GHSA-74M3-9QVM-RP9H

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-25 23:34 – Updated: 2026-05-12 13:29
VLAI?
Summary
zrok: WebDAV drive backend follows symlinks outside DriveRoot, enabling host filesystem read/write
Details

Summary The zrok WebDAV drive backend (davServer.Dir) restricts path traversal through lexical normalization but does not prevent symlink following. When a symbolic link inside the shared DriveRoot points to a location outside that root, remote WebDAV consumers can read files and—on shares without OS-level permission restrictions—write or overwrite files anywhere on the host filesystem accessible to the zrok process.

  • Attack Vector: Network — exploitation is performed entirely over the WebDAV endpoint; the attacker issues HTTP requests to the public zrok share URL.
  • Attack Complexity: High — a precondition outside the attacker's direct control must hold: a symlink pointing outside DriveRoot must already exist within it (created locally, not via WebDAV).
  • Privileges Required: None — zrok share public --backend-mode drive exposes the WebDAV endpoint with no authentication by default.
  • User Interaction: None — once the symlink precondition is met, exploitation requires no user interaction.
  • Scope: Changed — the vulnerability allows an attacker to escape the WebDAV root (the security boundary) and access the broader host filesystem.
  • Confidentiality Impact: High — arbitrary files readable by the zrok process can be retrieved.
  • Integrity Impact: High — the WebDAV PUT handler opens files with O_RDWR|O_CREATE|O_TRUNC, meaning symlink targets outside DriveRoot can be overwritten (e.g. ~/.ssh/authorized_keys).
  • Availability Impact: None — no direct availability impact.

Affected Components

  • drives/davServer/file.go — Dir.OpenFile (line 140), Dir.Stat (line 176), Dir.Mkdir (line 133), Dir.RemoveAll (line 151)
  • endpoints/drive/backend.go — NewBackend (line 51–52)
Severity ?
8.7 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/openziti/zrok"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "1.1.11"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/openziti/zrok/v2"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.0.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-42275"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22",
      "CWE-61"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-25T23:34:35Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-08T04:16:22Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "**Summary**\nThe zrok WebDAV drive backend (davServer.Dir) restricts path traversal through lexical normalization but does not prevent symlink following. When a symbolic link inside the shared DriveRoot points to a location outside that root, remote WebDAV consumers can read files and\u2014on shares without OS-level permission restrictions\u2014write or overwrite files anywhere on the host filesystem accessible to the zrok process.\n\n- Attack Vector: Network \u2014 exploitation is performed entirely over the WebDAV endpoint; the attacker issues HTTP requests to the public zrok share URL.\n- Attack Complexity: High \u2014 a precondition outside the attacker\u0027s direct control must hold: a symlink pointing outside DriveRoot must already exist within it (created locally, not via WebDAV).\n- Privileges Required: None \u2014 zrok share public --backend-mode drive exposes the WebDAV endpoint with no authentication by default.\n- User Interaction: None \u2014 once the symlink precondition is met, exploitation requires no user interaction.\n- Scope: Changed \u2014 the vulnerability allows an attacker to escape the WebDAV root (the security boundary) and access the broader host filesystem.\n- Confidentiality Impact: High \u2014 arbitrary files readable by the zrok process can be retrieved.\n- Integrity Impact: High \u2014 the WebDAV PUT handler opens files with O_RDWR|O_CREATE|O_TRUNC, meaning symlink targets outside DriveRoot can be overwritten (e.g. ~/.ssh/authorized_keys).\n- Availability Impact: None \u2014 no direct availability impact.\n\nAffected Components\n\n- drives/davServer/file.go \u2014 Dir.OpenFile (line 140), Dir.Stat (line 176), Dir.Mkdir (line 133), Dir.RemoveAll (line 151)\n- endpoints/drive/backend.go \u2014 NewBackend (line 51\u201352)",
  "id": "GHSA-74m3-9qvm-rp9h",
  "modified": "2026-05-12T13:29:09Z",
  "published": "2026-04-25T23:34:35Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openziti/zrok/security/advisories/GHSA-74m3-9qvm-rp9h"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42275"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openziti/zrok/commit/459bcfc1e121decae1b1d11c37ad94e4ed5bbf2e"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/openziti/zrok"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openziti/zrok/releases/tag/v2.0.2"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "zrok: WebDAV drive backend follows symlinks outside DriveRoot, enabling host filesystem read/write"
}


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