GHSA-3JFQ-G458-7QM9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-08-03 19:06 – Updated: 2021-08-30 23:14Impact
Arbitrary File Creation, Arbitrary File Overwrite, Arbitrary Code Execution
node-tar aims to prevent extraction of absolute file paths by turning absolute paths into relative paths when the preservePaths flag is not set to true. This is achieved by stripping the absolute path root from any absolute file paths contained in a tar file. For example /home/user/.bashrc would turn into home/user/.bashrc.
This logic was insufficient when file paths contained repeated path roots such as ////home/user/.bashrc. node-tar would only strip a single path root from such paths. When given an absolute file path with repeating path roots, the resulting path (e.g. ///home/user/.bashrc) would still resolve to an absolute path, thus allowing arbitrary file creation and overwrite.
Patches
3.2.2 || 4.4.14 || 5.0.6 || 6.1.1
NOTE: an adjacent issue CVE-2021-32803 affects this release level. Please ensure you update to the latest patch levels that address CVE-2021-32803 as well if this adjacent issue affects your node-tar use case.
Workarounds
Users may work around this vulnerability without upgrading by creating a custom onentry method which sanitizes the entry.path or a filter method which removes entries with absolute paths.
const path = require('path')
const tar = require('tar')
tar.x({
file: 'archive.tgz',
// either add this function...
onentry: (entry) => {
if (path.isAbsolute(entry.path)) {
entry.path = sanitizeAbsolutePathSomehow(entry.path)
entry.absolute = path.resolve(entry.path)
}
},
// or this one
filter: (file, entry) => {
if (path.isAbsolute(entry.path)) {
return false
} else {
return true
}
}
})
Users are encouraged to upgrade to the latest patch versions, rather than attempt to sanitize tar input themselves.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "tar"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.2.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "tar"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.4.14"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "tar"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "5.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.0.6"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "tar"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "6.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.1.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-32804"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2021-08-03T19:06:15Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2021-08-03T19:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nArbitrary File Creation, Arbitrary File Overwrite, Arbitrary Code Execution\n\n`node-tar` aims to prevent extraction of absolute file paths by turning absolute paths into relative paths when the `preservePaths` flag is not set to `true`. This is achieved by stripping the absolute path root from any absolute file paths contained in a tar file. For example `/home/user/.bashrc` would turn into `home/user/.bashrc`. \n\nThis logic was insufficient when file paths contained repeated path roots such as `////home/user/.bashrc`. `node-tar` would only strip a single path root from such paths. When given an absolute file path with repeating path roots, the resulting path (e.g. `///home/user/.bashrc`) would still resolve to an absolute path, thus allowing arbitrary file creation and overwrite. \n\n### Patches\n\n3.2.2 || 4.4.14 || 5.0.6 || 6.1.1\n\nNOTE: an adjacent issue [CVE-2021-32803](https://github.com/npm/node-tar/security/advisories/GHSA-r628-mhmh-qjhw) affects this release level. Please ensure you update to the latest patch levels that address CVE-2021-32803 as well if this adjacent issue affects your `node-tar` use case.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nUsers may work around this vulnerability without upgrading by creating a custom `onentry` method which sanitizes the `entry.path` or a `filter` method which removes entries with absolute paths.\n\n```js\nconst path = require(\u0027path\u0027)\nconst tar = require(\u0027tar\u0027)\n\ntar.x({\n file: \u0027archive.tgz\u0027,\n // either add this function...\n onentry: (entry) =\u003e {\n if (path.isAbsolute(entry.path)) {\n entry.path = sanitizeAbsolutePathSomehow(entry.path)\n entry.absolute = path.resolve(entry.path)\n }\n },\n\n // or this one\n filter: (file, entry) =\u003e {\n if (path.isAbsolute(entry.path)) {\n return false\n } else {\n return true\n }\n }\n})\n```\n\nUsers are encouraged to upgrade to the latest patch versions, rather than attempt to sanitize tar input themselves.",
"id": "GHSA-3jfq-g458-7qm9",
"modified": "2021-08-30T23:14:50Z",
"published": "2021-08-03T19:06:36Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/npm/node-tar/security/advisories/GHSA-3jfq-g458-7qm9"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-32804"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/npm/node-tar/commit/1f036ca23f64a547bdd6c79c1a44bc62e8115da4"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/pdf/ssa-389290.pdf"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/npm/node-tar"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/advisories/1770"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/tar"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/cpuoct2021.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Arbitrary File Creation/Overwrite due to insufficient absolute path sanitization"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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Related by attack behaviour
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