GHSA-6P92-QFQF-QWX4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-02-12 15:08 – Updated: 2024-02-12 21:35Summary
A jdbc attack vulnerability exists in OpenRefine(version<=3.7.7)
Details
Vulnerability Recurrence
Start by constructing a malicious MySQL Server (using the open source project MySQL_Fake_Server here).
Then go to the Jdbc connection trigger vulnerability

Vulnerability Analysis
This vulnerability is the bypass of CVE-2023-41887 vulnerability repair, the main vulnerability principle is actually the use of official syntax features, as shown in the following figure, when the connection we can perform parameter configuration in the Host part
In com.google.refine.extension.database.mysql.MySQLConnectionManager#getConnection method in the final JdbcUrl structure
That is, in the toURI method call here, you can see that the Host part is directly concatenated for any verification, which can be bypassed using the address feature of mysql
That is, in the toURI method call here, you can see that the Host part is directly concatenated for any verification, which can be bypassed using the address feature of mysql

PoC
Complete instructions, including specific configuration details, to reproduce the vulnerability.
Type: MySQL
Host: 127.0.0.1:3306,(host=127.0.0.1,port=3306,autoDeserialize=true,allowLoadLocalInfile=true,allowUrlInLocalInfile=true,allowLoadLocalInfileInPath=true),127.0.0.1
Port: 3306
User: win_hosts
Database: test
Impact
Due to the newer MySQL driver library in the latest version of OpenRefine (8.0.30), there is no associated deserialization utilization point, so original code execution cannot be achieved, but attackers can use this vulnerability to read sensitive files on the target server.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.7.7"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.openrefine:database"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.7.8"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-23833"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-02-12T15:08:48Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2024-02-12T21:15:08Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\nA jdbc attack vulnerability exists in OpenRefine(version\u003c=3.7.7)\n\n### Details\n#### Vulnerability Recurrence\nStart by constructing a malicious MySQL Server (using the open source project MySQL_Fake_Server here).\n\nThen go to the Jdbc connection trigger vulnerability\n\n#### Vulnerability Analysis\nThis vulnerability is the bypass of `CVE-2023-41887` vulnerability repair, the main vulnerability principle is actually the use of official syntax features, as shown in the following figure, when the connection we can perform parameter configuration in the Host part\n\nIn `com.google.refine.extension.database.mysql.MySQLConnectionManager#getConnection` method in the final JdbcUrl structure\n\nThat is, in the ` toURI` method call here, you can see that the Host part is directly concatenated for any verification, which can be bypassed using the address feature of mysql\n\nThat is, in the toURI method call here, you can see that the Host part is directly concatenated for any verification, which can be bypassed using the address feature of mysql\n\n\n\n\n### PoC\n_Complete instructions, including specific configuration details, to reproduce the vulnerability._\n```\nType: MySQL\nHost: 127.0.0.1:3306,(host=127.0.0.1,port=3306,autoDeserialize=true,allowLoadLocalInfile=true,allowUrlInLocalInfile=true,allowLoadLocalInfileInPath=true),127.0.0.1\nPort: 3306\nUser: win_hosts\nDatabase: test\n```\n\n\n### Impact \nDue to the newer MySQL driver library in the latest version of OpenRefine (8.0.30), there is no associated deserialization utilization point, so original code execution cannot be achieved, but attackers can use this vulnerability to read sensitive files on the target server.\n",
"id": "GHSA-6p92-qfqf-qwx4",
"modified": "2024-02-12T21:35:52Z",
"published": "2024-02-12T15:08:48Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/OpenRefine/OpenRefine/security/advisories/GHSA-6p92-qfqf-qwx4"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-23833"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/OpenRefine/OpenRefine/commit/41ccf574847d856e22488a7c0987ad8efa12a84a"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/OpenRefine/OpenRefine"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "OpenRefine JDBC Attack Vulnerability"
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.