GHSA-3XF5-26FR-5WMR

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-23 15:31 – Updated: 2026-10-23 15:31
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

scsi: ch: Do not keep references to data transfer element devices

ch_readconfig() looks up the scsi_device of every data transfer element whose SCSI id the changer reports in READ ELEMENT STATUS, and stores it in ch->dt[]. scsi_device_lookup() takes a reference, and nothing ever drops it: ch_destroy() frees the array with kfree(). ch->dt[] is read nowhere else - it only supplies the vendor, model and revision printed in the same loop.

Once such a drive is removed, its scsi_device can never be released. It stays on the host's device list at its address, so a new device there is refused by anything that walks the list - target_core_pscsi reports "scsi_device_get() failed for H:C:T:L" - and the low-level driver's module can no longer be unloaded. Only a reboot recovers.

It shows with any changer that reports its drives' ids; with the mhvtl virtual library (IBM 3573-TL personality), each create and remove of a library with four drives leaves four references behind, counted by the module's use count in lsmod. With ch not bound the count is unchanged, and with this patch applied it is unchanged too.

Drop the reference as soon as the name has been printed, and remove the now unused dt[] array. That also removes the array leaked when ch_probe() fails after ch_readconfig().

The same leak was reported with an RFC patch in 2022, which was not merged.

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-99019"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-10-23T13:17:24Z",
    "severity": null
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nscsi: ch: Do not keep references to data transfer element devices\n\nch_readconfig() looks up the scsi_device of every data transfer element\nwhose SCSI id the changer reports in READ ELEMENT STATUS, and stores it in\nch-\u003edt[]. scsi_device_lookup() takes a reference, and nothing ever drops\nit: ch_destroy() frees the array with kfree(). ch-\u003edt[] is read nowhere\nelse - it only supplies the vendor, model and revision printed in the same\nloop.\n\nOnce such a drive is removed, its scsi_device can never be released. It\nstays on the host\u0027s device list at its address, so a new device there is\nrefused by anything that walks the list - target_core_pscsi reports\n\"scsi_device_get() failed for H:C:T:L\" - and the low-level driver\u0027s module\ncan no longer be unloaded. Only a reboot recovers.\n\nIt shows with any changer that reports its drives\u0027 ids; with the mhvtl\nvirtual library (IBM 3573-TL personality), each create and remove of a\nlibrary with four drives leaves four references behind, counted by the\nmodule\u0027s use count in lsmod. With ch not bound the count is unchanged, and\nwith this patch applied it is unchanged too.\n\nDrop the reference as soon as the name has been printed, and remove the now\nunused dt[] array. That also removes the array leaked when ch_probe() fails\nafter ch_readconfig().\n\nThe same leak was reported with an RFC patch in 2022, which was not merged.",
  "id": "GHSA-3xf5-26fr-5wmr",
  "modified": "2026-10-23T15:31:35Z",
  "published": "2026-10-23T15:31:35Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-99019"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1d35a17f1c2ed4154731895694a1a3557f0da766"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/27c0f718d3b3c99e6d315308e95d987d0382a8a8"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a34a230ccea1b8b667ae59dca11295a2c8f81738"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cef2cedb6f7a394b278775b3d6ffb9b20ecd61db"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ec6ecab1b7577ae555ee6b81480814d123dd9ec0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}



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