GHSA-3R68-X3XC-RXPG

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-05 20:15 – Updated: 2026-05-13 15:20
VLAI
Summary
wireshark-mcp vulnerable to arbitrary file write via export_objects when WIRESHARK_MCP_ALLOWED_DIRS is not configured
Details

Description

Impact

wireshark-mcp exposes a wireshark_export_objects MCP tool that accepts an attacker-controlled dest_dir parameter and passes it to tshark's --export-objects flag with no mandatory path restriction.

The path sandbox (_allowed_dirs) is None by default and only activates when the environment variable WIRESHARK_MCP_ALLOWED_DIRS is explicitly set. In a default installation, any directory on the filesystem can be used as the export destination.

Affected code (src/wireshark_mcp/tshark/client.py:531-543):


output_validation = self._validate_output_path(dest_dir)

# _validate_output_path only enforces the sandbox when _allowed_dirs is set.

# Default: _allowed_dirs = None → no restriction.

os.makedirs(dest_dir, exist_ok=True)   # creates arbitrary directories

cmd = [..., "--export-objects", f"{protocol},{dest_dir}"]

Attack Scenario

An attacker embeds a crafted HTTP response in a pcap file (e.g. Content-Disposition: filename=authorized_keys). Via prompt injection in the pcap payload, an AI model using this MCP server is manipulated into calling wireshark_export_objects with:


dest_dir=/home/user/.ssh/

tshark then extracts and writes the HTTP object to that path, granting the attacker SSH access.

The same technique can target:

  • /etc/cron.d/

  • Writable web roots

  • Other sensitive filesystem locations

Additional Affected Operations

The same missing sandbox affects:

  • merge_pcap_files

  • editcap_trim

  • editcap_split

  • editcap_time_shift

  • editcap_deduplicate

  • text2pcap_import

Proof of Concept

Confirmed on wireshark-mcp v1.1.5 with tshark 4.6.4.

A crafted pcap’s HTTP object was successfully written to an arbitrary filesystem path when:


_allowed_dirs = None


Patches

Not yet patched.

A fix should make the path sandbox mandatory for all file-write operations rather than optional:


# Reject all write operations when no sandbox is configured

if not self._allowed_dirs:

    return json.dumps({

        "success": False,

        "error": {

            "type": "SecurityError",

            "message": "Set WIRESHARK_MCP_ALLOWED_DIRS before using file-write operations"

        }

    })


Workarounds

Set WIRESHARK_MCP_ALLOWED_DIRS to a restricted safe directory before starting the server:


export WIRESHARK_MCP_ALLOWED_DIRS=/tmp/wireshark_mcp_safe

This activates the existing sandbox and blocks writes outside the allowed path.


Resources

  • Vulnerable code:

  • src/wireshark_mcp/tshark/client.py lines 521–543

  • src/wireshark_mcp/tshark/client.py lines 685–839

  • CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory

  • CWE-73: External Control of File Name or Path

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "wireshark-mcp"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "1.1.5"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-43901"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-05T20:15:12Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-11T23:20:21Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Description\n\n### Impact\n\n`wireshark-mcp` exposes a `wireshark_export_objects` MCP tool that accepts an attacker-controlled `dest_dir` parameter and passes it to tshark\u0027s `--export-objects` flag with **no mandatory path restriction**.\n\nThe path sandbox (`_allowed_dirs`) is `None` by default and only activates when the environment variable `WIRESHARK_MCP_ALLOWED_DIRS` is explicitly set. In a default installation, any directory on the filesystem can be used as the export destination.\n\n**Affected code** (`src/wireshark_mcp/tshark/client.py:531-543`):\n\n```python\n\noutput_validation = self._validate_output_path(dest_dir)\n\n# _validate_output_path only enforces the sandbox when _allowed_dirs is set.\n\n# Default: _allowed_dirs = None \u2192 no restriction.\n\nos.makedirs(dest_dir, exist_ok=True)   # creates arbitrary directories\n\ncmd = [..., \"--export-objects\", f\"{protocol},{dest_dir}\"]\n\n```\n\n### Attack Scenario\n\nAn attacker embeds a crafted HTTP response in a pcap file (e.g. `Content-Disposition: filename=authorized_keys`). Via prompt injection in the pcap payload, an AI model using this MCP server is manipulated into calling `wireshark_export_objects` with:\n\n```bash\n\ndest_dir=/home/user/.ssh/\n\n```\n\n`tshark` then extracts and writes the HTTP object to that path, granting the attacker SSH access.\n\nThe same technique can target:\n\n- `/etc/cron.d/`\n\n- Writable web roots\n\n- Other sensitive filesystem locations\n\n### Additional Affected Operations\n\nThe same missing sandbox affects:\n\n- `merge_pcap_files`\n\n- `editcap_trim`\n\n- `editcap_split`\n\n- `editcap_time_shift`\n\n- `editcap_deduplicate`\n\n- `text2pcap_import`\n\n### Proof of Concept\n\nConfirmed on **wireshark-mcp v1.1.5** with **tshark 4.6.4**.\n\nA crafted pcap\u2019s HTTP object was successfully written to an arbitrary filesystem path when:\n\n```python\n\n_allowed_dirs = None\n\n```\n\n---\n\n## Patches\n\nNot yet patched.\n\nA fix should make the path sandbox **mandatory** for all file-write operations rather than optional:\n\n```python\n\n# Reject all write operations when no sandbox is configured\n\nif not self._allowed_dirs:\n\n    return json.dumps({\n\n        \"success\": False,\n\n        \"error\": {\n\n            \"type\": \"SecurityError\",\n\n            \"message\": \"Set WIRESHARK_MCP_ALLOWED_DIRS before using file-write operations\"\n\n        }\n\n    })\n\n```\n\n---\n\n## Workarounds\n\nSet `WIRESHARK_MCP_ALLOWED_DIRS` to a restricted safe directory before starting the server:\n\n```bash\n\nexport WIRESHARK_MCP_ALLOWED_DIRS=/tmp/wireshark_mcp_safe\n\n```\n\nThis activates the existing sandbox and blocks writes outside the allowed path.\n\n---\n\n## Resources\n\n- Vulnerable code:\n\n  - `src/wireshark_mcp/tshark/client.py` lines 521\u2013543\n\n  - `src/wireshark_mcp/tshark/client.py` lines 685\u2013839\n\n- CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory\n\n- CWE-73: External Control of File Name or Path",
  "id": "GHSA-3r68-x3xc-rxpg",
  "modified": "2026-05-13T15:20:15Z",
  "published": "2026-05-05T20:15:12Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/bx33661/Wireshark-MCP/security/advisories/GHSA-3r68-x3xc-rxpg"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-43901"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/bx33661/Wireshark-MCP"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "wireshark-mcp vulnerable to arbitrary file write via export_objects when WIRESHARK_MCP_ALLOWED_DIRS is not configured"
}


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