Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-44GV-5X3Q-67MM

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-08 21:33 – Updated: 2026-04-08 21:33

Details

The MW WP Form plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Arbitrary File Move/Read in all versions up to and including 5.1.1. This is due to insufficient validation of the $name parameter (upload field key) passed to the generate_user_file_dirpath() function, which uses WordPress's path_join() — a function that returns absolute paths unchanged, discarding the intended base directory. The attacker-controlled key is injected via the mwf_upload_files[] POST parameter, which is loaded into the plugin's Data model via _set_request_valiables(). During form processing, regenerate_upload_file_keys() iterates over these keys and calls generate_user_filepath() with the attacker-supplied key as the $name argument — the key survives validation because the targeted file (e.g., wp-config.php) genuinely exists at the absolute path. The _get_attachments() method then re-reads the same surviving keys and passes the resolved file path to move_temp_file_to_upload_dir(), which calls rename() to move the file into the uploads folder. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to move arbitrary files on the server, which can easily lead to remote code execution when the right file is moved (such as wp-config.php). The vulnerability is only exploitable if a file upload field is added to the form and the “Saving inquiry data in database” option is enabled.

Severity

8.1 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

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JSON

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-5436"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-08T21:17:01Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "The MW WP Form plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Arbitrary File Move/Read in all versions up to and including 5.1.1. This is due to insufficient validation of the $name parameter (upload field key) passed to the generate_user_file_dirpath() function, which uses WordPress\u0027s path_join() \u2014 a function that returns absolute paths unchanged, discarding the intended base directory. The attacker-controlled key is injected via the mwf_upload_files[] POST parameter, which is loaded into the plugin\u0027s Data model via _set_request_valiables(). During form processing, regenerate_upload_file_keys() iterates over these keys and calls generate_user_filepath() with the attacker-supplied key as the $name argument \u2014 the key survives validation because the targeted file (e.g., wp-config.php) genuinely exists at the absolute path. The _get_attachments() method then re-reads the same surviving keys and passes the resolved file path to move_temp_file_to_upload_dir(), which calls rename() to move the file into the uploads folder. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to move arbitrary files on the server, which can easily lead to remote code execution when the right file is moved (such as wp-config.php). The vulnerability is only exploitable if a file upload field is added to the form and the \u201cSaving inquiry data in database\u201d option is enabled.",
  "id": "GHSA-44gv-5x3q-67mm",
  "modified": "2026-04-08T21:33:34Z",
  "published": "2026-04-08T21:33:34Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-5436"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/web-soudan/mw-wp-form/commit/f872ab18ca670f5867b2241745daa30cd0fab861"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/mw-wp-form/tags/5.1.1/classes/models/class.data.php#L591"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/mw-wp-form/tags/5.1.1/classes/models/class.directory.php#L138"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3501261/mw-wp-form"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/bc308993-7fc5-41db-a396-f05e95fe47b8?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

CVE-2026-5436 (GCVE-0-2026-5436)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-04-08 20:25 – Updated: 2026-04-10 20:50

Title

MW WP Form <= 5.1.1 - Unauthenticated Arbitrary File Move via regenerate_upload_file_keys

Summary

Severity

8.1 (High)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

SSVC

Exploitation: none Automatable: no Technical Impact: total

CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)

Decision recorded 2026-04-10 20:49 UTC

CWE

CWE-22 - Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')

Assigner

Wordfence CNA under the mitre root

CNA scorecard C 65/100 over 2453 records in the last 180 days details

References

5 references

URL	Tags
https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabil…
https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/mw-wp-…
https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/mw-wp-…
https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3501…
https://github.com/web-soudan/mw-wp-form/commit/f…

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version
inc2734	MW WP Form	Affected: 0 , ≤ 5.1.1 (semver)

Credits

Sander Horsman

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "containers": {
    "adp": [
      {
        "metrics": [
          {
            "other": {
              "content": {
                "id": "CVE-2026-5436",
                "options": [
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                    "Exploitation": "none"
                  },
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                    "Automatable": "no"
                  },
                  {
                    "Technical Impact": "total"
                  }
                ],
                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                "timestamp": "2026-04-10T20:49:59.187525Z",
                "version": "2.0.3"
              },
              "type": "ssvc"
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        "providerMetadata": {
          "dateUpdated": "2026-04-10T20:50:10.628Z",
          "orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
          "shortName": "CISA-ADP"
        },
        "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
      }
    ],
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "MW WP Form",
          "vendor": "inc2734",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "5.1.1",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "credits": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "type": "finder",
          "value": "Sander Horsman"
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "The MW WP Form plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Arbitrary File Move/Read in all versions up to and including 5.1.1. This is due to insufficient validation of the $name parameter (upload field key) passed to the generate_user_file_dirpath() function, which uses WordPress\u0027s path_join() \u2014 a function that returns absolute paths unchanged, discarding the intended base directory. The attacker-controlled key is injected via the mwf_upload_files[] POST parameter, which is loaded into the plugin\u0027s Data model via _set_request_valiables(). During form processing, regenerate_upload_file_keys() iterates over these keys and calls generate_user_filepath() with the attacker-supplied key as the $name argument \u2014 the key survives validation because the targeted file (e.g., wp-config.php) genuinely exists at the absolute path. The _get_attachments() method then re-reads the same surviving keys and passes the resolved file path to move_temp_file_to_upload_dir(), which calls rename() to move the file into the uploads folder. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to move arbitrary files on the server, which can easily lead to remote code execution when the right file is moved (such as wp-config.php). The vulnerability is only exploitable if a file upload field is added to the form and the \u201cSaving inquiry data in database\u201d option is enabled."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
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        "dateUpdated": "2026-04-08T20:25:10.473Z",
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          "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/mw-wp-form/tags/5.1.1/classes/models/class.directory.php#L138"
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          "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/mw-wp-form/tags/5.1.1/classes/models/class.data.php#L591"
        },
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          "time": "2026-04-02T18:01:08.000Z",
          "value": "Vendor Notified"
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          "time": "2026-04-08T07:57:15.000Z",
          "value": "Disclosed"
        }
      ],
      "title": "MW WP Form \u003c= 5.1.1 - Unauthenticated Arbitrary File Move via regenerate_upload_file_keys"
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    "dateReserved": "2026-04-02T17:45:46.532Z",
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Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

Order JSON

How durations are calculated

Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.

Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.

Publication & reservation Sightings KEV catalogs Other timestamps

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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.

Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.

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