GHSA-4PQ2-JH73-G3HW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-04 12:30 – Updated: 2026-07-18 09:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: SEV: Require in-GHCB scratch area if GHCB v2+ is in use
As per the GHCB spec, when using GHCB v2+ require the software scratch area to reside in the GHCB's shared buffer. Note, things like Page State Change (PSC) requests rely on this behavior, as the guest can't provide a length when making the request, i.e. the size of the guest payload is bounded by the size of the shared buffer.
Failure to force usage of the GHCB, and a slew of other flaws, lets a malicious SNP guest corrupt host kernel heap memory, and leak host heap layout information.
setup_vmgexit_scratch() allocates a buffer via kvzalloc(exit_info_2), where exit_info_2 is guest-controlled. With exit_info_2=24, this yields a 24-byte allocation in kmalloc-cg-32 (32-byte slab objects). The buffer holds an 8-byte psc_hdr followed by 8-byte psc_entry structs, so only entries[0] and entries[1] are in-bounds.
snp_begin_psc() validates end_entry against VMGEXIT_PSC_MAX_COUNT (253) but NOT against the actual buffer size:
idx_end = hdr->end_entry;
if (idx_end >= VMGEXIT_PSC_MAX_COUNT) { // checks 253, not buffer
snp_complete_psc(svm, ...);
return 1;
}
for (idx = idx_start; idx <= idx_end; idx++) {
entry_start = entries[idx]; // OOB when idx >= 2
The guest sets end_entry=10+, causing the host to iterate entries[2+] which are OOB into adjacent slab objects. For each OOB entry:
- The host reads 8 bytes (OOB READ / info leak oracle)
- If the data passes PSC validation, __snp_complete_one_psc() writes cur_page = 1 or 512 into the entry (OOB WRITE, sev.c:3806)
- If validation fails, the error response reveals whether adjacent memory is zero vs non-zero (information disclosure to guest)
The guest controls allocation size (exit_info_2), entry range (cur_entry/end_entry), and can fire unlimited VMGEXITs to repeatedly hit different slab positions.
By exploiting the variety of bugs, a malicious SEV-SNP guest can: - OOB read adjacent kmalloc-cg-32 objects (heap layout disclosure) - OOB write cur_page bits into adjacent objects (heap corruption) - Trigger use-after-free conditions across VMGEXITs
E.g. with KASAN enabled, a single insmod of the PoC guest module produces 73 KASAN reports:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in snp_begin_psc+0x126/0x890
Read of size 8 at addr ffff888219ffb5e0 by task qemu-system-x86/2199
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in snp_begin_psc+0x468/0x890
Write of size 8 at addr ffff888351566648 by task qemu-system-x86/2199
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888XXXXXXXXX
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-cg-32 of size 32
The buggy address is located N bytes to the right of
allocated 32-byte region [ffff888XXXXXXXXX, ffff888XXXXXXXXX)
Breakdown: 62 slab-out-of-bounds (reads + writes past allocation) 7 slab-use-after-free 4 use-after-free
All credit to Stan for the wonderful description and reproducer!
[sean: write changelog]
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-53360"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-125",
"CWE-787"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-04T12:17:01Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nKVM: SEV: Require in-GHCB scratch area if GHCB v2+ is in use\n\nAs per the GHCB spec, when using GHCB v2+ require the software scratch area\nto reside in the GHCB\u0027s shared buffer. Note, things like Page State Change\n(PSC) requests _rely_ on this behavior, as the guest can\u0027t provide a length\nwhen making the request, i.e. the size of the guest payload is bounded by\nthe size of the shared buffer.\n\nFailure to force usage of the GHCB, and a slew of other flaws, lets a\nmalicious SNP guest corrupt host kernel heap memory, and leak host heap\nlayout information.\n\nsetup_vmgexit_scratch() allocates a buffer via kvzalloc(exit_info_2),\nwhere exit_info_2 is guest-controlled. With exit_info_2=24, this yields\na 24-byte allocation in kmalloc-cg-32 (32-byte slab objects). The buffer\nholds an 8-byte psc_hdr followed by 8-byte psc_entry structs, so only\nentries[0] and entries[1] are in-bounds.\n\nsnp_begin_psc() validates end_entry against VMGEXIT_PSC_MAX_COUNT (253)\nbut NOT against the actual buffer size:\n\n idx_end = hdr-\u003eend_entry;\n\n if (idx_end \u003e= VMGEXIT_PSC_MAX_COUNT) { // checks 253, not buffer\n snp_complete_psc(svm, ...);\n return 1;\n }\n\n for (idx = idx_start; idx \u003c= idx_end; idx++) {\n entry_start = entries[idx]; // OOB when idx \u003e= 2\n\nThe guest sets end_entry=10+, causing the host to iterate entries[2+]\nwhich are OOB into adjacent slab objects. For each OOB entry:\n\n - The host reads 8 bytes (OOB READ / info leak oracle)\n - If the data passes PSC validation, __snp_complete_one_psc() writes\n cur_page = 1 or 512 into the entry (OOB WRITE, sev.c:3806)\n - If validation fails, the error response reveals whether adjacent\n memory is zero vs non-zero (information disclosure to guest)\n\nThe guest controls allocation size (exit_info_2), entry range\n(cur_entry/end_entry), and can fire unlimited VMGEXITs to repeatedly\nhit different slab positions.\n\nBy exploiting the variety of bugs, a malicious SEV-SNP guest can:\n - OOB read adjacent kmalloc-cg-32 objects (heap layout disclosure)\n - OOB write cur_page bits into adjacent objects (heap corruption)\n - Trigger use-after-free conditions across VMGEXITs\n\nE.g. with KASAN enabled, a single insmod of the PoC guest module\nproduces 73 KASAN reports:\n\n BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in snp_begin_psc+0x126/0x890\n Read of size 8 at addr ffff888219ffb5e0 by task qemu-system-x86/2199\n\n BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in snp_begin_psc+0x468/0x890\n Write of size 8 at addr ffff888351566648 by task qemu-system-x86/2199\n\n The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888XXXXXXXXX\n which belongs to the cache kmalloc-cg-32 of size 32\n The buggy address is located N bytes to the right of\n allocated 32-byte region [ffff888XXXXXXXXX, ffff888XXXXXXXXX)\n\n Breakdown:\n 62 slab-out-of-bounds (reads + writes past allocation)\n 7 slab-use-after-free\n 4 use-after-free\n\nAll credit to Stan for the wonderful description and reproducer!\n\n[sean: write changelog]",
"id": "GHSA-4pq2-jh73-g3hw",
"modified": "2026-07-18T09:32:16Z",
"published": "2026-07-04T12:30:28Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-53360"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b328ede59ac34e7998e1eee5e5f0cc26c2a91846"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bf9ba093fbb83c0c9a3dedd50efec29424eca2fc"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c9b4198fbc6ed99a9da4bee9f74bb730f926c9ae"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/db3f2195d29344a3cf1e9dd9ab7f21ced7308cf7"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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