d98f950] [c000000000692324] __asan_load8+0xa4/0xe0\n[c00000001d98f970] [c0000000011c6ed0] _find_first_zero_bit+0x40/0x140\n[c00000001d98f9b0] [c0000000000dbfbc] xive_spapr_get_ipi+0xcc/0x260\n[c00000001d98fa70] [c0000000000d6d28] xive_setup_cpu_ipi+0x1e8/0x450\n[c00000001d98fb30] [c000000004032a20] pSeries_smp_probe+0x5c/0x118\n[c00000001d98fb60] [c000000004018b44] smp_prepare_cpus+0x944/0x9ac\n[c00000001d98fc90] [c000000004009f9c] kernel_init_freeable+0x2d4/0x640\n[c00000001d98fd90] [c0000000000131e8] kernel_init+0x28/0x1d0\n[c00000001d98fe10] [c00000000000cd54] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x5c/0x64\n\nAllocated by task 0:\n kasan_save_stack+0x34/0x70\n __kasan_kmalloc+0xb4/0xf0\n __kmalloc+0x268/0x540\n xive_spapr_init+0x4d0/0x77c\n pseries_init_irq+0x40/0x27c\n init_IRQ+0x44/0x84\n start_kernel+0x2a4/0x538\n start_here_common+0x1c/0x20\n\nThe buggy address belongs to the object at c00000001d1d0118\n which belongs to the cache kmalloc-8 of size 8\nThe buggy address is located 0 bytes inside of\n 8-byte region [c00000001d1d0118, c00000001d1d0120)\n\nThe buggy address belongs to the physical page:\npage:c00c000000074740 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xc00000001d1d0558 pfn:0x1d1d\nflags: 0x7ffff000000200(slab|node=0|zone=0|lastcpupid=0x7ffff)\nraw: 007ffff000000200 c00000001d0003c8 c00000001d0003c8 c00000001d010480\nraw: c00000001d1d0558 0000000001e1000a 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000\npage dumped because: kasan: bad access detected\n\nMemory state around the buggy address:\n c00000001d1d0000: fc 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc\n c00000001d1d0080: fc fc 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc\n\u003ec00000001d1d0100: fc fc fc 02 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc\n                            ^\n c00000001d1d0180: fc fc fc fc 04 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc\n c00000001d1d0200: fc fc fc fc fc 04 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc\n\nThis happens because the allocation uses the wrong unit (bits) when it\nshould pass (BITS_TO_LONGS(count) * sizeof(long)) or equivalent. With small\nnumbers of bits, the allocated object can be smaller than sizeof(long),\nwhich results in invalid accesses.\n\nUse bitmap_zalloc() to allocate and initialize the irq bitmap, paired with\nbitmap_free() for consistency.",
  "id": "GHSA-7cgw-456x-7466",
  "modified": "2025-03-12T00:31:47Z",
  "published": "2025-03-12T00:31:47Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-49623"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/10f2cd373e65bcd3be8f3cdc71c330c25763dfd8"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/19fc5bb93c6bbdce8292b4d7eed04e2fa118d2fe"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/99d1c36bddd93919072b5a51a89297bbb5ad6a6f"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}



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