Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-6H4H-QFFC-3GFP

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-01 15:30 – Updated: 2026-11-01 15:30

Details

The Beta9 worker serves the sandbox file API from outside the container. getHostPathFromContainerPath turns the tenant's container path into a worker path. If the unresolved path starts with a mount destination, including the default upload mount at /tmp/.beta9, the remainder is joined onto that mount's source with filepath.Join, which cleans parent-directory segments after the prefix check. A long enough run of those segments names any absolute path on the worker. A path that matches no mount is joined onto the container root and opened in the worker's own filesystem, so an absolute symbolic link such as /var/run pointing at /run is followed against the worker root. Upload, download, stat, list, find-in-files, replace-in-files, and delete-file all call this helper. A tenant with a workspace token and one running sandbox can read, write, list, and delete files on the hosting worker as root, including files of other tenants on that machine. A read-only proof downloaded the worker pod's Kubernetes service account token through the file API for a path that did not exist inside the sandbox. In the shipped remote-node manifests that service account is bound to cluster-admin. Fixed in worker 0.1.756: sandbox file operations and workspace sync open paths with os.OpenRoot, so parent-directory and symlink lookups stay inside the container root or the mount source.

Severity

9.9 (Critical)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-120307"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-11-01T13:18:01Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "The Beta9 worker serves the sandbox file API from outside the container. getHostPathFromContainerPath turns the tenant\u0027s container path into a worker path. If the unresolved path starts with a mount destination, including the default upload mount at /tmp/.beta9, the remainder is joined onto that mount\u0027s source with filepath.Join, which cleans parent-directory segments after the prefix check. A long enough run of those segments names any absolute path on the worker. A path that matches no mount is joined onto the container root and opened in the worker\u0027s own filesystem, so an absolute symbolic link such as /var/run pointing at /run is followed against the worker root. Upload, download, stat, list, find-in-files, replace-in-files, and delete-file all call this helper. A tenant with a workspace token and one running sandbox can read, write, list, and delete files on the hosting worker as root, including files of other tenants on that machine. A read-only proof downloaded the worker pod\u0027s Kubernetes service account token through the file API for a path that did not exist inside the sandbox. In the shipped remote-node manifests that service account is bound to cluster-admin. Fixed in worker 0.1.756: sandbox file operations and workspace sync open paths with os.OpenRoot, so parent-directory and symlink lookups stay inside the container root or the mount source.",
  "id": "GHSA-6h4h-qffc-3gfp",
  "modified": "2026-11-01T15:30:19Z",
  "published": "2026-11-01T15:30:19Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-120307"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/beam-cloud/beta9/pull/1897"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/beam-cloud/beta9/commit/a28bf12cf0007c792a25d8ed282b4e8bf6f30393"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/beam-cloud/beta9"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/beam-cloud/beta9/releases/tag/worker-0.1.756"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

CVE-2026-120307 (GCVE-0-2026-120307)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-01 12:49 – Updated: 2026-11-01 12:49

Title

Beta9 container escape via unvalidated sandbox file paths

Summary

Severity

9.9 (Critical)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

CWE

CWE-22 - Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
CWE-23 - Relative Path Traversal
CWE-59 - Improper Link Resolution Before File Access ('Link Following')

Assigner

JFROG CNA under the mitre root

CNA scorecard B 76/100 over 66 records in the last 180 days details

References

4 references

URL	Tags
https://github.com/beam-cloud/beta9	product
https://github.com/beam-cloud/beta9/pull/1897	patch
https://github.com/beam-cloud/beta9/commit/a28bf1…	patch
https://github.com/beam-cloud/beta9/releases/tag/…	release-notes

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version
beam-cloud	Beta9 worker	Affected: 0 , < 0.1.756 (semver)

Credits

Natan Nehorai JFrog Security Research

Show details on NVD website

JSON

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          "collectionURL": "https://github.com/beam-cloud/beta9/releases",
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "packageName": "github.com/beam-cloud/beta9",
          "product": "Beta9 worker",
          "programFiles": [
            "pkg/worker/container_server.go",
            "pkg/worker/lifecycle.go",
            "pkg/types/worker.go"
          ],
          "repo": "git://github.com/beam-cloud/beta9",
          "vendor": "beam-cloud",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "0.1.756",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "credits": [
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          "lang": "en",
          "type": "finder",
          "value": "Natan Nehorai"
        },
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          "lang": "en",
          "type": "coordinator",
          "value": "JFrog Security Research"
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
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          "lang": "en",
          "supportingMedia": [
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              "value": "\u003cp\u003eThe Beta9 worker serves the sandbox file API from outside the container. getHostPathFromContainerPath turns the tenant\u0027s container path into a worker path. If the unresolved path starts with a mount destination, including the default upload mount at /tmp/.beta9, the remainder is joined onto that mount\u0027s source with filepath.Join, which cleans parent-directory segments after the prefix check. A long enough run of those segments names any absolute path on the worker. A path that matches no mount is joined onto the container root and opened in the worker\u0027s own filesystem, so an absolute symbolic link such as /var/run pointing at /run is followed against the worker root. Upload, download, stat, list, find-in-files, replace-in-files, and delete-file all call this helper. A tenant with a workspace token and one running sandbox can read, write, list, and delete files on the hosting worker as root, including files of other tenants on that machine. A read-only proof downloaded the worker pod\u0027s Kubernetes service account token through the file API for a path that did not exist inside the sandbox. In the shipped remote-node manifests that service account is bound to cluster-admin. Fixed in worker 0.1.756: sandbox file operations and workspace sync open paths with os.OpenRoot, so parent-directory and symlink lookups stay inside the container root or the mount source.\u003c/p\u003e"
            }
          ],
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            "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
            "baseScore": 9.9,
            "baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
            "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
            "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
            "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
            "scope": "CHANGED",
            "userInteraction": "NONE",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
            "version": "3.1"
          },
          "format": "CVSS",
          "scenarios": [
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              "lang": "en",
              "value": "Tenant with a workspace token and a running sandbox on a worker that serves the sandbox file API"
            }
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              "cweId": "CWE-22",
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              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-23",
              "description": "CWE-23: Relative Path Traversal",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
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          ]
        },
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-59",
              "description": "CWE-59: Improper Link Resolution Before File Access (\u0027Link Following\u0027)",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
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      "references": [
        {
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          "tags": [
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          "url": "https://github.com/beam-cloud/beta9"
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          "name": "Handle sandbox edge cases (fix pull request)",
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        {
          "name": "worker-0.1.756",
          "tags": [
            "release-notes"
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          "url": "https://github.com/beam-cloud/beta9/releases/tag/worker-0.1.756"
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      ],
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        }
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        "discovery": "EXTERNAL"
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      "timeline": [
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          "lang": "en",
          "time": "2026-09-15T04:03:00.000Z",
          "value": "Fix merged in pull request 1897 (commit a28bf12)"
        },
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "time": "2026-09-15T04:03:00.000Z",
          "value": "Fixed release worker-0.1.756 published. No vendor security advisory was filed with the pull request."
        }
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    "datePublished": "2026-11-01T12:49:51.981Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-11-01T12:45:12.430Z",
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    "state": "PUBLISHED"
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Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Vulnerability timeline

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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
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