Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-48V2-6JCM-FC99

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-03 17:27 – Updated: 2026-11-03 17:27

Summary

praktor: Path traversal in Telegram file uploads allows writing outside the agent workspace uploads/ directory (stored instruction injection)

Details

Impact

A remote Telegram user can write files to arbitrary paths inside an agent's persistent workspace volume (praktor-wk-<workspace>, mounted at /workspace/agent), escaping the documented uploads/ directory.

The attacker controls the Telegram document filename, which was concatenated into the destination path without sanitization (internal/telegram/bot.go, at both upload sites) and resolved with path.Join, which collapses ../ sequences. A filename like ../../../CLAUDE.md resolved to the root of the agent workspace volume, outside uploads/.

Because the agent workspace is the persistent working directory the Claude agent reads from and operates on across runs, writing outside uploads/ lets an attacker plant or overwrite files the agent later consumes — e.g. CLAUDE.md, agent instruction/skill/hook files, or other config under /workspace/agent. This turns a file upload into a stored injection into the agent's instruction/execution surface (CWE-22 path traversal escalating to stored instruction injection).

Reachability

By default the bot has no user allowlist (allow_from: [] means "allow all"), so the only precondition is that a user can message the bot. No authentication or prior privilege is required.

Affected versions

Through v0.9.0 (and HEAD 3902d29).

Patched versions

v0.9.1, containing PR #228.

Workarounds

Restrict telegram.allow_from to trusted user IDs to limit who can send uploads to the bot. Upgrading to v0.9.1 is the recommended fix.

Fix (defense in depth)

internal/telegram/bot.go: apply path.Base() to the attacker-controlled filename at both upload sites, stripping directory components and ...
internal/container/manager.go: WriteVolumeBytes now rejects any path that escapes /vol after path.Join, protecting future callers.

Credit

Reported privately by tonghuaroot, who provided a detailed root-cause analysis, a deployed end-to-end proof of concept against the real container.Manager, and fix verification.

Severity

8.2 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.9.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/mtzanidakis/praktor"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.9.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-62331"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-11-03T17:27:25Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-10-30T19:18:33Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n\nA remote Telegram user can write files to arbitrary paths inside an agent\u0027s persistent workspace volume (`praktor-wk-\u003cworkspace\u003e`, mounted at `/workspace/agent`), escaping the documented `uploads/` directory.\n\nThe attacker controls the Telegram document filename, which was concatenated into the destination path without sanitization (`internal/telegram/bot.go`, at both upload sites) and resolved with `path.Join`, which collapses `../` sequences. A filename like `../../../CLAUDE.md` resolved to the root of the agent workspace volume, outside `uploads/`.\n\nBecause the agent workspace is the persistent working directory the Claude agent reads from and operates on across runs, writing outside `uploads/` lets an attacker plant or overwrite files the agent later consumes \u2014 e.g. `CLAUDE.md`, agent instruction/skill/hook files, or other config under `/workspace/agent`. This turns a file upload into a stored injection into the agent\u0027s instruction/execution surface (CWE-22 path traversal escalating to stored instruction injection).\n\n### Reachability\n\nBy default the bot has no user allowlist (`allow_from: []` means \"allow all\"), so the only precondition is that a user can message the bot. No authentication or prior privilege is required.\n\n### Affected versions\n\nThrough `v0.9.0` (and HEAD `3902d29`).\n\n### Patched versions\n\n`v0.9.1`, containing PR #228.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nRestrict `telegram.allow_from` to trusted user IDs to limit who can send uploads to the bot. Upgrading to `v0.9.1` is the recommended fix.\n\n### Fix (defense in depth)\n\n- `internal/telegram/bot.go`: apply `path.Base()` to the attacker-controlled filename at both upload sites, stripping directory components and `..`.\n- `internal/container/manager.go`: `WriteVolumeBytes` now rejects any path that escapes `/vol` after `path.Join`, protecting future callers.\n\n### Credit\n\nReported privately by [tonghuaroot](https://github.com/tonghuaroot), who provided a detailed root-cause analysis, a deployed end-to-end proof of concept against the real `container.Manager`, and fix verification.",
  "id": "GHSA-48v2-6jcm-fc99",
  "modified": "2026-11-03T17:27:25Z",
  "published": "2026-11-03T17:27:25Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/mtzanidakis/praktor/security/advisories/GHSA-48v2-6jcm-fc99"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-62331"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/mtzanidakis/praktor/pull/228"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/mtzanidakis/praktor/commit/c3731eeda01c0b3ec1dbd13cccd5a147c3182141"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/mtzanidakis/praktor"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/mtzanidakis/praktor/releases/tag/v0.9.1"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "praktor: Path traversal in Telegram file uploads allows writing outside the agent workspace uploads/ directory (stored instruction injection)"
}

CVE-2026-62331 (GCVE-0-2026-62331)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-10-30 19:00 – Updated: 2026-10-30 19:46

Title

praktor: Telegram upload traversal permits persistent agent instruction injection

Summary

praktor is a multi-agent Claude Code orchestrator with Telegram input and output, Docker isolation, and a Mission Control UI. Prior to 0.9.1, both Telegram upload sites in `internal/telegram/bot.go` concatenate the attacker-controlled document filename into a destination path without sanitization, and `path.Join` collapses parent-directory traversal. A remote Telegram user who can message the bot can therefore write outside `uploads/` within the persistent agent workspace mounted at `/workspace/agent`. Because `allow_from: []` permits all senders by default, no prior authentication or privilege is required in that configuration. The attacker can plant or overwrite `CLAUDE.md`, instruction, skill, hook, or configuration files that the Claude agent reads and operates on across later runs, turning a document upload into stored instruction injection. The demonstrated arbitrary-write scope is the persistent agent workspace volume, not an unrestricted host-filesystem write. This issue is fixed in version 0.9.1.

Severity

8.2 (High)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N

SSVC

Exploitation: none Automatable: yes Technical Impact: partial

CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)

Decision recorded 2026-10-30 19:45 UTC

CWE

CWE-22 - Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')

Assigner

GitHub_M CNA under the mitre root

CNA scorecard C 72/100 over 8028 records in the last 180 days details

References

4 references

URL	Tags
https://github.com/mtzanidakis/praktor/security/a…	x_refsource_CONFIRM
https://github.com/mtzanidakis/praktor/pull/228	x_refsource_MISC
https://github.com/mtzanidakis/praktor/commit/c37…	x_refsource_MISC
https://github.com/mtzanidakis/praktor/releases/t…	x_refsource_MISC

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version
mtzanidakis	praktor	Affected: < 0.9.1

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "containers": {
    "adp": [
      {
        "metrics": [
          {
            "other": {
              "content": {
                "id": "CVE-2026-62331",
                "options": [
                  {
                    "Exploitation": "none"
                  },
                  {
                    "Automatable": "yes"
                  },
                  {
                    "Technical Impact": "partial"
                  }
                ],
                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                "timestamp": "2026-10-30T19:45:09.898798Z",
                "version": "2.0.3"
              },
              "type": "ssvc"
            }
          }
        ],
        "providerMetadata": {
          "dateUpdated": "2026-10-30T19:46:25.082Z",
          "orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
          "shortName": "CISA-ADP"
        },
        "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
      }
    ],
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "praktor",
          "vendor": "mtzanidakis",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c 0.9.1"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "praktor is a multi-agent Claude Code orchestrator with Telegram input and output, Docker isolation, and a Mission Control UI. Prior to 0.9.1, both Telegram upload sites in `internal/telegram/bot.go` concatenate the attacker-controlled document filename into a destination path without sanitization, and `path.Join` collapses parent-directory traversal. A remote Telegram user who can message the bot can therefore write outside `uploads/` within the persistent agent workspace mounted at `/workspace/agent`. Because `allow_from: []` permits all senders by default, no prior authentication or privilege is required in that configuration. The attacker can plant or overwrite `CLAUDE.md`, instruction, skill, hook, or configuration files that the Claude agent reads and operates on across later runs, turning a document upload into stored instruction injection. The demonstrated arbitrary-write scope is the persistent agent workspace volume, not an unrestricted host-filesystem write. This issue is fixed in version 0.9.1."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV3_1": {
            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
            "attackVector": "NETWORK",
            "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "baseScore": 8.2,
            "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
            "confidentialityImpact": "LOW",
            "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
            "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
            "scope": "UNCHANGED",
            "userInteraction": "NONE",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N",
            "version": "3.1"
          }
        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-22",
              "description": "CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory (\u0027Path Traversal\u0027)",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-10-30T19:00:25.777Z",
        "orgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
        "shortName": "GitHub_M"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/mtzanidakis/praktor/security/advisories/GHSA-48v2-6jcm-fc99",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_CONFIRM"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/mtzanidakis/praktor/security/advisories/GHSA-48v2-6jcm-fc99"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/mtzanidakis/praktor/pull/228",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/mtzanidakis/praktor/pull/228"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/mtzanidakis/praktor/commit/c3731eeda01c0b3ec1dbd13cccd5a147c3182141",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/mtzanidakis/praktor/commit/c3731eeda01c0b3ec1dbd13cccd5a147c3182141"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/mtzanidakis/praktor/releases/tag/v0.9.1",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/mtzanidakis/praktor/releases/tag/v0.9.1"
        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "advisory": "GHSA-48v2-6jcm-fc99",
        "discovery": "UNKNOWN"
      },
      "title": "praktor: Telegram upload traversal permits persistent agent instruction injection"
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
    "assignerShortName": "GitHub_M",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-62331",
    "datePublished": "2026-10-30T19:00:25.777Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-07-13T21:42:50.094Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-10-30T19:46:25.082Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

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Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
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