GHSA-6JQX-86GH-F27W
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-22 21:07 – Updated: 2026-07-22 21:07Summary
Netty's SPDY SETTINGS decoder accepts a peer-declared SETTINGS entry count up to the 24-bit frame-length limit and materializes every unique setting ID in DefaultSpdySettingsFrame without an implementation-level count cap. A remote SPDY/3.1 peer can send one syntactically valid roughly 2 MiB SETTINGS frame that creates 262144 map entries, amplifying network input into heap growth and ordered-map insertion work.
Details
Inbound SPDY bytes enter SpdyFrameCodec.decode() and are passed directly to the frame decoder. The decoder reads the peer-controlled flags and 24-bit frame length from the common header, then accepts SETTINGS frames with only length >= 4. For SETTINGS payloads, it reads the peer-controlled numSettings field and validates only that the remaining payload is divisible into 8-byte entries and exactly matches that count. Each accepted entry then supplies an attacker-controlled 24-bit ID and value, and the normal delegate path forwards it into spdySettingsFrame.setValue(). The sink is DefaultSpdySettingsFrame: it backs settings with a TreeMap, checks only that IDs fit the SPDY 24-bit maximum, and inserts a new Setting for each previously unseen ID. There is no count budget between the wire-format count validation and the TreeMap insertion site.
PoC
run with
bash ./poc/run.sh
expected output:
NETTY_SPDY_SETTINGS_COUNT_MAP_TRIGGERED settings_count=262144 wire_bytes=2097164 approx_heap_delta=17692272 first_value=1 last_value=262144
The NETTY_SPDY_SETTINGS_COUNT_MAP_TRIGGERED line means the harness decoded the crafted SETTINGS frame and observed all 262144 peer-selected IDs in the resulting settings map. The wire_bytes=2097164, first_value=1, and last_value=262144 fields distinguish this from a setup failure: they show the exact oversized frame was accepted and fully materialized.
Impact
remote unauthenticated network peer that can speak SPDY/3.1 to a Netty pipeline containing SpdyFrameCodec can trigger resource-exhaustion denial of service. The required guards are satisfied by a complete valid SETTINGS frame using the expected SPDY version, a length of 4 + numSettings * 8, and IDs within the accepted 24-bit range; the verified PoC uses numSettings=262144 and wire_bytes=2097164. On that input, Netty materializes 262144 attacker-controlled entries in a TreeMap-backed DefaultSpdySettingsFrame, with local runs observing about 17-18 MiB of heap growth per decoded frame plus CPU work for ordered-map insertion.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.2.15.Final"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "io.netty:netty-codec-http"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.2.0.Final"
},
{
"fixed": "4.2.16.Final"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.1.135.Final"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "io.netty:netty-codec-http"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.1.0.Final"
},
{
"fixed": "4.1.136.Final"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-55831"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-22T21:07:36Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-21T00:17:35Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\nNetty\u0027s SPDY SETTINGS decoder accepts a peer-declared SETTINGS entry count up to the 24-bit frame-length limit and materializes every unique setting ID in `DefaultSpdySettingsFrame` without an implementation-level count cap. A remote SPDY/3.1 peer can send one syntactically valid roughly 2 MiB SETTINGS frame that creates 262144 map entries, amplifying network input into heap growth and ordered-map insertion work.\n\n### Details\nInbound SPDY bytes enter `SpdyFrameCodec.decode()` and are passed directly to the frame decoder. The decoder reads the peer-controlled flags and 24-bit frame length from the common header, then accepts SETTINGS frames with only `length \u003e= 4`. For SETTINGS payloads, it reads the peer-controlled `numSettings` field and validates only that the remaining payload is divisible into 8-byte entries and exactly matches that count. Each accepted entry then supplies an attacker-controlled 24-bit ID and value, and the normal delegate path forwards it into `spdySettingsFrame.setValue()`. The sink is `DefaultSpdySettingsFrame`: it backs settings with a `TreeMap`, checks only that IDs fit the SPDY 24-bit maximum, and inserts a new `Setting` for each previously unseen ID. There is no count budget between the wire-format count validation and the TreeMap insertion site.\n\n### PoC\n[poc.zip](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/28445737/poc.zip)\n\nrun with\n```bash\nbash ./poc/run.sh\n```\n\nexpected output:\n```text\nNETTY_SPDY_SETTINGS_COUNT_MAP_TRIGGERED settings_count=262144 wire_bytes=2097164 approx_heap_delta=17692272 first_value=1 last_value=262144\n```\n\nThe `NETTY_SPDY_SETTINGS_COUNT_MAP_TRIGGERED` line means the harness decoded the crafted SETTINGS frame and observed all 262144 peer-selected IDs in the resulting settings map. The `wire_bytes=2097164`, `first_value=1`, and `last_value=262144` fields distinguish this from a setup failure: they show the exact oversized frame was accepted and fully materialized.\n\n### Impact\n remote unauthenticated network peer that can speak SPDY/3.1 to a Netty pipeline containing `SpdyFrameCodec` can trigger resource-exhaustion denial of service. The required guards are satisfied by a complete valid SETTINGS frame using the expected SPDY version, a length of `4 + numSettings * 8`, and IDs within the accepted 24-bit range; the verified PoC uses `numSettings=262144` and `wire_bytes=2097164`. On that input, Netty materializes 262144 attacker-controlled entries in a TreeMap-backed `DefaultSpdySettingsFrame`, with local runs observing about 17-18 MiB of heap growth per decoded frame plus CPU work for ordered-map insertion.",
"id": "GHSA-6jqx-86gh-f27w",
"modified": "2026-07-22T21:07:36Z",
"published": "2026-07-22T21:07:36Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/netty/netty/security/advisories/GHSA-6jqx-86gh-f27w"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-55831"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/netty/netty/commit/5b68c61f37aa4a3045cba624cbea239655c9003b"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/netty/netty/commit/bb2ff68a1fb71cb4b0eb9a9e17b66c52aff680c6"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/netty/netty"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/netty/netty/releases/tag/netty-4.1.136.Final"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/netty/netty/releases/tag/netty-4.2.16.Final"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Netty SPDY SETTINGS frame count materializes unbounded settings map"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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