GHSA-6GXP-VF4Q-CCGC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-07 06:31 – Updated: 2026-11-07 06:31The Active Woot Products Tables for WooCommerce. 100% FREE plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Media Library File Deletion in all versions up to, and including, 2.1.5 This is due to the get_table_data() AJAX handler — registered for unauthenticated access via wp_ajax_nopriv_woot_get_table_data — performing no nonce verification and no capability check before passing the attacker-supplied wp_columns_actions parameter directly to apply_filters() alongside an attacker-controlled integer derived from the table_id parameter. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to delete any WordPress media library attachment and its underlying file in the uploads directory by supplying a known or guessed numeric attachment ID, enabling complete erasure of a site's media library. Exploitation is achievable because WordPress core registers wp_delete_attachment() as a callback on hooks such as upgrader_scheduled_cleanup and importer_scheduled_cleanup, which sanitize_key() does not strip; notably, only attachment posts reachable by numeric ID are affected, and files outside wp-content/uploads — such as wp-config.php or plugin PHP files — cannot be targeted through this path.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-120560"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-11-07T04:17:13Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The Active Woot Products Tables for WooCommerce. 100% FREE plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Media Library File Deletion in all versions up to, and including, 2.1.5 This is due to the `get_table_data()` AJAX handler \u2014 registered for unauthenticated access via `wp_ajax_nopriv_woot_get_table_data` \u2014 performing no nonce verification and no capability check before passing the attacker-supplied `wp_columns_actions` parameter directly to `apply_filters()` alongside an attacker-controlled integer derived from the `table_id` parameter. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to delete any WordPress media library attachment and its underlying file in the uploads directory by supplying a known or guessed numeric attachment ID, enabling complete erasure of a site\u0027s media library. Exploitation is achievable because WordPress core registers `wp_delete_attachment()` as a callback on hooks such as `upgrader_scheduled_cleanup` and `importer_scheduled_cleanup`, which `sanitize_key()` does not strip; notably, only attachment posts reachable by numeric ID are affected, and files outside `wp-content/uploads` \u2014 such as `wp-config.php` or plugin PHP files \u2014 cannot be targeted through this path.",
"id": "GHSA-6gxp-vf4q-ccgc",
"modified": "2026-11-07T06:31:14Z",
"published": "2026-11-07T06:31:13Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-120560"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.svn.wordpress.org/profit-products-tables-for-woocommerce/trunk/index.php"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/profit-products-tables-for-woocommerce/trunk/index.php#L1090"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/profit-products-tables-for-woocommerce/trunk/index.php#L1094"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/profit-products-tables-for-woocommerce/trunk/index.php#L1206"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/profit-products-tables-for-woocommerce/trunk/index.php#L91"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3784667/profit-products-tables-for-woocommerce/trunk/index.php"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/a4962c61-9059-4fb9-9ddf-5e6aa1d2675a?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.